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Foreword  Court of Justice
Foreword
For the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2010 was a year of consolidation of the reforms to 
the European Union’s judicial system that were introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The procedure 
to implement the most important of those reforms, namely the accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, was embarked upon in 2010. The Court of Justice has 
followed and will continue to follow this procedure closely as it progresses.
The past year will also be remembered for the unflagging tempo of the institution’s judicial activity. 
It may be noted, in this connection, that a total of 1 406 cases were brought before the three courts 
comprising the Court of Justice; this figure is the highest in the institution’s history and reflects the 
constant increase in the volume of European Union litigation. In addition, the overall decrease in 
the duration of proceedings is worthy of mention, a decrease that is very significant especially in 
preliminary ruling proceedings.
The past year also saw the departure of two members and the registrar of the Court of Justice and 
of four members of the General Court, partly as a result of the renewal of the General Court’s mem-
bership. The new members of the Court of Justice and the General Court are the first to have been 
appointed under the new procedure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, that is to say, following an 
opinion of the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU.
This report provides a full record of changes affecting the institution and of its work in 2010. As is 
the case every year, a substantial part of the report is devoted to succinct but exhaustive accounts 
of the main judicial activity of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribu-
nal. Separate statistics for each court supplement and illustrate the analysis of the judicial activity 
during 2010.
V. Skouris
President of the Court of JusticeChapter I
The Court of JusticeAnnual Report 2010  9
Changes and activity  Court of Justice
A — The Court of Justice in 2010: changes and activity
By Mr Vassilios Skouris, President of the Court of Justice
The first part of the Annual Report gives an overview of the activities of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in 2010. It describes, first, how the institution evolved during the past year, with 
the emphasis on the institutional changes affecting the Court of Justice and developments relating 
to its internal organisation and working methods. It includes, second, an analysis of the statistics 
relating to changes in the Court of Justice’s workload and in the average duration of proceedings. 
It presents, third, as each year, the main developments in the case-law, arranged by subject-matter.
1. Since the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the European Union is to accede to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR), the procedure 
for bringing about its accession was begun in 2010. The first stage of that procedure was conclud-
ed and a negotiating mandate was given to the European Commission to pursue negotiations with 
the Council of Europe. The accession of the European Union to the ECHR will incontestably have 
effects upon the European Union’s judicial system as a whole.
For this reason, the Court of Justice has followed that procedure closely as it progresses and, with 
a view to contributing to the efforts being made to bring to fruition the proposed accession, which 
raises complex legal questions, it submitted its initial reflections on a particular aspect linked 
to the way in which the European Union’s judicial system functions, in a document published 
on 5 May 2010 (1). In this document, the Court concluded that, in order to observe the principle of 
subsidiarity which is inherent in the ECHR and at the same time to ensure the proper functioning 
of the judicial system of the European Union, a mechanism must be available which is capable of 
ensuring that the question of the validity of a European Union act can be brought effectively be-
fore the Court of Justice before the European Court of Human Rights rules on the compatibility of 
that act with the ECHR.
Finally, the amendments made to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice on 23 March 2010 
(OJ 2010 L 92, p. 2) are also worthy of mention. These amendments are intended to make the 
changes to the Rules of Procedure that became necessary following the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.
2. The statistics concerning the Court’s activity in 2010 show, overall, sustained productivity and 
a very significant improvement in efficiency as regards the duration of proceedings. The unprec-
edented increase in the number of cases brought in 2010, in particular the number of references 
for a preliminary ruling submitted to the Court, is also to be noted.
The Court completed 522 cases in 2010 (net figures, that is to say, taking account of the joinder of 
cases), a slight decrease compared with the previous year (543 cases completed in 2009). Of those 
cases, 370 were dealt with by judgments and 152 gave rise to orders.
In 2010, the Court had 631 new cases brought before it (without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity), which amounts to a very significant increase com-
pared with 2009 (562 new cases) and constitutes the highest number of cases brought in the 
Court’s history. The situation is identical as regards references for a preliminary ruling. In 2010 the 
number of references for a preliminary ruling submitted was, for the second year in succession, the 
(1)  http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en_2010-05-21_12-10-16_272.pdf10  Annual Report 2010
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highest ever reached, and it exceeded the number in 2009 by 27.4% (385 cases in 2010 compared 
with 302 cases in 2009).
So far as concerns the duration of proceedings, the statistics prove very positive. In the case of 
references for a preliminary ruling, the average duration amounted to 16.1 months. A comparative 
analysis covering the entire period for which the Court has reliable statistical data shows that the 
average time taken to deal with references for a preliminary ruling reached its shortest in 2010. 
The average time taken to deal with direct actions and appeals was 16.7 months and 14.3 months 
respectively (compared with 17.1 months and 15.4 months in 2009).
In addition to the reforms in its working methods that have been undertaken in recent years, the 
improvement in the Court’s efficiency in dealing with cases is also due to the wider use of the vari-
ous procedural instruments at its disposal to expedite the handling of certain cases, in particular 
the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, priority treatment, the accelerated or expedited proce-
dure, the simplified procedure and the possibility of giving judgment without an opinion of the 
Advocate General.
In 2010, use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure was requested in six cases and the desig-
nated chamber considered that the conditions under Article 104b of the Rules of Procedure were 
met in five of them. Those cases were completed in an average period of 2.1 months.
Use of the expedited or accelerated procedure was requested 12 times in 2010, but the condi-
tions under the Rules of Procedure were met in only four of those cases. Following a practice es-
tablished in 2004, requests for the use of the expedited or accelerated procedure are granted or 
refused by reasoned order of the President of the Court. In addition, priority treatment was granted 
in 14 cases.
The Court also continued to use the simplified procedure laid down in Article 104(3) of the Rules 
of Procedure to answer certain questions referred to it for a preliminary ruling. A total of 24 cases 
were brought to a close by orders made on the basis of that provision.
Finally, the Court made frequent use of the possibility offered by Article 20 of its Statute of deter-
mining cases without an opinion of the Advocate General where they do not raise any new point 
of law. About 50% of the judgments delivered in 2010 were delivered without an opinion (com-
pared with 52% in 2009).
As regards the distribution of cases between the various formations of the Court, it may be noted 
that the Grand Chamber dealt with roughly 14%, chambers of five judges with 58%, and chambers 
of three judges with approximately 27%, of the cases brought to a close by judgments or by or-
ders involving a judicial determination in 2010. Compared with the previous year, a considerable 
increase may be noted in the proportion of cases dealt with by the Grand Chamber (8% in 2009), 
while the proportion of cases dealt with by three-judge chambers decreased significantly (34% 
in 2009).
The section of this report devoted to statistics concerning the Court’s judicial activity should be 
consulted for more detailed information regarding the statistics for 2010.Annual Report 2010  11
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B — Case-law of the Court of Justice in 2010
This section of the Annual Report provides an overview of the case-law in 2010.
Constitutional or institutional issues
In 2010, significant additions were made to the case-law on fundamental rights.
In Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert (judgment of 9 Novem-
ber 2010), the Court had the opportunity to explain the requirements flowing from the right to 
the protection of personal data when it was called upon to review the validity of Regulations (EC) 
Nos 1290/2005 and 259/2008 (1) governing the financing of the common agricultural policy and 
requiring the publication of information on natural persons who receive aid from the European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD). Those regulations required such information to be made available to the public, in partic-
ular through websites operated by the national offices. Asked to give a preliminary ruling concern-
ing the relationship between the right, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, to the protection of personal data and the obligation of transparency in relation 
to European funds, the Court stated that publication on a website of data naming the beneficiaries 
of the funds and indicating the precise amounts received by them constitutes, because the site is 
freely accessible to third parties, an interference with the right of the beneficiaries concerned to 
respect for their private life in general and to the protection of their personal data in particular. In 
order to be justified, such interference must be provided for by law, respect the essence of those 
rights and, pursuant to the principle of proportionality, be necessary and genuinely meet objec-
tives of general interest recognised by the European Union, whilst derogations from and limita-
tions on those rights must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary. In this context, the Court 
held that, whilst in a democratic society taxpayers have a right to be kept informed of the use of 
public funds, the Council and the Commission were nevertheless required to strike a proper bal-
ance between the various interests involved, and it was therefore necessary, before adopting the 
contested provisions, to ascertain whether publication of the data via a single website in a Member 
State went beyond what was necessary for achieving the legitimate aims pursued. The Court thus 
declared certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005, and Regulation (EC) No 259/2008 in 
its entirety, to be invalid, without prejudice to the effects of the publication of the lists of benefici-
aries of EAGF and EAFRD aid carried out by the national authorities during the period prior to the 
date on which the judgment was delivered.
The Court delivered on 22 December 2010, in Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und 
Beratungsgesellschaft, another important judgment in the field of fundamental rights, concerning 
the interpretation of the principle of effective judicial protection as enshrined in Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The main proceedings were brought by the German commercial company DEB against the Ger-
man State and concerned an application for legal aid submitted by that company to the German 
courts. DEB wished to bring an action for damages against the German State in order to obtain 
(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ 2005 L 209, p. 1), 
as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1437/2007 of 26 November 2007 (OJ 2007 L 322, p. 1), and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 259/2008 of 18 March 2008 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 as regards 
the publication of information on the beneficiaries of funds deriving from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) 
and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2008 L 76, p. 28).12  Annual Report 2010
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compensation for the damage allegedly caused to it by that Member State’s delay in the transposi-
tion of Directive 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (2). It was 
refused legal aid, on the ground that the conditions laid down by German law for the grant of such 
aid to legal persons were not met. The court called upon to decide the appeal brought against that 
refusal submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, in order to ascertain 
whether the principle of effectiveness of European Union law precludes, in the context of a proce-
dure for pursuing a claim seeking to establish State liability under European Union law, a national 
rule under which the pursuit of a claim before the courts is subject to the making of an advance 
payment in respect of costs and which limits the grant of legal aid to a legal person that is unable to 
make that advance payment, by requiring compliance with very stringent conditions.
The Court stated that, in answering that question, account has to be taken of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union which, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, has 
acquired the same legal value as the Treaties. More specifically, the Court referred to Article 47 of 
the Charter which provides for a right of effective access to justice for any persons wishing to assert 
the rights and freedoms that they are guaranteed by European Union law. The third paragraph of 
Article 47 states that ‘legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so 
far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice’. The Court held, first, that it is not 
impossible for the principle of effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, 
to be relied upon by legal persons to obtain dispensation from advance payment of the costs of 
proceedings and/or the assistance of a lawyer. Next, the Court explained, in light of the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which enshrines the right of effective access to justice, 
that it is for the national court to ascertain, first, whether the conditions for granting legal aid con-
stitute a limitation on the right of access to the courts which is liable to undermine the very core of 
that right, second, whether those conditions pursue a legitimate aim and, finally, whether there is 
a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aim 
which it is sought to achieve. The Court then detailed the factors that the national court may take 
into account, taking up the factors used in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
inter alia the importance of what is at stake, the complexity of the applicable law and procedure 
and, with regard more specifically to legal persons, their form and whether they are profit-making 
or non-profit-making as well as the financial capacity of the partners or shareholders.
The manner in which a national court must implement State liability where the State infringes its 
Community obligations continues to give rise to questions.
In Case C-118/08 Trasportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (judgment of 26 January 2010), the refer-
ring court wished to ascertain the Court’s position regarding application of a rule under which an 
action for damages against the State, alleging a breach of European Union law by national legisla-
tion, can succeed only if domestic remedies are exhausted, when such a rule is not applicable to 
an action for damages against the State alleging breach of the Constitution. After recalling the 
principles governing the Member States’ obligation to make reparation in the event of breach of 
European Union law, an obligation which arises by virtue of the latter’s primacy, the Court replied 
that European Union law precludes the application of such a rule. Relying on the principle of equiv-
alence, it held that all the rules applicable to actions are to apply without distinction to an action 
alleging infringement of European Union law and to an action alleging infringement of national 
law: the purpose of the two actions for damages is similar since they seek compensation for the 
loss suffered as a result of conduct of the State. In light of the principle of equivalence, the sole 
(2)  Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 (OJ 1998 L 204, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  13
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difference, relating to the court having jurisdiction to find the breach of law, is not sufficient to 
establish a distinction between those two actions.
In Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli (judgment of 22 June 2010), the Court 
had the opportunity to rule on whether the ‘priority question on constitutionality’, a procedural 
mechanism recently introduced in France, is compatible with European Union law. The Court re-
called that, in order to ensure the primacy of European Union law, the functioning of the system 
of cooperation between it and national courts requires a national court to be free to refer to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling any question that it considers necessary, at whatever stage of the 
proceedings it considers appropriate, even at the end of an interlocutory procedure for the review 
of constitutionality. Accordingly, Article 267 TFEU does not preclude national legislation which es-
tablishes an interlocutory procedure for the review of the constitutionality of national laws, in so 
far as the other national courts or tribunals remain free to:
— make a reference to the Court at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate,  
even at the end of the interlocutory procedure for the review of constitutionality;
— adopt any measure necessary to ensure provisional judicial protection of the rights conferred                                     
under the European Union legal order; and
— disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the national legislative provision at is       
sue if they consider it to be contrary to European Union law.
With regard to the issue, broached many times already, of the consequences attaching to an interpre-
tation of European Union law that the Court provides when exercising its jurisdiction to give prelimi-
nary rulings, Case C-242/09 Albron Catering (judgment of 21 October 2010) provided the opportunity 
for the Court to recall that, when exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 267 TFEU, it is 
only exceptionally that it may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the 
legal order of the European Union, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity 
of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relation-
ships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can 
be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be 
a risk of serious difficulties. Accordingly, the Court held that, since it had not been presented with 
any concrete evidence capable of establishing a risk of serious difficulties in connection with mas-
sive litigation which might following the judgment — which relates to the interpretation of Direc-
tive 2001/23/EC (3) — be brought against undertakings which had carried out a transfer covered by 
the directive, it was not appropriate to limit in time the effects of the judgment.
With regard to the contribution made by the Court in defining the effects of agreements conclud-
ed by the European Union with non-member countries, Case C-386/08 Brita (judgment of 25 Feb-
ruary 2010) may be noted, in which several important questions relating to the interpretation of 
international agreements, in particular the EC–Israel Association Agreement (4), were raised.
(3)  Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safe-
guarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses 
(OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16).
(4)  Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, signed in Brussels on 20 November 1995 (OJ 2000 L 147, p. 3).14  Annual Report 2010
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The Court explained that the rules laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (5) 
apply to an agreement concluded between a State and an international organisation, such as the 
EC–Israel Association Agreement, in so far as the rules are an expression of general customary 
international law. In particular, the provisions of the association agreement which define its territo-
rial scope must be interpreted in accordance with the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. 
In light of those principles, the Court held that the customs authorities of an importing Member 
State may refuse to grant the preferential treatment provided for under the EC–Israel Association 
Agreement to goods that originate in the West Bank. It follows from another association agree-
ment, the EC–PLO Association Agreement (6), that if the products concerned can be regarded as 
products originating in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, the customs authorities of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip have sole competence to issue a movement certificate. To interpret the EC–Israel As-
sociation Agreement as meaning that the Israeli customs authorities enjoy competence in respect 
of products originating in the West Bank would be tantamount to imposing on the Palestinian 
customs authorities an obligation to refrain from exercising the competence conferred upon them 
by virtue of the provisions of the EC–PLO agreement. Such an interpretation would have the effect 
of creating an obligation for a third party without its consent and would thus be contrary to the 
abovementioned principle of general international law, pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, consoli-
dated by the Vienna Convention.
In addition, the Court stated that, for the purposes of the procedure laid down by the EC–Israel As-
sociation Agreement, the customs authorities of the importing State are not bound by the proof 
of origin submitted or by the reply given by the customs authorities of the exporting State where 
that reply does not contain sufficient information to enable the real origin of the products to be 
determined.
As in previous years, access to documents of the institutions generated litigation and three judg-
ments are particularly worthy of note. In Case C-28/08 P Commission v Bavarian Lager (judgment 
of 29 June 2010), the Court considered the relationship between Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (7) 
and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (8).
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 lays down as a general rule that the public may have access to the 
documents of the institutions, but provides for exceptions, including where disclosure would un-
dermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual in accordance with European 
Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data. According to the Court, where a re-
quest based on Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 seeks to obtain access to documents including per-
sonal data, the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 become applicable in their entirety. By 
not taking account of this reference to the European Union legislation concerning the protection 
of personal data and by limiting the application of the exception to situations in which privacy 
or the integrity of the individual would be infringed for the purposes of Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case-law of 
(5)  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331).
(6)  Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one 
part, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, of the other part, signed in Brussels on 24 February 1997 (OJ 1997 L 187, p. 3).
(7)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to Eu-
ropean Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).
(8)  Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement 
of such data (OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  15
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the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of First Instance (now ‘the General Court’) gave 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 a particular and restrictive interpretation which does not corre-
spond to the equilibrium which the European Union legislature intended to establish between the 
two regulations in question.
On the substance, the Court held that the Commission rightly decided that the list of participants 
at a meeting held in the context of a procedure for failure to fulfil obligations contained personal 
data and that, in requiring, for persons who had not given their express consent, that the person 
requesting access establish the necessity of having those personal data transferred, the Commis-
sion complied with Article 8(b) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.
On the same day, the Court delivered another very important judgment on access to documents 
(judgment of 29 June 2010 in Case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau), this 
time concerning the relationship between Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and Regulation (EC) 
No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (9). The 
Court held that, in order to justify refusal of access to a document the disclosure of which has been 
requested, it is not sufficient, in principle, for that document to fall within an activity mentioned in 
Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The institution concerned must also supply explana-
tions as to how access to the document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest 
protected by an exception laid down in that article. The Court stated, however, that it is, in princi-
ple, open to the Community institution to base its decisions on general presumptions which apply 
to certain categories of documents.
As regards procedures for reviewing State aid, such presumptions may arise from Regulation (EC) 
No 659/1999 and from the case-law concerning the right to consult documents on the Commis-
sion’s administrative file. Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 does not lay down any right of access to 
documents in the Commission’s administrative file for interested parties, with the exception of 
the Member State responsible for granting the aid. If those interested parties were able to ob-
tain access to the documents in the Commission’s administrative file on the basis of Regulation 
(EC) No 1049/2001, the system for the review of State aid would be called into question. Account 
should be taken of the fact that, in the procedures for reviewing State aid, interested parties other 
than the Member State concerned do not have the right to consult the documents in the Commis-
sion’s administrative file and the existence of a general presumption that disclosure of documents 
in the administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objectives of investigation ac-
tivities should therefore be acknowledged. That general presumption does not exclude the right of 
interested parties to demonstrate that a given document disclosure of which has been requested 
is not covered by the presumption, or that there is a higher public interest justifying the disclosure 
of the document concerned by virtue of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
A  presumption  mechanism  of  that  kind  was  also  at  the  heart  of  Joined  Cases  C-514/07  P, 
C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden v API et Commission (judgment of 21 September 2010), in 
which the Court considered the question of access to pleadings lodged before it by an institution 
in court proceedings. According to the Court, such pleadings display quite specific characteristics 
since they are inherently part of the judicial activities of the Court: they are drafted exclusively 
for the purposes of the court proceedings, in which they play the key role. Judicial activities are 
as such excluded from the scope, established by the European Union rules, of the right of access 
to documents. The protection of court proceedings implies, in particular, that compliance with 
(9)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).16  Annual Report 2010
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the principles of equality of arms and the sound administration of justice must be ensured. If the 
content of the institution’s pleadings were to be open to public debate, there would be a danger 
that the criticism levelled against them might influence the position defended by the institution. 
Such a situation could well upset the vital balance between the parties to a dispute before the 
courts of the European Union since only the institution concerned by an application for access to 
its documents, and not all the parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the obligation of 
disclosure. Furthermore, the exclusion of judicial activities from the scope of the right of access to 
documents is justified in the light of the need to ensure that, throughout the court proceedings, 
the exchange of argument by the parties and the deliberations take place in an atmosphere of 
total serenity. Disclosure of the pleadings would have the effect of exposing judicial activities to 
external pressure, albeit only in the perception of the public, and would disturb the serenity of the 
proceedings. Consequently, the Court held that there is a general presumption that disclosure of 
the pleadings lodged by one of the institutions in court proceedings would undermine the protec-
tion of those proceedings, for the purposes of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001, while those proceedings remain pending, but such a general presumption does not 
exclude the right of an interested party to demonstrate that a given document is not covered by 
the presumption.
On the other hand, where the judicial activities of the Court have come to an end, there are no 
longer grounds for presuming that disclosure of the pleadings would undermine those activities, 
and a specific examination of the documents to which access is requested is then necessary to 
establish whether their disclosure may be refused on the basis of the second indent of Article 4(2) 
of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
European citizenship
In this constantly developing field, Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis (judgment of 23 November 2010) 
raised before the Court the difficult issue of the conditions for expulsion of a citizen of the Un-
ion who has a right of permanent residence under Article 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC on freedom 
of movement and residence (10). The Court stated first of all that an expulsion measure must be 
founded on an individual examination of the situation of the person concerned, taking into ac-
count considerations such as his age, his state of health, the centre of his personal, family or occu-
pational interests, the duration of his absences from the host Member State and the extent of his 
links with the country of origin, whilst the decisive criterion for the grant of enhanced protection 
against an expulsion measure remains that of residence in the host Member State for the 10 years 
preceding such a measure. The Court further pointed out that an expulsion measure can be justi-
fied on ‘imperative grounds of public security’ or ‘serious grounds of public policy or public security’ 
within the meaning of Article 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC only if, having regard to the exceptional 
seriousness of the threat, such a measure is necessary for the protection of the interests it aims to 
secure, provided that that objective cannot be attained by less restrictive means, having regard 
to the length of residence of the Union citizen in the host Member State. Finally, the Court also 
noted that the fight against crime in connection with dealing in narcotics as part of an organised 
group, the offence of which the person concerned was convicted, is capable of being covered by 
the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ or ‘serious grounds of public policy or public 
security’ within the meaning of Article 28 of the directive.
(10)  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and 
repealing  Directives  64/221/EEC,  68/360/EEC,  72/194/EEC,  73/148/EEC,  75/34/EEC,  75/35/EEC,  90/364/EEC,  90/365/EEC 
and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda at OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34).Annual Report 2010  17
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Staying with the issue of the rights of free movement and residence that are attached to Euro-
pean citizenship, Case C-73/08 Bressol and Others (judgment of 13 April 2010) should be noted, 
in which the Court considered whether national legislation limiting the number of students on 
university medical and paramedical courses who, whilst being citizens of the Union, are regarded 
as non-residents is compatible with European Union law. The Court stated first that, irrespective 
of any application of Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC to the situation of some of the students at 
issue in the main proceedings, national legislation which limits the number of students regarded 
as non-resident in the host Member State who may enrol for the first time at higher education es-
tablishments is contrary to Articles 18 and 21 of the Treaty, since the legislation results in unequal 
treatment between resident and non-resident students and, therefore, in discrimination based in-
directly on nationality. Second, the Court observed that restrictive legislation of that kind can be 
justified by the objective of protecting public health only if the competent authorities conduct 
a detailed three-stage examination of the legislation in question: they must establish that there 
are genuine risks to the objective pursued, that the legislation is appropriate for attaining that 
objective and that the legislation is proportionate to that objective, and the entire analysis must 
be based on objective and detailed criteria and supported by figures. Finally, the Court stated that 
the national authorities would be unable to rely on Article 13 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 Decem-
ber 1966, if the referring court were to hold that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is 
not compatible with Articles 18 and 21 TFEU.
In Case C-162/09 Lassal (judgment of 7 October 2010), the Court devoted attention to Article 16 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC. More specifically, the reference for a preliminary ruling related to wheth-
er, for the purposes of acquisition of the right of permanent residence provided for in Article 16, 
a continuous period of five years’ residence completed before 30 April 2006 — the date for trans-
position of that directive — in accordance with earlier instruments of European Union law must be 
taken into account and, if so, whether temporary absences which occurred before 30 April 2006, 
but after the continuous period of five years’ legal residence, prevent a right of permanent resi-
dence within the meaning of the directive from being obtained. The Court answered the first part 
of the question in the affirmative, holding that, even though the possibility of obtaining a right 
of residence subject to compliance with the five-year period did not appear in the instruments 
of European Union law prior to Directive 2004/38/EC, refusal to take account of that continuous 
period of residence would entirely deprive the directive of its effectiveness and would give rise to 
a situation that is incompatible with the idea behind the directive of integration through length 
of residence. The Court held, second, that the objectives and the purpose of Directive 2004/38/EC, 
which is intended in particular to facilitate the exercise of the primary right to move and reside 
freely on the territory of the Member States, to promote social cohesion and to strengthen the 
feeling of Union citizenship by means of the right of residence, would be seriously compromised 
if that right of residence were refused to citizens of the Union who had legally resided in the host 
Member State for a continuous period of five years completed before 30 April 2006, on the sole 
ground that there had been temporary absence of less than two consecutive years subsequent to 
that period but before that date.
The  account  of  the  case-law  relating  to  European  citizenship  will  be  concluded  by  Case 
C-135/08 Rottmann (judgment of 2 March 2010), in which the Court ruled on the conditions under 
which a European citizen who has acquired by means of deception nationality of a Member State 
by naturalisation may have that nationality withdrawn. According to the Court, European Union 
law, in particular Article 17 EC, does not preclude a Member State from withdrawing from a citizen 
of the Union nationality acquired by naturalisation when that nationality has been obtained by 
deception, since the decision withdrawing nationality corresponds to a reason in the public inter-
est by reason of the deception which breaks the tie of nationality between the Member State and 18  Annual Report 2010
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its national. Nevertheless, the withdrawal decision must observe the principle of proportionality. 
Where, as in the case in point, the citizen who practised the deception has already lost his national-
ity of origin because of the naturalisation, the national courts have the task of examining the con-
sequences that the withdrawal decision entails for the person concerned and for the members of 
his family and, in particular, of assessing whether the loss of the rights enjoyed by a Union citizen 
is justified having regard to the gravity of the offence committed by the person concerned, to the 
lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision and to whether 
it might be possible for that person to recover his nationality of origin. Loss of the nationality of 
origin and loss of the nationality of naturalisation are therefore not incompatible in principle with 
European Union law even though the decision withdrawing nationality results in the loss of citi-
zenship of the European Union.
Free movement of goods
In Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika (judgment of 2 December 2010), the Court held that national legisla-
tion prohibiting the sale of contact lenses from other Member States via the Internet and their 
delivery to the consumer’s home deprives traders from other Member States of a particularly ef-
fective means of selling those products and thus significantly impedes their access to the national 
market; it therefore constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods. The Court accepted 
that a Member State may impose a requirement that contact lenses are to be supplied by quali-
fied staff, capable of providing the customer with information on the correct use and care of those 
products and on the risks linked to wearing them. Allowing contact lenses to be supplied only by 
opticians’ shops which offer the services of a qualified optician secures the attainment of the objec-
tive of ensuring protection of consumers’ health. The Court observed, however, that those services 
can also be supplied by ophthalmologists in places other than opticians’ shops. Furthermore, those 
services are required, as a general rule, only when contact lenses are first supplied. At the time of 
subsequent supplies, it is sufficient that the customer advise the seller of the type of lenses which 
were provided when lenses were first supplied and of any change in his vision recorded by an oph-
thalmologist. The Court accordingly held that the objective of ensuring protection of the health of 
users of contact lenses can be achieved by measures less restrictive than those provided for under 
the national legislation at issue. Consequently, such a prohibition on selling contact lenses via the 
Internet is not proportionate to the objective of ensuring the protection of public health and is 
thus contrary to the rules governing the free movement of goods.
Free movement of persons, services and capital
In 2010 the Court again delivered a large number of judgments concerning freedom of establish-
ment, the freedom to provide services, the free movement of capital and freedom of movement for 
workers. In the interests of clarity, the judgments chosen will be grouped together on the basis of 
the freedom with which they deal and then, where appropriate, of the fields of activity concerned.
With regard to freedom of establishment, Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and 
Chao Gómez (judgment of 1 June 2010) should be mentioned, which involved Spanish legisla-
tion requiring prior administrative authorisation to be obtained for the opening of new pharma-
cies in a given area. More specifically, grant of such a licence was tied to conditions relating to 
population density and the minimum distance between pharmacies in the area concerned. The 
Court held that Article 49 TFEU does not preclude such legislation in principle. According to the 
Court, a Member State might see a risk that some parts of its territory will be left with too few 
pharmacies and that, as a consequence, the provision of medicinal products might well not be 
reliable and of good quality. Accordingly, that State may, in view of the risk, adopt legislation 
under which only one pharmacy may be set up in relation to a certain number of inhabitants, so Annual Report 2010  19
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as to distribute pharmacies evenly throughout the national territory. The Court stated, however, 
that Article 49 TFEU precludes such legislation in so far as it prevents, in any geographical area 
which has special demographic features, the establishment of a sufficient number of pharma-
cies to ensure adequate pharmaceutical services, that being a matter for the national court to 
ascertain. In addition, the Court held that 49 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) and (2) 
of Directive 85/432/EEC concerning the coordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in respect of certain activities in the field of pharmacy and Article 45(2)
(e) and (g) of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, precludes 
criteria, provided for in national legislation, for the selection of licensees for new pharmacies un-
der which, first, points for professional qualifications are to be increased by 20% in the case of 
professional experience within a specified part of the national territory and, second, in the event 
that several candidates score an equal number of points on the scale, licences are to be granted 
in accordance with an order of priority in which precedence is given to pharmacists who have 
pursued their professional activities within that part of the national territory, since such criteria 
can obviously be more easily met by national pharmacists.
The principle of freedom of establishment was also the subject of a number of tax judgments. 
These include, first, Case C-337/08 X Holding (judgment of 25 February 2010), in which the Court 
held that Articles 43 EC and 48 EC do not preclude legislation of a Member State which makes it 
possible for a parent company to form a single tax entity with its resident subsidiary, but which 
prevents the formation of such a single tax entity with a non-resident subsidiary, in that the profits 
of that non-resident subsidiary are not subject to the fiscal legislation of that Member State. Ac-
cording to the Court, such a tax scheme is justified in view of the need to safeguard the allocation 
of the power to impose taxes between the Member States. Since the parent company is at liberty 
to decide to form a tax entity with its subsidiary and, with equal liberty, to dissolve such an en-
tity from one year to the next, the possibility of including a non-resident subsidiary in the single 
tax entity would be tantamount to granting the parent company the freedom to choose the tax 
scheme applicable to the losses of that subsidiary and the place where those losses are taken into 
account. In addition, the fact that a Member State decides to permit the temporary offsetting of 
losses incurred by a foreign permanent establishment at the place of the company’s registered 
office does not mean that that possibility must also be extended to non-resident subsidiaries of 
a resident parent company. As permanent establishments situated in another Member State and 
non-resident subsidiaries are not in a comparable situation with regard to the allocation of the 
power of taxation, the Member State of origin is not obliged to apply the same tax scheme to non-
resident subsidiaries as that which it applies to foreign permanent establishments.
Second, Case C-440/08 Gielen (judgment of 18 March 2010) is to be noted, concerning the grant, 
by the Netherlands’ income tax legislation, of a deduction for self-employed persons having per-
formed a certain number of hours’ work as a business operator. That legislation provided, however, 
that hours worked by non-resident taxable persons for an establishment situated in another Mem-
ber State were not taken into account for that purpose. According to the Court, Article 49 TFEU 
precludes such legislation, which is discriminatory towards non-resident taxable persons, even if 
those taxable persons may opt for the regime applicable to resident taxable persons in order to 
benefit from that tax advantage. With regard to the last point, the Court stated that the existence 
of indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality for the purposes of Article 49 TFEU is not called 
into question by the fact that an option to be treated as a resident taxable person is available to 
non-resident taxable persons, enabling them to choose between the discriminatory tax regime 
and that applicable to residents, since such a choice is not capable of remedying the discrimina-
tory effects of the first of those two tax regimes. If such a choice were to be recognised as having 
that effect, the consequence would be to validate a tax regime which, in itself, remains contrary to 
Article 49 TFEU by reason of its discriminatory nature. In addition, the fact that a national scheme 20  Annual Report 2010
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which restricts the freedom of establishment is optional does not mean that it is not incompatible 
with European Union law.
A third tax judgment delivered by the Court, relating, this time, to the freedom to provide servic-
es, should also be mentioned. In Case C-97/09 Schmelz (judgment of 26 October 2010), the Court 
was led to review the compatibility with Article 49 EC of the special scheme for small undertak-
ings provided for in Articles 24(3) and 28i of sixth Directive 77/388/EC (11) and in Article 283(1)
(c) of Directive 2006/112/EC (12), which allow Member States to grant an exemption from value 
added tax, with loss of the right of deduction, to small undertakings established in their territory, 
but exclude that possibility for small undertakings established in other Member States. Accord-
ing to the Court, although that scheme constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide serv-
ices, at this stage in the evolution of the system of value added tax the objective which consists 
in guaranteeing the effectiveness of fiscal supervision in order to combat possible tax evasion, 
avoidance and abuse and the objective of the scheme for small undertakings, which is to support 
the competitiveness of such undertakings, nevertheless justify limiting the applicability of the 
exemption from value added tax to the activities of small undertakings established in the terri-
tory of the Member State in which the tax is due. In particular, effective supervision of activities 
pursued under the freedom to provide services of a small undertaking which is not established in 
that territory is not at all easy for the host Member State. Furthermore, the rules on administrative 
assistance laid down by Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 on administrative cooperation in the field 
of value added tax and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 (13) and by Directive 77/799/EEC (14) 
are not capable of ensuring an exchange of useful data in relation to small undertakings pursu-
ing their activities in the territory of a Member State which applies a value-added-tax exemption. 
Therefore, according to the Court, Article 49 EC does not preclude such a scheme.
In the case of the freedom to provide services, the Court delivered a large number of judgments 
in a wide variety of areas, including those of public health, the posting of workers and games of 
chance.
First, in Case C-512/08 Commission v France (judgment of 5 October 2010), the Court held that 
a Member State whose national legislation requires — except in special situations relating, in par-
ticular, to the insured person’s state of health or to the urgency of the treatment needed — prior 
authorisation in order for the competent institution to be responsible for payment, in accordance 
with the rules governing cover in force in the Member State to which it belongs, for treatment 
planned in another Member State and involving the use of major medical equipment outside 
hospital infrastructures did not fail to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 EC. According to the 
Court, having regard to the dangers to the organisation of public health policy and to the financial 
balance of the social security system, such a requirement would appear, as European Union law 
now stands, to be a justified restriction. Those dangers are connected to the fact that, regardless 
of the setting, hospital or otherwise, in which it is intended to be installed and used, it must be 
possible for major medical equipment to be the subject of planning policy, with particular regard 
to quantity and geographical distribution, in order to help ensure throughout national territory 
a rationalised, stable, balanced and accessible supply of up-to-date treatment, and also to avoid, 
(11)  Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turno-
ver taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).
(12)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).
(13)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 (OJ 2003 L 264, p. 1).
(14)  Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Mem-
ber States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15).Annual Report 2010  21
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so far as possible, any waste of financial, technical and human resources. On the other hand, the 
Court held in Case C-173/09 Elchinov (judgment of 5 October 2010) that legislation of a Member 
State which is interpreted as excluding, in all cases, reimbursement in respect of hospital treatment 
given in another Member State without prior authorisation is not consistent with Article 49 EC and 
Article 22 of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, amended and updated by Regulation (EC) No 118/97, as 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 1992/2006 (15). Although European Union law does not preclude, 
in principle, a system of prior authorisation, as the judgment in Commission v France shows, it is 
nevertheless necessary that the conditions attached to the grant of such authorisation be justified. 
According to the Court, that was not so in the case of the legislation at issue, in that it deprived 
an insured person who, for reasons relating to his state of health or to the need to receive urgent 
treatment in a hospital, was prevented from applying for such authorisation or was not able to wait 
for the answer of the competent institution, of reimbursement from that institution in respect of 
such treatment, even though all other conditions for such reimbursement to be made were met. 
Reimbursement in respect of such treatment is not likely to compromise achievement of the objec-
tives of hospital planning, nor seriously to undermine the financial balance of the social security 
system. Therefore, the Court concluded that the legislation constituted an unjustified restriction on 
the freedom to provide services.
Next, in relation to the posting of workers, Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota and Others (judgment 
of 7 October 2010) is to be noted, in which the Court held that Articles 56 TFEU and 57 TFEU pre-
clude legislation of a Member State requiring an employer, established in another Member State 
and posting workers to its territory, to send a prior declaration of posting, in so far as the employer 
must be notified of a registration number for the declaration before the planned posting may take 
place and the national authorities of the host State have a period of five working days from receipt 
of the declaration to issue that notification. The Court took the view that a procedure of that kind 
must be regarded as an administrative authorisation procedure which may, in particular by reason 
of the period laid down for issuing the notification, impede the planned posting and, consequently, 
the provision of services by the employer of the workers who are to be posted, in particular where 
the services to be provided necessitate a certain speed of action. On the other hand, Articles 56 TFEU 
and 57 TFEU do not, according to the Court, preclude legislation of a Member State requiring an em-
ployer, established in another Member State and posting workers to the territory of the first Member 
State, to keep available to the national authorities of the latter, during the posting, copies of docu-
ments equivalent to the social or labour documents required under the law of the first Member State 
and also to send those copies to the authorities at the end of that period. Such measures are propor-
tionate to the aim of protecting workers since they are appropriate for enabling the authorities to 
monitor compliance with the terms and conditions of employment of posted workers as set out in 
Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71/EC (16) and, therefore, to ensure that the latter are protected.
The Court also had the opportunity, in several cases, to consider the difficult issue of national 
monopolies over games of chance and sports betting and to set out the conditions which such 
monopolies must meet in order to be regarded as justified. First of all, in Case C-203/08 Sporting 
Exchange (judgment of 3 June 2010) and Case C-258/08 Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes 
International (judgment of 3 June 2010), the Court held that Article 49 EC does not preclude legis-
lation of a Member State under which exclusive rights to organise and promote games of chance 
(15)  Regulation (EC) No 1992/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 amending Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community (OJ 2006 L 392, p. 1).
(16)  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services (OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1).22  Annual Report 2010
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are conferred on a single operator, and which prohibits any other operator, including an operator 
established in another Member State, from offering via the Internet services within the scope of 
that regime in the territory of the first Member State. According to the Court, since the Internet 
gaming industry has not been the subject of harmonisation within the European Union, a Member 
State is entitled to take the view that the mere fact that an operator lawfully offers services in that 
sector via the Internet in another Member State, in which it is established and where it is in princi-
ple already subject to statutory conditions and controls on the part of the competent authorities 
in that State, does not amount to a sufficient assurance that national consumers will be protected 
against the risks of fraud and crime, in the light of the difficulties liable to be encountered in such 
a context by the authorities of the Member State of establishment in assessing the professional 
qualities and integrity of operators. In addition, because of the lack of direct contact between con-
sumer and operator, games of chance accessible via the Internet involve different and more sub-
stantial risks of fraud by operators against consumers compared with the traditional markets for 
such games. In the light of the specific features associated with the provision of games of chance 
via the Internet, the restriction may therefore be regarded as justified by the objective of combat-
ing fraud and crime. In Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes International, the Court added 
that national legislation which seeks to curb addiction to games of chance and to combat fraud, 
and which in fact contributes to the achievement of those objectives, can be regarded as limiting 
betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner even where the holder(s) of an exclusive 
licence are entitled to make what they are offering on the market attractive by introducing new 
games and by means of advertising. It is for the national court to determine whether unlawful 
gaming activities constitute a problem in the Member State concerned which might be solved by 
the expansion of authorised and regulated activities, and whether that expansion is on such a scale 
as to make it impossible to reconcile with the objective of curbing such addiction.
Next, in Case C-46/08 Carmen Media Group (judgment of 8 September 2010) and Joined Cases 
C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07 Stoß and Others (judgment of 8 Septem-
ber 2010), the Court addressed German legislation prohibiting any organisation or arrangement 
of public games of chance on the Internet. The Court held, following the line of case-law set out 
in Sporting Exchange and Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes International, that, in order 
to confine the desire to gamble and the exploitation of gambling within controlled channels, the 
Member States are free to establish public monopolies, as such a monopoly is capable of control-
ling the risks connected with the gambling sector more effectively than a system under which 
private operators are authorised to organise betting, subject to compliance by them with the ap-
plicable legislation. The Court stated in particular that the fact that some types of games of chance 
were subject to a public monopoly whilst others were subject to a system of authorisations issued 
to private operators could not, in itself, call the coherence of the German regime into question, 
since those games had different characteristics. Nevertheless, the Court observed that, having re-
gard to the findings made by the German courts in these cases, the latter were entitled to take 
the view that the German legislation did not limit games of chance in a consistent and systematic 
manner. Those courts had found, first, that the holders of public monopolies engaged in intensive 
advertising campaigns in order to maximise profits from lotteries, thus straying from the objectives 
justifying the existence of the monopolies, and, second, that in the case of games of chance, such 
as casino games and automated games, which were not covered by the public monopoly but pos-
sessed a higher potential risk of addiction than the games of chance subject to that monopoly, the 
German authorities conducted or tolerated policies aimed at encouraging participation in those 
games. According to the Court, in such circumstances the preventive objective of that monopoly 
could no longer be effectively pursued and the monopoly could therefore no longer be justified.
In addition, the Court pointed out in Stoß and Others that the Member States enjoy a broad discre-
tion when setting the level of protection against the dangers from games of chance. Thus, and in Annual Report 2010  23
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the absence of any Community harmonisation in the matter, the Member States are not obliged 
to recognise authorisations issued by other Member States in this field. For the same reasons and 
given the risks presented by games of chance on the Internet compared with traditional games of 
chance, the Member States may also prohibit games of chance from being offered on the Internet. 
Nevertheless, the Court specified in Carmen Media Group that a system of authorisation, which 
derogates from the freedom to provide services, must be based on criteria which are objective, 
non-discriminatory and known in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the 
national authorities’ discretion so that it is not used arbitrarily. Furthermore, any persons affected 
by a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have an effective judicial remedy avail-
able to them.
Finally, in Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten (judgment of 8 September 2010), the Court held that, by 
reason of the primacy of directly applicable European Union law, such national legislation concern-
ing a public monopoly on bets on sporting competitions which comprises restrictions that are in-
compatible with the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, because those 
restrictions do not contribute to limiting betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner 
as required by the Court’s case-law, cannot continue to apply during a transitional period.
As regards, last, the free movement of capital, Case C-171/08 Commission v Portugal (judgment 
of 8 July 2010) is particularly worthy of note. In this case, the Court had to determine whether 
the specific regime governing the ‘golden’ shares held by the Portuguese State in the privatised 
company Portugal Telecom was compatible with Article 56 EC. That regime entailed special rights 
relating to the election of a third of the total number of directors, the election of a given number 
of members of the executive committee chosen from the board of directors, the nomination of 
at least one of the directors elected to deal specifically with certain management questions, and 
the adoption of important decisions of the general meeting. The Court held that, in view of the 
influence, not justified by the size of the shareholding, that the special rights conferred over the 
management of the company, the Portuguese State had, by maintaining such rights, failed to fulfil 
its obligations under Article 56 EC. The Court recalled, in relation to the derogations permitted by 
Article 58 EC, that public security or, in the case in point, the need to ensure the security of the 
availability of the telecommunications network in case of crisis, war or terrorism, could be relied 
on only if there was a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. 
Finally, as regards the proportionality of the restriction at issue, the uncertainty created by the 
fact that neither national legislation nor the articles of association of the company concerned laid 
down any criteria determining when the special powers could be exercised constituted serious 
interference with the free movement of capital in that it conferred on the national authorities, as 
regards the use of such powers, a latitude so discretionary in nature that it could not be regarded 
as proportionate to the objectives pursued.
With regard to the freedom to provide services, the case-law was also developed in the specific 
sector of public procurement. Following on from the well-known judgments in Case C-438/05 In-
ternational  Transport  Workers’  Federation  and  Finnish  Seamen’s  Union, ‘Viking  Line’  [2007]  ECR 
I-10779 and in Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767, Case C-271/08 Commission 
v Germany (judgment of 15 July 2010) posed the question of how to reconcile the right to bargain 
collectively and the principles of freedom of establishment and of the freedom to provide services, 
in relation to public procurement. In this case, the Commission sought a declaration that the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations flowing from Directives 92/50/EEC (17) 
(17)  Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service con-
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and 2004/18/EC (18), in the context of the award of service contracts that concerned occupational 
old-age pensions and implemented a collective agreement negotiated between management and 
labour. The Commission considered that, by awarding such contracts directly, without a call for 
tenders at European Union level, to bodies and undertakings referred to in paragraph 6 of the col-
lective agreement on the conversion, for local authority employees, of earnings into pension sav-
ings, the Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations under those directives and had offended 
against the principles of freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. The Fed-
eral Republic of Germany contended that the contracts at issue had been awarded in the particular 
context of implementation of a collective labour agreement.
The Court held in this judgment that the fact that the right to bargain collectively is a fundamen-
tal right, and the social objective of a collective agreement on the conversion, for local authority 
employees, of earnings into pension savings, cannot, in themselves, mean that local authority em-
ployers are automatically excluded from the obligation to comply with the requirements stemming 
from Directives 92/50/EEC and 2004/18/EC on public procurement, which implement freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services in the field of public procurement. Exercise of 
the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore be reconciled with the requirements 
stemming from the freedoms protected by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Treaty and be in accordance with the principle of proportionality. After examining, point by point, 
the various considerations that could justify excluding the contract awards at issue from the Euro-
pean Union provisions on public procurement, such as the workers’ participation in selecting the 
body to implement the salary conversion measure, the elements of solidarity underlying the ten-
ders of the bodies and undertakings referred to in the collective agreement in question, and the 
experience and financial soundness of those bodies and undertakings, the Court concluded that 
compliance with the abovementioned public procurement directives was not, in the case in point, 
irreconcilable with the social objective pursued by that collective agreement. Finally, the Court 
established that the conditions for classification as a ‘public contract’ that are laid down by those 
directives were met in the case in point. First, it stated that even if the local authority employers 
gave effect, in the field of occupational old-age pensions, to a choice predetermined by a collective 
agreement, they were nevertheless contracting authorities since they were represented when the 
collective agreement implemented in the case in point was negotiated. Second, it held that the 
group insurance contracts entailed a direct economic interest for the employers which concluded 
them, so that they were contracts for pecuniary interest. Consequently, the Court concluded that 
the Federal Republic of Germany had failed to fulfil the obligation, imposed by the European Union 
public procurement directives, requiring the contract awards at issue, made pursuant to a collec-
tive agreement, to be preceded by a call for tenders.
The interpretation of Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of 
public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts was at issue in another 
important decision of the Court, in Case C-226/09 Commission v Ireland (judgment of 18 Novem-
ber 2010). Here, the problem arose from the fact that, whilst the contracting authority was not 
obliged to specify in the contract notice the relative weighting given by it to each of the award 
criteria, it nevertheless did specify their weighting, after the closing date set for the submission 
of tenders. The Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against the Member 
State responsible for the award of the contract, alleging that it had infringed the principle of equal 
treatment and the obligation of transparency.
(18)  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for 
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The Court established first of all that, while the requirement to state the relative weighting for each 
of the award criteria for a contract falling within the ambit of Annex II A to Directive 2004/18/EC 
meets the requirement of ensuring compliance with the principle of equal treatment and the con-
sequent obligation of transparency, it cannot legitimately be considered that, in the absence of 
specific provisions for contracts covered by Annex II B, it is necessary to go so far as to require that 
a contracting authority which nevertheless decides to indicate the relative weighting for the cri-
teria must so indicate before the closing date set for the submission of tenders. According to the 
Court, by attributing weightings to the criteria, the contracting authority simply set out the terms 
on which the tenders submitted were to be evaluated. On the other hand, the Court held that the 
alteration that was made to the weighting of the criteria for award of the contract at issue after the 
initial review of the tenders submitted infringed the principle of equal treatment and the conse-
quent obligation of transparency. That alteration was contrary to the Court’s case-law according 
to which those fundamental principles of European Union law imply an obligation on the part of 
contracting authorities to interpret the award criteria in the same way throughout the procedure.
As regards freedom of movement for workers, Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais (judgment 
of 16 March 2010), relating to whether rules applicable in the field of professional football were 
compatible with Article 45 TFEU, should be noted. Under those rules, a joueur espoir (a trainee 
between the ages of 16 and 22) could be ordered to pay damages if, at the end of his training 
period, he signed a professional contract not with the club which provided his training but with 
a club in another Member State. In its judgment, the Court first of all verified that the rules at issue 
did indeed fall within the scope of Article 45 TFEU. The case concerned the Professional Football 
Charter of the French Football Federation. According to the Court, that document had the status 
of a collective agreement aimed at regulating gainful employment and, as such, was covered by 
European Union law. Next, the Court found that the rules under examination were likely to discour-
age a joueur espoir from exercising his right of free movement. Consequently, they were a restric-
tion on freedom of movement for workers. However, as the Court has already held in Bosman (19), 
in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the 
European Union, the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must 
be accepted as legitimate. The Court accordingly concluded that Article 45 TFEU does not pre-
clude a scheme which, in order to attain such an objective, guarantees compensation to the club 
which provided the training if, at the end of his training period, a young player signs a professional 
contract with a club in another Member State, provided that the scheme is suitable to ensure the 
attainment of that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. On the other 
hand, a scheme such as the one that was at issue is not necessary to ensure the attainment of that 
objective, since the amount of damages that the joueur espoir may be ordered to pay is unrelated 
to the actual costs of the training.
Remaining in the field of workers, the Court delivered on the same day two judgments (Cases 
C-310/08 Ibrahim and C-480/08 Teixeira, judgments of 23 February 2010) relating to the interpreta-
tion of Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers (20), more 
specifically to its relationship with Directive 2004/38/EC on freedom of movement of citizens of 
the Union (21). In these two cases, the national authorities refused to grant the claimants housing 
assistance for them and their children, on the ground that the claimants did not have a right of 
residence in the United Kingdom pursuant to European Union law. One of the claimants was sepa-
(19)  Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.
(20)  Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community 
(OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (II), p. 475).
(21)  See footnote 10.26  Annual Report 2010
Court of Justice  Case-law
rated from her husband who, after working in the United Kingdom, had finally left the country, and 
the other, also separated from her husband, had herself lost the status of worker. However, since 
their children were in education in the United Kingdom, the claimants pleaded Article 12 of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 1612/68, as interpreted by the Court in Baumbast and R (22). Confirming its case-law, 
the Court observed that Article 12 of the regulation means that the child of a migrant worker can, 
in connection with his right of access to education in the host Member State, have an independent 
right of residence and, for that purpose, it requires only that the child has lived with at least one of 
his parents in a Member State while that parent resided there as a worker. The fact that the parents 
of the child have meanwhile divorced and the fact that only one parent is a citizen of the Union 
and that that parent has ceased to be a migrant worker in the host Member State are irrelevant in 
this regard. Thus, according to the Court, Article 12 of the regulation must be applied independ-
ently of the provisions of European Union law which expressly govern the conditions of exercise of 
the right to reside in another Member State, an independence which was not called into question 
by the entry into force of the new directive on freedom of movement of European citizens. Draw-
ing the appropriate conclusions from that independence, the Court then found that the right of 
residence of the parent who is the primary carer of a migrant worker’s child in education is not 
subject to the condition requiring that that parent have sufficient resources not to become a bur-
den on the social assistance system of the host Member State. Finally, in the second case (Teixeira), 
the Court also explained that whilst, as a general rule, the right of residence of the parent who is 
the primary carer for a child of a migrant worker ends, where that child is in education in the host 
Member State, when the child reaches the age of majority, it may be otherwise if the child contin-
ues to need the presence and care of that parent in order to be able to pursue and complete his 
education. It is then for the national court to assess whether that is actually the case.
Approximation of laws
Since it is not possible to set out all the case-law developments in this area which, reflecting the 
ever increasing range of the European Union legislature’s activity, displays the greatest diversity, 
it has been decided to place emphasis on two sectors, namely on commercial practices in gen-
eral, paying particular attention to consumer protection, and on telecommunications, whilst a few 
other decisions of evident interest are also mentioned.
As regards unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, Directive 2005/29/EC (23) was inter-
preted twice in 2010. This directive harmonises fully the rules relating to unfair business-to-consum-
er commercial practices and contains, in Annex I, an exhaustive list of 31 commercial practices which, 
in accordance with Article 5(5), are to be regarded as unfair in all circumstances. As recital 17 in the 
preamble to the directive expressly states, those commercial practices alone can be deemed to be 
unfair without a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9 of the directive.
In the first case to be covered, namely Case C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag 
(judgment of 9 November 2010), the Court consequently ruled that the directive must be interpret-
ed as precluding a national provision which lays down a general prohibition on sales with bonuses 
and is not only designed to protect consumers but also pursues other objectives. Practices consisting 
in offering consumers bonuses associated with the purchase of products or services do not appear 
(22)  Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091.
(23)  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC 
and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).Annual Report 2010  27
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in Annex I to the directive and they therefore cannot be prohibited in all circumstances, but only fol-
lowing a specific assessment allowing the unfairness of those practices to be established. Thus, the 
possibility of participating in a prize competition, linked to the purchase of a newspaper, does not 
constitute an unfair commercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(2) of the directive simply 
on the ground that, for at least some of the consumers concerned, that possibility of participating in 
a competition represents the factor which determines them to buy that newspaper.
Second, in Case C-304/08 Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft (judgment of 14 January 2010), the Court 
held that Directive 2005/29/EC also precludes national legislation which provides for a prohibition 
in principle, without taking account of the specific circumstances of individual cases, of commercial 
practices under which the participation of consumers in a prize competition or lottery is made con-
ditional on the purchase of goods or the use of services. The Court observed first that promotional 
campaigns which enable consumers to take part free of charge in a lottery subject to their purchas-
ing a certain quantity of goods or services constitute commercial acts that clearly form part of an 
operator’s commercial strategy and relate directly to the promotion of the operator’s sales. They 
therefore do indeed constitute commercial practices within the meaning of the directive and, conse-
quently, come within its scope. The Court then pointed out that the directive, which harmonises the 
rules fully, provides expressly that Member States may not adopt stricter rules than those provided 
for by it, even in order to achieve a higher level of consumer protection. Since the practice at issue in 
this case is likewise not referred to in Annex I, it cannot be prohibited without it being determined, 
having regard to the facts of each particular instance, whether it is ‘unfair’ in the light of the criteria 
laid down by the directive. Those criteria include whether the practice materially distorts, or is likely 
materially to distort, the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product.
In 2010 the Court was also required on two occasions to interpret Directive 93/13/EEC (24) on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts.
In the first case, namely Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid (judgment 
of 3 June 2010), the Court recalled that the system of protection introduced by Directive 93/13/EEC 
is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as re-
gards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This leads to the consumer agreeing 
to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the content 
of those terms. The directive carried out only a partial and minimum harmonisation of national leg-
islation concerning unfair terms, while recognising that Member States have the option of afford-
ing consumers a higher level of protection than that for which the directive provides. The Court 
thus pointed out that the Member States may retain or adopt, in the entire area covered by the 
directive, rules more stringent than those laid down by the directive itself, provided that they are 
designed to ensure a greater degree of consumer protection. Consequently, the Court concluded 
that the directive does not preclude national legislation which authorises a judicial review as to 
the unfairness of contractual terms which relate to the definition of the main subject-matter of the 
contract or to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the serv-
ices or goods to be supplied in exchange, on the other hand, even in the case where those terms 
are drafted in plain, intelligible language.
Second, in Case C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing (judgment of 9 November 2010), the Court was re-
quired to expand upon the judgment in Case C-243/08 Pannon GSM [2009] ECR I-4713 (see Annual 
Report 2009). It stated that Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union extends to the interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair 
(24)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).28  Annual Report 2010
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term’ used in Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC and in the annex thereto, and to the criteria which 
the national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of the provi-
sions of that directive, whilst it is for the national court to determine, in the light of those criteria, 
whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circumstances of the case. The unfair-
ness of a contractual term is to be assessed taking into account the nature of the goods or services 
for which the contract was concluded and by referring, as at the time of conclusion of the contract, 
to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of it, among which are the fact that a term which 
is contained in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier and which con-
fers exclusive jurisdiction on the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier 
has his principal place of business has been included without being individually negotiated. The 
Court also ruled that the national court must investigate of its own motion whether a term con-
ferring exclusive territorial jurisdiction in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and 
a consumer, which is the subject of a dispute before it, falls within the scope of Directive 93/13/EEC 
and, if it does, assess of its own motion whether such a term is unfair. In order to safeguard the ef-
fectiveness of the consumer protection intended by the European Union legislature in a situation 
characterised by the imbalance between the consumer and the seller or supplier, which may be 
corrected only by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract, the national 
court must, in all cases and whatever the rules of its domestic law, determine whether or not the 
contested term was individually negotiated between a seller or supplier and a consumer.
In relation, now, to protection of the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from busi-
ness premises, the Court ruled in Case C-215/08 E. Friz (judgment of 15 April 2010) that Direc-
tive 85/577/EEC (25) applies to a contract, concluded between a trader and a consumer during 
a doorstep-selling visit to the latter’s home, concerning the consumer’s entry to a closed-end real 
property fund established in the form of a partnership when the principal purpose of joining is 
not to become a member of that partnership, but is a means of capital investment. The Court stat-
ed that Article 5(2) of Directive 85/577/EEC does not preclude a national law according to which, 
in the event of cancellation of membership of such a real property fund, entered into following 
a doorstep-selling visit by a trader to a consumer’s home, the consumer has a claim against the 
partnership, to his severance balance, calculated on the basis of the value of his interest at the 
date of his retirement from membership of the fund, and may therefore get back less than the 
value of his capital contribution or have to participate in the losses of the fund. It explained that, 
while there is no doubt that the aim of the directive is to protect consumers, that does not imply 
that that protection is absolute. Both the general structure of the directive and the wording of 
several of its provisions indicate that such protection is subject to certain limits. As regards the 
consequences of the exercise of the right of renunciation in particular, notification of the cancel-
lation has the effect, both for the consumer and for the trader, of the restoration of the status quo 
ante. However, the fact remains that there is nothing in the directive to preclude the consumer, in 
certain specific cases, from having obligations to the trader and, depending on the circumstances, 
from having to bear certain consequences resulting from the exercise of his right of cancellation.
On a related issue, the Court held in Case C-511/08 Heinrich Heine (judgment of 15 April 2010), 
concerning the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, that Article 6(1), first sub-
paragraph, second sentence, and Article 6(2) of Directive 97/7/EC (26) must be interpreted as pre-
cluding national legislation which allows the supplier under a distance contract to charge the costs 
(25)  Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from 
business premises (OJ 1985 L 372, p. 31).
(26)  Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of 
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of delivering the goods to the consumer where the latter exercises his right of withdrawal. The 
directive’s provisions on the legal consequences of withdrawal clearly have as their purpose not 
to discourage consumers from exercising their right of withdrawal. It would therefore be contrary 
to that objective to interpret those provisions as authorising the Member States to allow delivery 
costs to be charged to consumers in the event of withdrawal. Moreover, charging consumers the 
delivery costs, in addition to the direct costs for returning the goods, would compromise a bal-
anced sharing of the risks between parties to distance contracts, by making consumers liable to 
bear all of the costs related to transporting the goods.
Lastly in relation to commercial practices, Case C-159/09 Lidl (judgment of 18 November 2010), 
which arose from an advertising campaign launched by a supermarket, is to be noted. The supermar-
ket had placed in a local newspaper an advertisement that compared till receipts listing products, 
in the main foodstuffs, respectively purchased from two supermarket chains and showing different 
total costs, a method contested by the competitor referred to. The Court stated first that the directive 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising (27) is to be interpreted as meaning that the fact 
alone that food products differ in terms of the extent to which consumers would like to eat them and 
the pleasure to be derived from consuming them, according to the conditions and place of produc-
tion, their ingredients and who produced them, cannot preclude the possibility that the comparison 
of such products may meet the requirement that the products compared meet the same needs or 
are intended for the same purpose, and hence display a sufficient degree of interchangeability (28). To 
decide that, unless they are identical, two food products cannot be regarded as comparable would 
effectively rule out any real possibility of comparative advertising regarding a particularly important 
category of consumer goods. The Court added that advertising relating to a comparison of the prices 
of food products marketed by two competing retail store chains may be misleading (29), in particu-
lar, if it is found, in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the specific case, in particular the 
information contained in or omitted from the advertisement, that the decision to buy on the part 
of a significant number of consumers to whom the advertisement is addressed may be made in the 
mistaken belief that the selection of goods made by the advertiser is representative of the general 
level of his prices as compared with those charged by his competitor and that such consumers will 
therefore make savings of the kind claimed by the advertisement by regularly buying their everyday 
consumer goods from the advertiser rather than the competitor, or in the mistaken belief that all 
of the advertiser’s products are cheaper than those of his competitor. Such advertising may also be 
misleading if it is found that, for the purposes of a comparison based solely on price, food products 
were selected which, nevertheless, have different features capable of significantly affecting the aver-
age consumer’s choice, without such differences being apparent from the advertising concerned. 
Finally, the Court held that the condition of verifiability (30) requires, in the case of an advertisement 
which compares the prices of two selections of goods, that it must be possible to identify the goods 
on the basis of information contained in the advertisement, thus enabling the persons to whom the 
advertisement is addressed to satisfy themselves that they have been correctly informed with regard 
to the purchases of basic consumables which they are prompted to make.
(27)  Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17), as amended by Directive 97/55/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 so as to include comparative advertising (OJ 1997 L 290, 
p. 18).
(28)  Article 3a(1)(b) of Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading and comparative advertising, as amended by Directive 97/55/EC.
(29)  Article 3a(1)(a) of Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading and comparative advertising, as amended by Directive 97/55/EC.
(30)  Article 3a(1)(c) of Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading and comparative advertising, as amended by Directive 97/55/EC.30  Annual Report 2010
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Case-law relating to the telecommunications sector was particularly plentiful in 2010. First of all, 
Case C-99/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa (judgment of 1 July 2010) gave the Court the opportunity 
to interpret Article 30(2) of Directive 2002/22/EC (the Universal Service Directive) (31) in relation 
to the costs of the mobile telephone number portability that enables a telephone subscriber to 
retain the same number when changing operator. According to the Court, that provision is to be 
interpreted as obliging the national regulatory authority to take account of the costs incurred by 
mobile telephone network operators in implementing the number portability service when it as-
sesses whether the direct charge to subscribers for the use of that service is a disincentive. Howev-
er, the authority retains the power to fix the maximum amount of that charge levied by operators 
at a level below the costs incurred by them, when a charge calculated only on the basis of those 
costs is liable to dissuade users from making use of the portability facility.
Still  with  regard  to  telecommunications,  Joined  Cases  C-317/08,  C-318/08,  C-319/08  and 
C-320/08 Alassini and Others (judgment of 18 March 2010) will be noted, in which the Court re-
plied to a question referred to it for a preliminary ruling regarding the interpretation of the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection in relation to national legislation under which an attempt to 
achieve an out-of-court settlement is a mandatory condition for the admissibility before the courts 
of actions in certain disputes between providers and end-users under the Universal Service Direc-
tive (32). According to the Court, Article 34(1) of that directive assigns Member States the objective 
of establishing out-of-court procedures for dealing with disputes involving consumers that relate 
to matters covered by that directive. National legislation which has put in place an out-of-court 
settlement procedure and has made it mandatory to have recourse to that procedure before any 
action is brought before a court is not such as to compromise the objective in the general interest 
pursued by the directive and is even designed to strengthen the directive’s effectiveness, by reason 
of the quicker and less expensive settlement of disputes and the lightening of the courts’ workload 
which are achieved by that legislation. The Court thus stated that the additional step for access to 
the courts, in the form of a prior settlement procedure made mandatory by the legislation in ques-
tion, is not contrary to the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection, 
provided that it does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it does not cause 
a delay to the conducting of legal proceedings or costs for consumers that are too high, that elec-
tronic means are not the only means by which the settlement procedure may be accessed and that 
interim measures are possible in exceptional urgent cases.
Next, in Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (judgment of 8 June 2010), the Court had to rule on the 
validity of Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks (33), in 
the context of proceedings between several operators of public mobile telephone networks and 
the national authorities concerning the validity of national provisions for the implementation of 
that regulation. The Court, to which three questions had been referred for a preliminary ruling, 
noted first of all that the regulation, adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC, introduces a common 
approach so that users of terrestrial public mobile telephone networks do not pay excessive prices 
for Community-wide roaming services and so that operators in the various Member States can 
operate within a single coherent regulatory framework based on objectively established criteria, 
thereby contributing to the smooth functioning of the internal market in order to achieve a high 
level of consumer protection and maintain competition among operators. Then the Court — which 
(31)  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51).
(32)  See the preceding footnote.
(33)  Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public mobile 
telephone networks within the Community and amending Directive 2002/21/EC (OJ 2007 L 171, p. 32).Annual Report 2010  31
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had been asked whether the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity were complied with be-
cause the regulation imposes not only a ceiling for average wholesale charges per minute, but also 
for retail charges, and imposes an obligation to provide information to roaming customers — held 
that, in the light of the broad discretion which the Community legislature has in the area at issue, 
the latter could legitimately take the view, having regard to objective criteria and an exhaustive 
economic study, that regulation of the wholesale market alone would not achieve the same result 
as regulation which covered at the same time the wholesale and the retail markets, a fact which 
rendered the latter regulation necessary, and that the obligation to provide information reinforces 
the effectiveness of imposing ceilings for the charges. The Court then continued that appraisal 
by stating that there was no breach of the principle of subsidiarity, given the interdependence of 
wholesale and retail charges and the effects of the common approach laid down in the regulation, 
the objective of which could best be achieved at Community level.
Finally, in Case C-222/08 Commission v Belgium (judgment of 6 October 2010), in the context of 
Treaty infringement proceedings brought by the Commission concerning the Kingdom of Belgium’s 
partial transposition of Articles 12(1) and 13(1) and Annex IV, Part A, of the Universal Service Direc-
tive (34), the Court held first that, since the directive lays down only the rules for calculating the net 
costs of the provision of universal service where the national authorities have considered that such 
provision may represent an unfair burden, the Member State in question had not failed to fulfil 
its obligations by laying down itself the conditions for determining whether or not that burden is 
unfair. Second, the Court stated that, in linking the mechanisms for the recovery of net costs which 
an undertaking may incur by the provision of universal service to the existence of an unfair bur-
den on that undertaking, the Community legislature wished to exclude the automatic conferral of 
a right to compensation for any net cost of universal service provision, since it took the view that 
the net cost of that service does not necessarily represent an unfair burden for all the undertakings 
concerned. In those circumstances, the unfair burden which must be found to exist by the national 
regulatory authority before any compensation is paid can only be a burden which, for each under-
taking concerned, is excessive in view of the undertaking’s ability to bear it, account being taken of 
the undertaking’s own characteristics (equipment, economic and financial situation, market share 
and so forth). Furthermore, the Court held that the relevant Member State, which is bound by the 
directive to establish the mechanisms necessary to compensate undertakings suffering an unfair 
burden, fails to fulfil its obligations if it makes a general finding on the basis of the calculation of the 
net costs of the erstwhile sole provider of universal service that all undertakings now responsible 
for the provision of universal service are in fact subject to an unfair burden on account of that provi-
sion, without carrying out a specific assessment both of the net cost of the service for each operator 
concerned and of all the characteristics particular to each operator. Finally, the Court indicated that 
a Member State also fails to fulfil its obligations under the directive where it fails to take into consid-
eration, in the calculation of the net cost of provision of the social component of universal service, 
the market benefits, including intangible benefits, accruing to the undertakings responsible.
Whilst a homogeneous body of case-law can thus be seen to be developing in two particularly 
sensitive sectors, case-law in the area of approximation of laws is far from limited to those sectors, 
as is attested by a number of cases.
Case C-428/08 Monsanto Technology (judgment of 6 July 2010) raised, for the first time, the ques-
tion of the scope of a European patent relating to a DNA sequence. Monsanto, which has held 
since 1996 a European patent relating to a DNA sequence which, once introduced into the DNA 
of a soy plant, makes that plant resistant to a certain herbicide, sought to oppose imports into 
(34)  See footnote 31.32  Annual Report 2010
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a Member State of soy meal produced from such genetically modified soy in Argentina, where 
there is no patent protection for Monsanto’s invention. The national court before which proceed-
ings were brought asked the Court of Justice whether the mere presence of the DNA sequence 
protected by a European patent is sufficient to constitute an infringement of Monsanto’s patent 
when the meal is marketed in the European Union. According to the Court, Directive 98/44/EC (35) 
makes the protection conferred by a European patent subject to the condition that the genetic 
information contained in the patented product or constituting that product is currently perform-
ing its function in the material in which it is contained. The Court observed in this regard that the 
function of Monsanto’s invention is performed when the genetic information protects the soy 
plant in which it is incorporated against the effect of the herbicide. This function of the protected 
DNA sequence can no longer be performed when it is in a residual state in the soy meal, which is 
a dead material obtained after the soy has undergone several treatment processes. Consequent-
ly, the protection under the European patent is not available when the genetic information has 
ceased to perform the function it had in the initial plant from which it is derived. Nor can such 
protection be granted on the ground that the genetic information contained in the soy meal 
could possibly perform its function again in another plant, as it would be necessary that the DNA 
sequence actually be introduced in that other plant in order for protection under a European 
patent to be conferred in relation to that plant. In those circumstances, Monsanto cannot rely 
on Directive 98/44/EC to prohibit the marketing of soy meal originating from Argentina which 
contains its biotechnological invention in a residual state. Lastly, the Court stated that the direc-
tive precludes a national rule from granting absolute protection to a patented DNA sequence as 
such, regardless of whether it performs its function in the material containing it. The provisions 
of the directive providing for a requirement of actual performance of that function constitute 
exhaustive harmonisation of the matter in the European Union.
In Case C-62/09 Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (judgment of 22 April 2010), the 
Court was required to interpret Directive 2001/83/EC (36). Whilst, in principle, that directive prohib-
its pecuniary advantages or benefits in kind from being supplied, offered or promised to doctors 
or pharmacists when medicinal products are being promoted to them, the Court held that the 
directive does not preclude financial incentive schemes implemented by the national public health 
authorities in order to reduce their public health expenditure and designed to encourage, for the 
purpose of treating certain conditions, the prescription by doctors of specific named medicinal 
products containing an active substance which is different from the active substance of the me-
dicinal product which was previously prescribed or which might have been prescribed but for such 
an incentive scheme. In general terms, the health policy defined by a Member State and the public 
expenditure devoted to it do not pursue any profit-making or commercial aim. Since a financial 
incentive scheme forms part of such a policy, it cannot be regarded as falling within the commer-
cial promotion of medicinal products. The Court nevertheless observed that the public authorities 
are required to make available to professionals in the pharmaceutical industry information show-
ing that the scheme in question is based on objective criteria and that there is no discrimination 
between national medicinal products and those from other Member States. Furthermore, those 
authorities must make such a scheme public and make available to those professionals the evalua-
tions establishing the therapeutic equivalence of the active substances available belonging to the 
same therapeutic class covered by the scheme.
(35)  Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions (OJ 1998 L 213, p. 13).
(36)  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67), as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament 
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In Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany (judgment of 9 March 2010), relating to the processing 
of personal data, the Court held that the guarantee of the independence of national supervisory 
authorities, which is provided for by Directive 95/46/EC (37), is intended to ensure the effectiveness 
and reliability of the supervision of compliance with the provisions on protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data, and it must be interpreted in the light of that aim. It 
was established not to grant a special status to those authorities themselves as well as their agents, 
but in order to strengthen the protection of individuals and bodies affected by their decisions, 
and the supervisory authorities must therefore act objectively and impartially when carrying out 
their duties. Consequently, the supervisory authorities responsible for supervising the processing 
of personal data outside the public sector must enjoy an independence allowing them to perform 
their duties free from external influence. That independence precludes not only any influence ex-
ercised by the supervised bodies, but also any directions or any other external influence, whether 
direct or indirect, which could call into question the performance by those authorities of their task 
consisting of establishing a fair balance between the protection of the right to private life and the 
free movement of personal data. The mere risk that the scrutinising authorities could exercise a po-
litical influence over the decisions of the competent supervisory authorities is enough to hinder 
the independent performance of their tasks. First, there could be ‘prior compliance’ on the part of 
those authorities in the light of the scrutinising authority’s decision-making practice. Second, for 
the purposes of the role adopted by the supervisory authorities as guardians of the right to private 
life, it is necessary that their decisions, and therefore the authorities themselves, remain above any 
suspicion of partiality. State scrutiny exercised over the national supervisory authorities is thus not 
consistent with the requirement of independence.
In Case C-467/08 Padawan (judgment of 21 October 2010) concerning the field of copyright and 
related rights, the Court provided explanation of the concept of fair compensation for private cop-
ying and of the criteria applicable to, and limits of, such compensation. Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (38) 
allows the private copying exception introduced into domestic law by certain Member States, pro-
vided that the holders of the reproduction right receive fair compensation. In this judgment, the 
Court stated, first of all, that the concept of ‘fair compensation’ referred to in Article 5(2)(b) of Di-
rective 2001/29/EC is an autonomous concept of European Union law which must be interpreted 
uniformly in all the Member States that have introduced a private copying exception. It then ex-
plained that the ‘fair balance’ between the persons concerned means that fair compensation must 
be calculated on the basis of the criterion of the harm caused to authors of protected works by the 
introduction of the private copying exception. The Court also indicated that the ‘private copying 
levy’ is imposed directly not on private users of the reproduction equipment, devices and me-
dia, but on persons who have such equipment, devices and media, inasmuch as those persons 
are easier to identify and are able to pass on to private users the actual burden of financing the 
fair compensation. Finally, the Court ruled that a link is necessary between the application of the 
levy intended to finance fair compensation with respect to equipment and the deemed use of the 
equipment for the purposes of private copying. Consequently, the indiscriminate application of 
the private copying levy, in particular with respect to digital reproduction equipment, devices and 
media not made available to private users and clearly reserved for uses other than private copy-
ing, is incompatible with Directive 2001/29/EC. On the other hand, where the equipment at issue 
has been made available to natural persons for private purposes it is unnecessary to show that 
(37)  Second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).
(38)  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).34  Annual Report 2010
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they have in fact made private copies with the help of that equipment and have therefore actually 
caused harm to the author of the protected work. Those natural persons are rightly presumed to 
benefit fully from the making available of that equipment, that is to say that they are deemed to 
take full advantage of the functions associated with that equipment, including copying.
In C-233/08 Kyrian (judgment of 14 January 2010), the order for reference related, first, to wheth-
er, in the light of Article 12(3) of Directive 76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery 
of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures (39), as amended by Direc-
tive 2001/44/EC (40), the courts of the Member State in which the requested authority is situated 
have jurisdiction to review the enforceability of an instrument, issued in another Member State, 
permitting enforcement of a claim. The Court explained, in this judgment, that the courts of the 
requested Member State do not, in principle, have jurisdiction to review the enforceability of an 
instrument permitting enforcement, except in order to review whether the instrument is consistent 
with the public policy of that State. On the other hand, the Court held that, inasmuch as the notifi-
cation constitutes an ‘enforcement measure’ referred to in Article 12(3) of Directive 76/308/EEC, the 
court of the requested Member State has jurisdiction to review whether that measure was correctly 
effected in accordance with the laws and regulations of that Member State. Second, the Court had 
to rule on whether, in order to be properly given, the notification of the instrument permitting en-
forcement of a claim must be addressed to the debtor in an official language of the Member State 
in which the requested authority is situated. Directive 76/308/EEC is silent on this point. According 
to the Court, however, in the light of the purpose of the directive, which is to ensure the effective 
notification of all instruments and decisions, it must be held that, in order for the addressee of an 
instrument permitting enforcement to be placed in a position to enforce his rights, he must receive 
the notification of that instrument in an official language of the requested Member State. The Court 
also ruled that, in order to ensure compliance with that right, it is for the national court to apply 
national law while taking care to ensure the full effectiveness of European Union law.
Competition
There have been interesting developments in the case-law in relation both to State aid and to the 
competition rules applicable to undertakings.
With regard to State aid, in Case C-399/08 P Commission v Deutsche Post (judgment of 2 Septem-
ber 2010), the Court considered the method used by the Commission to conclude that there was 
an advantage constituting State aid in favour of a private undertaking responsible for a service 
of general economic interest (‘SGEI’). While the Commission had taken the view that the public 
resources received by the undertaking concerned as compensation for the provision of an SGEI 
were greater than the additional costs generated by that service and that that overcompensation 
constituted State aid incompatible with the common market, the General Court annulled that de-
cision on the ground that the Commission had not shown sufficiently that there was an advantage 
for the purposes of Article 87(1) EC and was not entitled to assume that an advantage had been 
conferred on the undertaking by public funds without first ascertaining whether those funds ac-
tually exceeded all the additional costs associated with the provision of an SGEI that were borne 
by that undertaking. The Court of Justice confirmed the General Court’s analysis in rejecting the 
Commission’s plea alleging breach of Articles 87(1) EC and 86(2) EC. The Court of Justice observed 
at the outset that, in order for financial compensation awarded to an undertaking responsible 
for an SGEI to be able to escape classification as State aid, specific conditions must be fulfilled, 
(39)  Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 (OJ 1976 L 73, p. 18).
(40)  Council Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001 (OJ 2001 L 175, p. 17).Annual Report 2010  35
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requiring in particular that such compensation should not exceed what is necessary to cover all 
or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations (conditions laid 
down in Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, para-
graphs 74 and 75), and it concluded from this that, when examining the validity of the financing 
of such a service in the light of the law on State aid, the Commission is required to check whether 
that condition has been satisfied. The Court of Justice went on to find that the General Court had 
relied upon deficiencies in that respect in the method used by the Commission and had, therefore, 
correctly concluded that the Commission’s analysis was defective without, however, reversing the 
burden of proof or substituting its own method of analysis for the Commission’s. The restrictive 
nature of the conditions under which compensation for an SGEI is capable of escaping classifica-
tion as State aid does not, therefore, exempt the Commission from being put to strict proof when 
it takes the view that those conditions have not been observed.
In Case C-290/07 P Commission v Scott (judgment of 2 September 2010), an appeal was brought be-
fore the Court of Justice against a judgment of the General Court annulling a Commission decision 
declaring that State aid granted by the French authorities to an American company which had arisen 
from the sale of land on terms that did not reflect the reality of the market was incompatible, and it 
was necessary for the Court of Justice to clarify the limits of the General Court’s review jurisdiction 
where the identification of State aid raises serious valuation difficulties. The Commission complained 
that the General Court had exceeded the limits of its review in identifying errors of method and cal-
culation characteristic of a breach of the obligation to conduct in a diligent manner the formal inves-
tigation procedure provided for in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty. The Court of Justice upheld that plea, 
recalling, first, the principles laid down in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, 
paragraph 39, from which it follows that the courts of the European Union must establish not only 
whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that 
evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. That reminder 
is coupled with an important limitation, according to which, when conducting such a review, the 
courts of the European Union must not substitute their own economic assessment for that of the 
Commission. Second, the Court of Justice pointed out that the Commission had to apply the private 
investor test to determine whether the price paid by the presumed recipient of aid corresponded 
to the selling price which a private investor, operating in normal competitive conditions, would be 
likely to have fixed. The Court held that, in this instance, the General Court had not identified the 
manifest errors of assessment on the part of the Commission which could have justified annulment 
of the decision as to the incompatibility of the aid, thus exceeding its review jurisdiction. Finally, 
according to the Court of Justice, the General Court could not criticise the Commission for having 
overlooked certain information which could have been useful, since that information had been pro-
vided only after the formal investigation procedure and the Commission was not obliged to reopen 
the procedure after obtaining that new information.
In Case C-322/09 P NDSHT v Commission (judgment of 18 November 2010), the Court of Justice was 
called upon to define the concept of an act open to challenge, the act being that of a Community 
institution. An appeal had been lodged by which the appellant sought to have set aside a judgment 
of the General Court declaring inadmissible an action for annulment of a decision contained in 
Commission letters to the company NDSHT, relating to a complaint concerning allegedly unlawful 
State aid granted by the City of Stockholm to a competitor company. The appellant, NDSHT, claimed 
that the General Court had erred in law in considering that the letters at issue, in which the Commis-
sion had decided not to pursue NDSHT’s complaint, were an informal communication that was not 
open to challenge for the purposes of Article 230 EC. Under the procedure in force, where the Com-
mission finds, following examination of a complaint, that an investigation has revealed no grounds 36  Annual Report 2010
Court of Justice  Case-law
for concluding that there is State aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC, it refuses by implication 
to initiate the procedure provided for by Article 88(2) EC. According to the Court of Justice, the act 
in question could not be described as a mere informal communication or provisional measure in 
so far as it expressed the Commission’s definitive decision to terminate its preliminary examination 
and thus its refusal to initiate the formal investigation procedure, thereby resulting in significant 
consequences for the appellant. In that context, the Court of Justice confirmed that the appellant 
was an undertaking in competition with the company benefiting from the measures complained of 
and, as such, an interested party for the purposes of Article 88(2) EC, and it attributed to the General 
Court an error of law in respect of its finding that the act at issue did not have the characteristics 
of a decision under Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 that was open to challenge although, 
irrespective of status or form, it produced binding legal effects such as to affect the appellant’s in-
terests. The Court of Justice therefore set aside the judgment concerned, dismissed the objection of 
inadmissibility alleging that the act at issue was not open to challenge in an action for annulment 
and referred the case back to the General Court for judgment on its merits.
As regards the rules on competition applicable to undertakings, two judgments are particularly 
noteworthy, the first relating to the application of the competition rules to groups of companies, 
the second relating to the scope of the principle of legal professional privilege.
By its judgment of 1 July 2010 in Case C-407/08 P Knauf Gips v Commission, the Court held that, in 
the case of a group of companies at the apex of which were a number of legal persons, the Com-
mission made no error of assessment in considering one of those companies to be solely respon-
sible for the actions of the companies in that group which, as a whole, constituted an economic 
unit. The fact that there is no single legal person at the apex of a group is no obstacle to a company 
being held liable for the actions of that group. The legal structure particular to a group of compa-
nies, which is characterised by the absence of a single legal person at the apex of that group, is not 
decisive where that structure does not reflect the effective functioning and actual organisation 
of the group. In particular, the Court held that the lack of subordinating legal links between two 
companies at the apex of the group did not cast any doubt on the conclusion that one of those 
two companies had to be held liable for the activities of the group, since, in reality, the second 
company did not determine its conduct on the relevant market independently.
The judgment in Knauf Gips v Commission also clarifies the rights of undertakings during the ad-
ministrative procedure and in the exercise of rights of appeal. The Court of Justice stated in its 
judgment that there is no requirement under the law of the European Union that the addressee of 
a statement of objections must challenge its various matters of fact or law during the administra-
tive procedure, if it is not to be barred from doing so later at the stage of judicial proceedings, since 
such a restriction is contrary to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and of respect for the 
rights of the defence.
In Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission (judgment of 14 Sep-
tember 2010) a question also arose concerning the rights of undertakings during Commission 
investigations. The Commission had carried out inspections and seized numerous documents, in-
cluding copies of e-mails exchanged between the general manager and Akzo Nobel’s competition 
law coordinator, a lawyer enrolled as an Advocaat of the Netherlands Bar and employed by Akzo 
Nobel. In that context, the Court of Justice was called upon to clarify whether the communica-
tions of in-house lawyers employed by an undertaking are protected by legal professional privi-
lege in the same way as those of external lawyers. It held that neither the evolution of the legal 
situation within the Member States of the European Union nor the adoption of Regulation (EC) 
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the Treaty (41) supported the notion of a change in the case-law (42) resulting in in-house lawyers 
being covered by legal professional privilege. The Court recalled that that protection is subject 
to two cumulative conditions. First, the exchange with the lawyer must be connected to the cli-
ent’s rights of defence and, second, the exchange must be with an independent lawyer, that is to 
say, a lawyer who is not bound to the client by a relationship of employment. The requirement of 
independence means the absence of any employment relationship between the lawyer and his cli-
ent, so that legal professional privilege does not cover exchanges within a company or group with 
in-house lawyers. An in-house lawyer, despite his enrolment with a bar or law society and the pro-
fessional ethical obligations to which he is, as a result, subject, does not enjoy the same degree of 
independence from his employer as a lawyer working in an external law firm does in relation to his 
client. Consequently, an in-house lawyer is less able to deal effectively with any conflicts between 
his professional obligations and the aims of his client. Owing to the in-house lawyer’s economic 
dependence and the close ties with his employer, he does not enjoy a level of professional inde-
pendence comparable to that of an external lawyer.
Taxation
In three cases (judgments of 4 March 2010 in Cases C-197/08, C-198/08 and C-221/08), the Court 
was called upon to rule on actions for failure to fulfil obligations brought by the Commission 
against the French Republic, the Republic of Austria and Ireland in relation to the fixing of mini-
mum prices for the retail sale of certain types of manufactured tobacco (cigarettes and other to-
bacco products in the case of France, cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco in the case of Austria and cig-
arettes in the case of Ireland). The Commission had brought these cases before the Court because 
it took the view that the national legislation at issue was contrary to Directive 95/59/EC (43), which 
imposes certain rules on customs duties which affect the consumption of those products, in that 
the national legislation undermined the freedom of manufacturers and importers to determine the 
maximum retail selling price of their products, and thus free competition.
The Court held that a system of minimum prices cannot be regarded as compatible with that direc-
tive unless it is structured in such a way as to ensure, in any event, that the competitive advantage 
which could result for some producers and importers of those products from lower cost prices is 
not impaired. It ruled that the Member States which imposed minimum retail selling prices for 
cigarettes were failing to fulfil their obligations under Article 9(1) of Directive 95/59/EC, since that 
system did not make it possible to ensure, in any event, that the minimum price imposed did not 
impair the competitive advantage which could result for some producers and importers of tobacco 
products from lower cost prices. According to the Court, such a system, which furthermore fixed 
the minimum price by reference to the average price on the market for each category of ciga-
rette, was likely to eliminate price differences between competing products and to cause prices to 
converge around the price of the most expensive product. That system therefore undermined the 
freedom of producers and importers to determine their maximum retail selling price, guaranteed 
by the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 95/59/EC.
(41)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).
(42)  Case 155/79 AM & S Europe v Commission [1982] ECR 1575.
(43)  Council Directive 95/59/EC of 27 November 1995 on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manu-
factured tobacco (OJ 1995 L 291, p. 40), as amended by Council Directive 2002/10/EC of 12 February 2002 (OJ 2002 L 46, p. 26).38  Annual Report 2010
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The Member States had attempted to justify their legislation by invoking the Framework Conven-
tion of the World Health Organisation (WHO) (44). The Court held that that convention cannot affect 
the compatibility or otherwise of such a system with Article 9(1) of Directive 95/59/EC since the 
convention imposes no actual obligation on the contracting parties with regard to price policies 
for tobacco products, and merely describes possible approaches by which to take account of na-
tional health objectives concerning tobacco control. Article 6(2) of the convention provides only 
that the contracting parties are to adopt or maintain measures which ‘may include’ implement-
ing tax policies and, ‘where appropriate’, price policies, concerning tobacco products. The Mem-
ber States had also relied on the provisions of Article 30 EC in order to justify an infringement of 
Article 9(1) of Directive 95/59/EC with reference to the objective of protection of health and life of 
humans. The Court held that Article 30 EC cannot be understood as authorising measures other 
than the quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and the measures having equivalent ef-
fect envisaged by Articles 28 EC and 29 EC.
Finally, the Court considered that Directive 95/59/EC does not prevent the Member States from 
taking measures to combat smoking, which forms part of the objective of protecting public health, 
and recalled that fiscal legislation is an important and effective instrument for discouraging con-
sumption of tobacco products and, therefore, for the protection of public health, given that the 
objective of ensuring that a high price level is fixed for those products may adequately be attained 
by increased taxation of those products, the excise duty increases sooner or later being reflected 
in an increase in the retail price, without undermining the freedom to determine prices. The Court 
added that the prohibition against fixing minimum prices does not prevent the Member States 
from prohibiting the sale of manufactured tobacco at a loss in so far as this does not undermine 
the freedom of producers and importers to fix the maximum retail selling price of their products. 
Those economic players will thus not be able to absorb the impact of taxes on those prices by sell-
ing their products at a price below the sum of the cost price and all taxes.
Trade marks
In Case C-398/08 P Audi v OHIM (judgment of 21 January 2010), the Court held that an advertis-
ing slogan can be regarded, in certain circumstances, as a distinctive sign and can constitute on 
that basis a valid trade mark in accordance with the provisions of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 
No 40/94 (45). It therefore annulled the decision refusing registration of the trade mark in ques-
tion consisting of the slogan Vorsprung durch Technik (meaning, inter alia, advance or advantage 
through technology). The fact that a mark is made up of a promotional formula which could be 
used by other undertakings is not sufficient for that mark to be devoid of any distinctive character. 
Such a mark can therefore be perceived by the relevant public both as a promotional formula and 
as an indication of the commercial origin of goods and/or services, which is the function of the 
mark. The Court went on to list certain criteria applicable to advertising slogans: an expression 
which can have a number of meanings, constitute a play on words or be perceived as imagina-
tive, surprising and unexpected and, in that way, be easily remembered. Although the presence 
of such characteristics is not necessary, it is nevertheless likely to endow the sign in question with 
distinctive character. In the Court’s view, even if the advertising slogans are made up of an objec-
tive message, the trade marks formed from that slogan are not, by virtue of that fact alone, devoid 
of distinctive character in so far as they are not descriptive. Thus, according to the Court, in order 
for an advertising slogan submitted as a trade mark to have distinctive character, it must possess 
(44)  WHO  Framework  Convention  on  Tobacco  Control  approved  by  the  Community  by  Council  Decision  2004/513/EC 
of 2 June 2004 (OJ 2004 L 213, p. 8).
(45)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  39
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a certain originality or resonance, require at least some interpretation by the relevant public, or set 
off a cognitive process in the minds of that public. The Court therefore held that, however simple 
the slogan in question may be, it cannot be categorised as ordinary to the point of excluding, from 
the outset and without any further analysis, the possibility that the mark comprising that slogan is 
capable of indicating to the consumer the commercial origin of the goods or services covered by 
its registration.
In Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL and Google France SARL v Centre national de 
recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL and Others (judgment of 23 March 2010), the Court, 
on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the French Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), ruled 
on the respective liability of providers of referencing services and advertisers in the event of use of 
‘AdWords’. The Court thus had to interpret the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (46) and Direc-
tive 89/104/EEC (47) in order to clarify the concept of use of a mark for the purposes of Article 9(1) 
of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 and Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 89/104/EEC. Google operates an 
Internet search engine based on the use of keywords and offers a paid referencing service called 
‘AdWords’. That service enables any economic operator, by means of the reservation of one or more 
keywords, to obtain the placing — in the event of a correspondence between one or more of those 
words and that/those entered as a request in the search engine by an Internet user — of an adver-
tising link to its site, accompanied by an advertising message. The entry by Internet users of terms 
constituting trade marks into Google’s search engine triggers the display, under the heading ‘spon-
sored links’, of links to sites offering imitations of the products of Louis Vuitton Malletier and to the 
sites of competitors of Viaticum and of the Centre national de recherche en relations humaines, 
respectively. Those companies, proprietors of the trade marks used as ‘AdWords’, therefore brought 
proceedings against Google with a view to obtaining a declaration that Google had infringed their 
trade marks.
The Cour de cassation, ruling at last instance in the proceedings brought against Google by the 
trade mark proprietors, asked the Court of Justice about the lawfulness of the use, as keywords in 
an Internet referencing service, of signs which correspond to trade marks, without consent having 
been given by the proprietors of those trade marks. The advertisers use those signs in respect of 
their goods or services. That is not, however, the case as regards the referencing service provider 
when it permits advertisers to select, as keywords, signs identical with trade marks, stores those 
signs and displays its clients’ advertisements on the basis thereof.
The Court stated that the use, by a third party, of a sign identical with, or similar to, the proprietor’s 
trade mark implies, at the very least, that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial com-
munication. According to the Court, a referencing service provider allows advertisers to use signs 
which are identical with, or similar to, trade marks held by third parties, without itself using those 
signs. While a trade mark proprietor may not be able to rely on his marks as against the referenc-
ing service provider, which does not use them itself, he can nonetheless rely on them as against 
advertisers who, by means of the keyword corresponding to the marks, have advertisements placed 
by Google which do not enable Internet users, or enable them only with difficulty, to identify the 
undertaking from which the goods or services covered by the advertisements originate. The Inter-
net user may err as to the origin of the goods or services in question. The function of the mark — to 
guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services (‘function of indicating [the] origin’ of 
(46)  See the preceding footnote.
(47)  First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1).40  Annual Report 2010
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the mark) — is then adversely affected. The Court stated that it is for the national court to assess, on 
a case-by-case basis, whether the facts of the dispute before it indicate such adverse effects, or a risk 
thereof, on the function of indicating origin. With regard to the use by Internet advertisers of a sign 
corresponding to another person’s trade mark as a keyword for the purposes of displaying advertis-
ing messages, the Court considered that that use is liable to have certain repercussions on the adver-
tising use of the mark by its proprietor and on the latter’s commercial strategy. Nevertheless, those 
repercussions of use by third parties of a sign identical with the trade mark do not of themselves 
constitute an adverse effect on the ‘advertising function’ of the trade mark.
The Court was also asked about the liability of an operator such as Google for its customers’ data 
which are stored on its server. Questions of liability are governed by national law. However, Europe-
an Union law lays down limitations of the liability of intermediary providers of information society 
services (48). In relation to whether an Internet referencing service, such as ‘AdWords’, constitutes an 
information society service consisting in the storage of information supplied by the advertiser and 
whether, therefore, the referencing service provider’s liability is limited, the Court observed that 
the referring court had to examine whether the role played by the service provider was neutral, in 
the sense that its conduct was merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowl-
edge or control of the data which it stored. Furthermore, according to the Court, if it transpires that 
an Internet referencing service provider has not played an active role, it cannot be held liable for 
the data which it has stored at the request of an advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of 
the unlawful nature of those data or of that advertiser’s activities, it failed to act expeditiously to 
remove or to disable access to those data.
Social policy
The Court has considered various aspects of social policy as reflected in the numerous directives 
introduced in this area.
In Case C-242/09 Albron Catering (judgment of 21 October 2010), the Court had to clarify the mean-
ing of ‘transferor’ in Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, busi-
nesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (49). According to recital 3 in the preamble thereto, 
the directive is intended ‘to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a change of 
employer’. To that effect, Article 3(1) provides that ‘[t]he transferor’s rights and obligations arising 
from a contract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a trans-
fer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee’. The question put to the Court 
in this case was whether, in the case of a transfer, within the meaning of Directive 2001/23/EC, of 
an undertaking belonging to a group to an undertaking outside that group, it is possible to regard 
as a ‘transferor’, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of that directive, the group company to which 
the employees were assigned on a permanent basis without, however, being linked to the latter by 
a contract of employment, given that there exists within that group an undertaking with which the 
employees concerned were linked by such a contract of employment. The Court answered in the 
affirmative. The requirement under Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC that there be either an em-
(48)  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, 
p. 1).
(49)  Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safe-
guarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses 
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ployment contract or, in the alternative and thus as an equivalent, an employment relationship at 
the date of the transfer suggests that, in the mind of the European Union legislature, a contractual 
link with the transferor is not required in all circumstances for employees to be able to benefit from 
the protection conferred by that directive.
In Case C-104/09 Roca Álvarez (judgment of 30 September 2010), the Court held that a national 
measure which provides that female workers who are mothers and whose status is that of an em-
ployed person are entitled, in various ways, to take leave during the first nine months following the 
child’s birth, whereas male workers who are fathers with that same status are not entitled to the 
same leave unless the child’s mother is also an employed person, is contrary to European Union law 
and, in particular, to Article 2(1), (3) and (4) and Article 5 of Directive 76/207/EEC (50). The Court noted 
that, since that leave can be taken by the employed father or the employed mother without distinc-
tion, meaning that feeding and devoting time to the child can be carried out just as well by the 
father as by the mother, it appears to be accorded to workers in their capacity as parents of the child. 
It cannot therefore be regarded as ensuring the protection of the biological condition of the woman 
following pregnancy or the protection of the special relationship between a mother and her child. 
Moreover, according to the Court, to refuse entitlement to such leave to fathers whose status is that 
of an employed person, on the sole ground that the child’s mother does not have that status, could 
have as its effect that a woman who is self-employed would have to limit her self-employed activity 
and bear the burden resulting from the birth of her child alone, without the child’s father being able 
to ease that burden. Consequently, the Court held that such a measure cannot be considered to be 
a measure eliminating or reducing existing inequalities in society within the meaning of Article 2(4) 
of Directive 76/207/EEC, nor a measure seeking to achieve substantive as opposed to formal equality 
by reducing the real inequalities that can arise in society and thus, in accordance with Article 157(4) 
TFEU, to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in the professional careers of the relevant persons.
In Case C-232/09 Danosa (judgment of 11 November 2010), the Court was asked, first, whether 
a person who provides services to a capital company, while being a member of its board of direc-
tors, must be regarded as a worker within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduc-
tion of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers 
and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (51). The Court answered in the 
affirmative, provided that the activity of the person concerned is carried out, for some time, under 
the direction or supervision of another body of that company and if, in return for those activities, 
the board member receives remuneration. It also stated that the sui generis nature of the employ-
ment relationship under national law is of no consequence as regards whether or not a person is 
a worker for the purposes of European Union law. Next, the Court had to ascertain whether na-
tional legislation under which a member of the board of directors of a capital company may be 
dismissed without any account being taken of the fact that she is pregnant is in conformity with 
the prohibition of dismissal laid down in Article 10 of Directive 92/85/EEC. According to the Court, 
if the person concerned is a ‘pregnant worker’ within the meaning of that directive, the legislation 
must be considered incompatible with the directive. The Court added that if the applicant were 
not a ‘pregnant worker’ within the meaning of that directive, the applicant could potentially rely on 
(50)  Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40).
(51)  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety 
and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (10th individual di-
rective within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1).42  Annual Report 2010
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Directive 76/207/EEC, as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC (52). By virtue of the principle of non-dis-
crimination and, in particular, the provisions of Directive 76/207/EEC, protection against dismissal 
must be afforded to women not only during maternity leave, but also throughout the period of 
the pregnancy. Consequently, according to the Court, even if the board member concerned is not 
a ‘pregnant worker’, the fact remains that her removal on account of pregnancy or essentially on 
account of pregnancy can affect only women and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on 
grounds of sex, contrary to Article 2(1) and (7) and Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 76/207/EEC.
Cases C-194/08 Gassmayr and C-471/08 Parviainen (judgments of 1 July 2010) also resulted in rulings 
by the Court on the interpretation of Directive 92/85/EEC, cited above (53). Specifically, the Court was 
called upon to rule on issues relating to the calculation of the income which must be paid to work-
ers during their pregnancy or maternity leave when they are temporarily transferred to another job 
or granted leave from work. According to the Court, Article 11(1) of Directive 92/85/EEC does not 
preclude national legislation which provides that a pregnant worker temporarily granted leave from 
work on account of her pregnancy is entitled to pay equivalent to the average earnings she received 
during a reference period prior to the beginning of her pregnancy with the exception of the on-call 
duty allowance. A pregnant worker who, in accordance with Article 5(2) of Directive 92/85/EEC, has 
been temporarily transferred on account of her pregnancy to a job in which she performs tasks other 
than those she performed prior to that transfer is not entitled to the pay she received on average 
prior to that transfer. The Member States and, where appropriate, management and labour are not 
required pursuant to Article 11(1) of Directive 92/85/EEC to maintain, during the temporary transfer, 
the pay components or supplementary allowances which are dependent on the performance by the 
worker concerned of specific functions in particular circumstances and which are intended essen-
tially to compensate for the disadvantages related to that performance. By contrast, the Court held 
that, in addition to the maintenance of her basic salary, a pregnant worker granted leave from work 
or who is prohibited from working is entitled, pursuant to Article 11(1), to pay components or sup-
plementary allowances relating to her professional status, such as allowances relating to her senior-
ity, her length of service and her professional qualifications.
Furthermore, in Case C-149/10 Chatzi (judgment of 16 September 2010), the Court clarified the 
scope of clause 2.1 of the framework agreement on parental leave annexed to Directive 96/34/EC 
on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (54). First, 
the Court held that that provision cannot be interpreted as conferring an individual right to paren-
tal leave on the child, on account of both the wording and the purpose of the framework agree-
ment. Second, the Court rejected the interpretation of clause 2.1 of the framework agreement on 
parental leave that the birth of twins confers entitlement to a number of periods of parental leave 
equal to the number of children born. Nonetheless, the Court stated that, read in the light of the 
principle of equal treatment, this clause obliges the national legislature to establish a parental 
leave regime which, according to the situation obtaining in the Member State concerned, ensures 
that the parents of twins receive treatment that takes due account of their particular needs. It then 
(52)  Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40) 
and Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Directive 76/207/EEC 
(OJ 2002 L 269, p. 15).
(53)  See footnote 51.
(54)  Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the 
ETUC (OJ 1996 L 145, p. 4), as amended by Council Directive 97/75/EC of 15 December 1997 amending and extending, to the 
United Kingdom, Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC 
(OJ 1998 L 10, p. 24).Annual Report 2010  43
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left it to national courts to determine whether the national rules meet that requirement and, if 
necessary, to interpret them, so far as possible, in conformity with European Union law.
A number of cases have served to enable the Court to reaffirm the existence of the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of age, and to clarify further the scope of that principle.
In Case C-499/08 Andersen (judgment of 12 October 2010), the Court had the opportunity to rule 
on the interpretation of Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC (55) establishing a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation. According to the Court, those provisions 
preclude national legislation pursuant to which workers who are eligible to draw an old-age pen-
sion from their employer under a pension scheme which they have joined before attaining the age 
of 50 years cannot, on that ground alone, claim a severance allowance aimed at assisting workers 
with more than 12 years of service in the undertaking in finding new employment. The Court found 
that the legislation at issue operated a difference of treatment based directly on age which deprived 
certain workers of their right to the severance allowance on the sole ground that they were entitled to 
draw an old-age pension. The Court went on to consider the possible justification for that difference 
of treatment, under the conditions laid down by Directive 2000/78/EC. It held that while the legisla-
tion is proportionate in the light of legitimate employment policy and labour market objectives, it 
goes beyond what is necessary to attain those aims. It excludes from entitlement to the allowance not 
only all workers who are actually going to receive an old-age pension from their employer but also all 
those who are eligible for such a pension but who wish to continue with their career. The legislation is 
therefore not justified and, accordingly, is incompatible with Directive 2000/78/EC.
In Case C-555/07 Kücükdevici (judgment of 19 January 2010), the Court held that the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression by Directive 2000/78/EC must be inter-
preted as precluding national legislation which provides that periods of employment completed 
by an employee before reaching the age of 25 are not taken into account in calculating the notice 
period for dismissal. The Court also observed that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations 
on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual. However, it noted 
that Directive 2000/78/EC merely gives expression to the principle of equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation, and that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is a general 
principle of European Union law. Consequently, it concluded that it is for the national court, hear-
ing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression 
in Directive 2000/78/EC, to provide, within the limits of its jurisdiction, the legal protection which 
individuals derive from European Union law and to ensure the full effectiveness of that law, disap-
plying if need be any provision of national legislation contrary to that principle.
Finally, in Cases C-229/08 Wolf and C-341/08 Petersen (judgments of 12 January 2010) and in Case 
C-45/09 Rosenbladt (judgment of 12 October 2010), the Court ruled on the scope to be attributed 
to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, in terms of Directive 2000/78/EC. In the 
first case, the Court held that, although national legislation which sets the maximum age for re-
cruitment to intermediate career posts in the fire service at 30 years introduces a difference of 
treatment on grounds of age for the purposes of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC, such leg-
islation may be regarded as appropriate to the objective of ensuring the operational capacity and 
proper functioning of the professional fire service, which constitutes a legitimate objective within 
the meaning of Article 4(1) of that directive. Furthermore, that legislation appears not to go be-
yond what is necessary to achieve that objective, since the possession of especially high physical 
(55)  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).44  Annual Report 2010
Court of Justice  Case-law
capacities may, for the purposes of Article 4(1) of the directive, be regarded as a genuine and deter-
mining occupational requirement for carrying on the occupation of a person in the intermediate 
career of the fire service, and the need to possess full physical capacity to carry on that occupation 
is related to the age of the persons in that career.
In the second case, the Court held that Article 2(5) of Directive 2000/78/EC precludes a national 
measure setting a maximum age for practising as a panel dentist, in this case 68 years, if its sole 
aim is ostensibly to protect the health of patients against the decline in performance of those den-
tists after that age and that age-limit does not apply to non-panel dentists. By contrast, Article 6(1) 
of that directive does not preclude such a measure where its aim is to share out employment op-
portunities among the generations in the profession of panel dentist, if, taking into account the 
situation in the labour market concerned, the measure is appropriate and necessary for achieving 
that aim. In the third case, the Court held that Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC does not pre-
clude a national provision under which clauses on automatic termination of employment contracts 
on the ground that the employee has reached the age of retirement are considered to be valid, in 
so far as, first, that provision is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim relating to 
employment policy and the labour market and, second, the means of achieving that aim are ap-
propriate and necessary.
Environment
In Case C-297/08 Commission v Italy (judgment of 4 March 2010), the Court had to consider wheth-
er, as the Commission claimed, the Italian Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under Direc-
tive 2006/12/EC (56). The allegations against Italy related to the disposal of waste by the region of 
Campania only.
With regard to facilities for the recovery or disposal of urban waste, the Court observed that, for the 
purposes of establishing an integrated and adequate network of waste disposal installations, the 
Member States enjoy a measure of discretion as to the territorial basis which they consider appro-
priate for achieving national self-sufficiency. It may be appropriate for certain categories of waste, 
owing to their specific characteristics, to be treated at one or more dedicated national installations 
or even in cooperation with other Member States. By contrast, in the case of non-hazardous urban 
waste — which does not require specialised installations — the Member States must organise 
a disposal network as close as possible to the places where the waste is produced, although that 
does not alter the fact that it is also possible to establish interregional or even cross-border co-
operation, where that is consistent with the principle of proximity. The opposition of inhabitants, 
the non-performance of contractual obligations or even the existence of criminal activity do not 
constitute cases of force majeure that might justify either the failure to fulfil obligations under that 
directive or the failure actually to construct the infrastructure on time.
With regard to danger to human health and harm to the environment, the Court observed that, 
whilst the directive lays down the objectives of preservation of the environment and protection of 
human health, it does not specify the actual content of the measures to be taken and leaves a cer-
tain margin of discretion to the Member States. It follows that, in principle, it cannot be inferred 
directly from the fact that a situation is not in conformity with the objectives laid down in Arti-
cle 4(1) of Directive 2006/12/EC that the Member State concerned has necessarily failed to fulfil its 
obligations under that provision, that is to say, to take the requisite measures to ensure that waste is 
disposed of without endangering human health and without harming the environment. However, 
(56)  Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on waste (OJ 2006 L 114, p. 9).Annual Report 2010  45
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if that situation persists and, in particular, if it leads to a significant deterioration in the environment 
over a protracted period without any action being taken by the competent authorities, this may be 
an indication that Member States have exceeded the discretion conferred on them by that provi-
sion. Consequently, by failing to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste recovery 
and disposal installations close to the place where that waste is produced, and by failing to adopt 
all the measures necessary to ensure that human health is not endangered or the environment 
harmed in the region of Campania, the Italian Republic failed to fulfil its obligations in two respects.
In  the  two  judgments  of  9  March  2010  in  Case  C-378/08  ERG and Others  and  Joined  Cases 
C-379/08 and C-380/08 ERG and Others, respectively, the Court was able to consider the interpreta-
tion of Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability (57).
In Case C-378/08, the Court held that that environmental liability directive does not preclude na-
tional legislation which allows the competent authority to operate on the presumption that there 
is a causal link between operators and the pollution found on account of the fact that the opera-
tors’ installations are located close to the polluted area. However, in accordance with the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle, in order for such a causal link to be presumed, that authority must have plausible 
evidence capable of justifying its presumption, such as the fact that the operator’s installation is 
located close to the pollution found and that there is a correlation between the pollutants identi-
fied and the substances used by the operator in connection with his activities. Furthermore, the 
competent authority is not required to establish fault on the part of operators whose activities 
are held to be responsible for the environmental damage. On the other hand, that authority must 
carry out a prior investigation into the origin of the pollution found, and it has a discretion as to the 
procedures, means to be employed and length of such an investigation.
In Joined Cases C-379/08 and C-380/08, the Court held that the competent authority is permitted 
to alter substantially the measures for remedying environmental damage which were chosen at 
the conclusion of a procedure carried out on a consultative basis with the operators concerned 
and which have already been implemented or begun to be put into effect. However, in order to 
adopt such a decision, that authority must:
— give the operators the opportunity to be heard, except where the urgency of the environmental 
situation requires immediate action on the part of the competent authority;
— invite, amongst others, the persons on whose land those measures are to be carried out to sub-
mit their observations and take them into account; and
— state in its decision the grounds on which its choice is based, and, where appropriate, the 
grounds which justify the fact that there was no need for a detailed examination or that it was not 
possible to carry out such an examination due, for example, to the urgency of the environmental 
situation.
Also, the Court held that the directive on environmental liability did not preclude national legis-
lation which permitted the competent authority to make the exercise by operators of the right 
to use their land subject to the condition that they carry out the environmental recovery works 
required, even though that land was not affected by those works because it had already been 
decontaminated or had never been polluted. However, such a measure had to be justified by the 
(57)  Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to 
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 56).46  Annual Report 2010
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objective of preventing a deterioration of the environmental situation or, pursuant to the precau-
tionary principle, by the objective of preventing the occurrence or resurgence of further environ-
mental damage on the land belonging to the operators which was adjacent to the whole shoreline 
at which the remedial measures were directed.
Visas, asylum and immigration
A number of judgments relating to this constantly developing area deserve particular attention. In 
Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli (judgment of 22 June 2010), the Court stated 
that Article 67(2) TFEU and Articles 20 and 21 of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 (58) preclude national 
legislation which grants to the police authorities of the Member State in question the power to 
check, solely within an area of 20 kilometres from the land border of that State with States party 
to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, the identity of any person, irrespec-
tive of his behaviour and of specific circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order, in 
order to ascertain whether the obligations laid down by law to hold, carry and produce papers and 
documents are fulfilled, where that legislation does not provide the necessary framework for that 
power to guarantee that its practical exercise cannot have an effect equivalent to border checks.
In Case C-578/08 Chakroun (judgment of 4 March 2010), the Court had an opportunity to clarify its 
case-law concerning family reunification.
It held, first of all, that the phrase ‘recourse to the social assistance system’ in Article 7(1)(c) of Di-
rective 2003/86/EC (59) must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from adopting rules in 
respect of family reunification which result in such reunification being refused to a sponsor who 
has proved that he has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and 
the members of his family, but who, given the level of his resources, will nevertheless be entitled 
to claim special assistance in order to meet exceptional, individually determined, essential living 
costs, tax refunds granted by local authorities on the basis of his income, or income-support meas-
ures in the context of local-authority minimum-income policies.
Second, the Court held that Directive 2003/86/EC, in particular Article 2(d) thereof, must be inter-
preted as precluding national legislation which, in applying the income requirement set out in Ar-
ticle 7(1)(c) of that directive, draws a distinction according to whether the family relationship arose 
before or after the sponsor entered the territory of the host Member State.
In Case C-31/09 Bolbol (judgment of 17 June 2010), the Court interpreted the first sentence of 
Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83/EC (60). It is a specific feature of this directive that it sets out, 
in the context of the European Union, the obligations arising under the Geneva Convention (61). 
The Court recalled that the particular convention rules applicable to displaced Palestinians relate 
only to persons who are at present receiving protection or assistance from the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Consequently, only 
(58)  Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community code 
on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1).
(59)  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12).
(60)  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nation-
als or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protec-
tion granted (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 12).
(61)  Geneva  Convention  of  28  July  1951  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees  (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.  189,  p.  150, 
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those persons who have actually availed themselves of the assistance provided by UNRWA come 
within those particular rules. By contrast, persons who are or have been eligible to receive protec-
tion or assistance from that agency are still covered by the general provisions of the convention. 
Thus, their applications for refugee status must be examined individually and can be granted only 
if there has been persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political persecution. As 
regards proof that assistance has actually been received from UNRWA, the Court stated that, while 
registration with UNRWA is sufficient proof, the beneficiary must be permitted to adduce evidence 
of that assistance by other means.
In Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 B and D (judgment of 9 November 2010), the Court clarified 
the rules for the application of the clauses excluding a person from refugee status laid down in Ar-
ticle 12(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2004/83/EC (62). It was faced with an applicant for refugee status, 
on the one hand, and a recognised refugee, on the other, both of whom had been members of 
organisations included in the European Union list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts 
of terrorism drawn up in the context of combating terrorism in accordance with a resolution of the 
United Nations Security Council.
The Court began by considering whether it constitutes a ‘serious non-political crime’ or an ‘act con-
trary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/83/EC 
if the person concerned was a member of an organisation which is included in the list and actively 
supported the armed struggle pursued by that organisation, possibly in a prominent position. The 
Court stated that the exclusion from refugee status of a person who has been a member of an or-
ganisation which uses terrorist methods is conditional on an individual assessment of the specific 
facts, making it possible for the competent authority to determine whether there are serious rea-
sons for considering that that person has, in the context of his activities within that organisation, 
committed a serious non-political crime or has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations, or that he has instigated such a crime or such acts, or participated 
in them in some other way, within the meaning of the directive.
It follows, first, that the mere fact that the person concerned was a member of such an organisation 
cannot automatically mean that that person must be excluded from refugee status. Second, the 
Court observed that participation alone in the activities of a terrorist group is not such as to trigger 
the automatic application of the exclusion clauses laid down in the directive, since the directive 
presupposes a full investigation into all the circumstances of each individual case.
The Court went on to find that exclusion from refugee status pursuant to one of the exclusion 
clauses concerned is not conditional on the person concerned representing a present danger to 
the host Member State. The exclusion clauses are intended as a penalty only for acts committed 
in the past. Within the scheme of the directive, there are other provisions enabling the competent 
authorities to adopt the necessary measures if a person represents a present danger.
Finally, the Court interpreted Directive 2004/83/EC as meaning that Member States may grant 
a right of asylum under their national law to a person who is excluded from refugee status pursu-
ant to one of the exclusion clauses under that directive, provided that that other kind of protection 
does not entail a risk of confusion with refugee status within the meaning of the directive.
In Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08 Salahadin Abdulla and Others (judg-
ment of 2 March 2010), the Court considered the conditions governing the cessation of refugee 
(62)  See footnote 60.48  Annual Report 2010
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status in connection with a change of the circumstances that had warranted its recognition, as 
provided for in Article 11(1)(e) of Directive 2004/83/EC.
The Court held that refugee status ceases to exist when, following a change of circumstances of 
a significant and non-temporary nature in the third country concerned, the circumstances which 
justified the fear of persecution no longer exist and the person has no other reason to fear per-
secution. In order to conclude that a refugee’s fear of persecution is no longer justified, the com-
petent authorities must verify that the third country’s actor or actors of protection, referred to 
in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/83/EC, have taken reasonable steps to prevent the persecution. 
They must therefore operate, inter alia, an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and 
punishment of acts constituting persecution. The competent authorities must also ensure that the 
national concerned will have access to such protection if he ceases to have refugee status.
Next, the Court examined the situation where the circumstances which resulted in the granting 
of refugee status have ceased to exist, and clarified the circumstances in which the competent 
authorities must verify, if necessary, whether there are no other circumstances which could justify 
the person concerned reasonably fearing persecution. In the context of that analysis, the Court 
noted, inter alia, that both at the stage of the granting of refugee status and at the stage of the 
examination of the question of whether that status should be maintained, the assessment relates 
to the same question of whether or not the established circumstances constitute such a threat of 
persecution that the person concerned may reasonably fear, in the light of his individual situation, 
that he will in fact be subjected to acts of persecution. Consequently, the Court concluded that 
the standard of probability used to assess the risk of persecution is the same as that applied when 
refugee status was granted.
Judicial cooperation in civil matters and private international law
The ‘Communitarisation’ of judicial cooperation in civil matters has been accompanied, as was to 
be expected, by a strengthening of the role of the Community courts.
In the course of 2010, the Court of Justice delivered a number of important judgments concerning 
the interpretation of the special provisions applicable to contracts laid down by Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (63).
Reference must be made, first of all, to Case C-381/08 Car Trim (judgment of 25 February 2010), 
in which the Court was required to rule on the interpretation of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 
No 44/2001, which contains two independent definitions — the first in matters relating to a con-
tract for the sale of goods and the second in matters relating to a contract for the provision of 
services — in order to facilitate the application of the rule of special jurisdiction in matters relating 
to a contract laid down in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, a rule which designates the 
courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question. In matters relating to a contract 
for the sale of goods, the first indent of Article 5(1)(b) of the regulation defines the place of per-
formance of that obligation as being the place of delivery of the goods, as provided for in the con-
tract. In matters relating to a contract for the provision of services, the second indent of Article 5(1)
(b) of the regulation refers to the place of provision of the services, as provided for in the contract. 
The question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in this case related, first, to the definition 
of the criteria for distinguishing between ‘sale of goods’ and ‘provision of services’ within the mean-
(63)  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  49
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ing of Article 5(1)(b) of the regulation and, second, to the determination of the place of perform-
ance of the delivery obligation in the case of contracts involving carriage of goods, particularly if 
no provision has been made for this in the contract.
With regard to the first part of the question, the Court answered that Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that where the purpose of contracts is the supply 
of goods to be manufactured or produced and, even though the purchaser has specified certain 
requirements with regard to the provision, fabrication and delivery of the components to be pro-
duced, the purchaser has not supplied the materials and the supplier is responsible for the quality 
of the goods and their compliance with the contract, those contracts must be classified as a ‘sale 
of goods’ within the meaning of the first indent of Article 5(1)(b) of that regulation. In response to 
the second part of the question referred — concerning the determination of the place of perform-
ance of the contract in the case of contracts involving carriage of goods — the Court answered 
that, in accordance with the first indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, in the case 
of a sale involving carriage of goods, the place where, under the contract, the goods sold were 
delivered or should have been delivered must be determined on the basis of the provisions of the 
contract. It went on to clarify that where it is impossible to determine the place of delivery on that 
basis, without reference to the substantive law applicable to the contract, that place is the place 
where the physical transfer of the goods took place, as a result of which the purchaser obtained, 
or should have obtained, actual power of disposal over those goods at their final destination. The 
Court considers not only that that outcome meets the objectives of predictability and proximity, 
but also that it is consistent with the principal aim of a contract for the sale of goods, which is the 
transfer of those goods from the seller to the purchaser, an operation which is not fully completed 
until the arrival of those goods at their final destination.
Equally worthy of note are Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer and Hotel. Alpenhof (judg-
ment of 7 December 2010), which also concern the application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in 
matters relating to contracts. This judgment contains the Court’s ruling on the interpretation of Ar-
ticle 15 of the regulation in relation to consumer contracts. More particularly, the question referred 
for a preliminary ruling that was common to both cases concerned the definition of the concept 
of ‘activity directed’ to the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled, as referred to in Arti-
cle 15(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. That concept, which is intended to allow the application 
of the regulation’s special provisions protecting consumers to contracts concluded via the Internet, 
is not defined in the regulation. A joint declaration by the Council and the Commission on Arti-
cle 15 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 states that ‘the mere fact that an Internet site is accessible is 
not sufficient for Article 15 to be applicable, although a factor will be that this Internet site solicits 
the conclusion of distance contracts and that a contract has actually been concluded at a distance, 
by whatever means’. The declaration also states that factors such as the language or currency used 
on a website are not sufficient evidence.
In order to clarify the terms of that regulation, the Court provided a general definition of the con-
cept of ‘directed activity’ in the context of electronic commerce and then a non-exhaustive list of 
evidence from which it may be concluded that the trader’s activity is directed to the Member State 
of the consumer’s domicile. In the first place, the Court confirmed that the concept of ‘directed ac-
tivity’ must be interpreted independently, and established that a trader directs his activity, via the 
Internet, to the Member State of the defendant’s domicile if, before the conclusion of any contract 
with the consumer, it is apparent from the websites and the trader’s overall activity that the trader 
was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, includ-
ing the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in the sense that he was minded to conclude 
a contract with them. In the second place, the Court specified, non-exhaustively, the matters to 
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the custom of consumers established in a Member State other than his own, namely the inter-
national nature of the activity, mention of itineraries from other Member States for going to the 
place where the trader is established, use of a language or a currency other than the language or 
currency generally used in the Member State in which the trader is established with the possibility 
of making and confirming the reservation in that other language, mention of telephone numbers 
with an international code, outlay of expenditure on an Internet referencing service in order to 
facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of his intermediary by consumers domiciled in other 
Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the 
trader is established, and mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled 
in various Member States. Finally, in the third place, the Court confirmed in this judgment the in-
sufficiency of matters such as the accessibility of the trader’s website in the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile, mention of an e-mail address or other contact details, or the use of the lan-
guage or currency generally used in the Member State of the trader’s establishment.
Furthermore, in Pammer, the Court also determined that a voyage by freighter can be classified 
as ‘package travel’ for the purposes of Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 if it fulfils the 
necessary conditions for a ‘package’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 90/314/EEC (64), 
according to which the voyage must involve, at an inclusive price, not only transport but also ac-
commodation, and must last more than 24 hours. It will be noted that, with a view to ensuring 
consistency in the European Union’s international private law, the Court decided to interpret Arti-
cle 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in the light of the corresponding provision in Regulation 
(EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, which expressly refers to the 
concept of ‘package travel’ within the meaning of Directive 90/314/EEC.
The interpretation of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (65), has given rise to three judgments worthy of note. 
These judgments concern applications relating to the return of a child where that child has been 
wrongfully removed from the country of the child’s habitual residence. It will also be noted that two 
of those judgments were delivered in the context of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure under 
Article 104b of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. That procedure has applied since 1 March 2008 to 
references concerning the area of freedom, security and justice, enabling the Court to deal within 
a considerably reduced timescale with the most sensitive issues, such as those which can arise, for 
example, in certain situations where a person has been deprived of his liberty, where the answer to 
the question raised is decisive as to the assessment of the legal situation of the person in custody 
or deprived of his liberty or, in matters of parental responsibility or the custody of children, where 
the identity of the court having jurisdiction under European Union law depends on the answer to 
the question referred for a preliminary ruling.
In Case C-211/10 Povse (judgment of 1 July 2010), the referring Austrian court put a series of ques-
tions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, in the context of the urgent procedure referred 
to above, relating to the interpretation of the provisions concerning the custody and return of 
a child contained in Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003. The main proceedings were between the par-
ents of a child who had been unlawfully removed by her mother from the family home in Italy to 
Austria. The complexity of the case arose from the fact that two sets of proceedings, one before the 
Italian courts and the other before the Austrian courts, had been conducted in parallel with differ-
ent outcomes. The first question referred for a preliminary ruling related to whether a provisional 
(64)  Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours (OJ 1990 L 158, p. 59).
(65)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  51
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measure, such as that handed down by the Italian court revoking the prohibition on the mother 
leaving Italy with the child and provisionally awarding custody to both parents, while authorising 
the child to reside in Austria pending final judgment, is a ‘judgment on custody that does not entail 
the return of the child’ within the meaning of Article 10(b)(iv) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003. The 
effect of such a decision by the court of the Member State where the child was previously habitu-
ally resident is to transfer jurisdiction from that court to the courts of the Member State to which 
the child was taken. The Court of Justice held that a provisional judgment does not constitute 
a ‘judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child’ within the meaning of Arti-
cle 10(b)(iv) of that regulation, and cannot be the basis of a transfer of jurisdiction to the courts of 
the Member State to which the child has been unlawfully removed. That conclusion follows from 
the structure of the regulation and is also in the interests of the child. The converse solution might 
deter the court which has jurisdiction in the Member State where the child was previously resident 
from adopting the provisional measures required in the interests of the child. Second, the Court 
of Justice was asked to rule on the interpretation of Article 11(8) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003. 
According to that provision, a decision of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention, such as that issued in this instance by the Austrian courts on the application of the 
father, cannot preclude the enforcement of any subsequent judgment which requires the return 
of the child issued by a court having jurisdiction under Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, such as that 
which the father obtained from the Italian courts in the main proceedings after the delivery of the 
Austrian decision of non-return. The question put to the Court of Justice was whether, in order 
to be enforceable, the decision ordering the return of the child had to be based on a final judg-
ment of the same court relating to rights of custody of the child. The Court answered in the nega-
tive, holding that such an interpretation is scarcely compatible with the objective of Article 11 of 
that regulation and the priority given to the jurisdiction of the court of origin. Third, the Court 
stated that the second subparagraph of Article 47(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 must be 
interpreted as meaning that a judgment delivered subsequently by a court in the Member State 
of enforcement which awards provisional custody rights and is deemed to be enforceable under 
the law of that State cannot preclude enforcement of a certified judgment delivered previously by 
the court which has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin and ordering the return of the child. 
As to whether a certified judgment is irreconcilable, within the meaning of the second subpara-
graph of Article 47(2) of the regulation, with a subsequent enforceable judgment, that question 
must be addressed only in relation to any judgments subsequently handed down by the courts 
with jurisdiction in the Member State of origin. Finally, fourth, the Court held that enforcement of 
a certified judgment cannot be refused in the Member State of enforcement because, as a result 
of a subsequent change of circumstances, it might be seriously detrimental to the best interests 
of the child. Such a change constitutes an issue of substance which must be resolved by the court 
with jurisdiction in the Member State of origin.
The issue of rights of custody and wrongful removal of a child in the context of the applica-
tion of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 was also at the heart of Case C-400/10 McB. (judgment 
of 5 October 2010), which was also dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure. 
This case highlights the differences between the national laws of the Member States in relation 
to the rights of custody of a father who is not married to the child’s mother. In certain national 
legal systems, the natural father of a child does not, by operation of law, have rights of custody; 
the acquisition of those rights is dependent on his obtaining a judgment from a national court 
with jurisdiction awarding him such rights. That is the case under Irish law which was applicable 
to the substance of the dispute. It follows from this that, in the absence of a decision awarding 
him custody of the child, the father cannot establish that the child’s removal was wrongful within 
the meaning of Article 2(11) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 in order to apply for the return of 
the child in its country of habitual residence. The question referred to the Court for a preliminary 
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custody to the father of a child who is not married to the mother subject to his obtaining a judi-
cial decision is compatible with Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, interpreted in accordance with 
Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union relating to respect for 
private and family life.
The Court emphasised, first of all, that while ‘rights of custody’ is defined autonomously by the 
regulation in question, it follows from Article 2(11)(a) of that regulation that the question of who 
has such rights is governed by the national law applicable, which is defined as being the law 
of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before its removal 
or retention. Next, the Court held that the fact that, unlike the mother, the natural father is not 
a person who automatically possesses rights of custody in respect of his child within the mean-
ing of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 does not affect the essence of his right to private 
and family life set out in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
provided that his right to apply for rights of custody to the national court with jurisdiction is 
safeguarded.
Finally, in Case C-256/09 Purrucker (judgment of 15 July 2010), the Court of Justice was called 
upon to rule on the applicability of the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 relating to 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments given by the court of another Member State to 
provisional measures adopted in relation to rights of custody on the basis of Article 20 of the 
regulation. In the first place, the Court recalled the distinction between the rules under Arti-
cles 8 to 14 of the regulation, which establish jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, and 
the rule under Article 20(1) of the regulation, under which a court of a Member State may adopt 
provisional, including protective, measures, even if its jurisdiction as to the substance is not estab-
lished, subject to the threefold condition that the measures adopted are urgent, are taken in re-
spect of persons and assets in the Member State where that court is situated and are provisional. 
In the second place, the Court held that the system of recognition and enforcement provided for 
in Article 21 et seq. of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 is not applicable to provisional measures 
adopted on the basis of Article 20 of that regulation. The Court stated that it was not the intention 
of the European Union legislature that there should be such applicability, as is clear both from 
the legislative history and from equivalent provisions in earlier instruments, such as Regulation 
(EC) No 1347/2000 and the Brussels II Convention. Furthermore, the Court accepted that the ap-
plication in all other Member States, including the State which has substantive jurisdiction, of the 
system of recognition and enforcement provided for by Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 in regard 
to provisional measures would create a risk of circumvention of the rules of jurisdiction laid down 
by that regulation and of forum shopping. That situation would be contrary to the objectives 
pursued by the regulation and, in particular, to the objective of making sure that the best inter-
ests of the child are taken into consideration by ensuring that decisions concerning the child are 
taken by the court geographically close to his habitual residence, that court being regarded by 
the European Union legislature as the court best placed to assess the measures to be taken in the 
interests of the child. Finally, in the third place, the Court ruled on the need to allow the defendant 
in the urgent procedure to bring an appeal against the judgment ordering provisional measures. 
The Court considered that, in view of the importance of the provisional measures — whether 
they are adopted by a court which has substantive jurisdiction or not — which may be ordered 
in matters of parental responsibility, it is vital that a person affected by such a procedure, even if 
that person has been heard by the court which adopted the provisional measures, be able to take 
steps to bring an appeal against the judgment ordering those measures. It is essential that that 
person be able to have the substantive jurisdiction which that court attributed to itself, or — if it is 
not evident from the judgment that that court had, or had attributed to itself, substantive jurisdic-
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regulation, reviewed by a court which is different from the court which adopted the measures and 
which is capable of ruling promptly.
Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
The instrument that epitomises police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the European 
arrest warrant, continues to generate case-law.
In Case C-261/09 Mantello (judgment of 16 November 2010), the Court interpreted Article 3(2) of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (66), which allows the judicial authority of the Member State 
of execution to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant if the executing judicial authority is 
informed that the requested person has been ‘finally judged by a Member State in respect of the 
same acts’. Asked, first of all, about the interpretation of ‘same acts’, the Court held that, for the 
purposes of the issue and execution of a European arrest warrant, the concept of the ‘same acts’ in 
Article 3(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA is an autonomous concept of European Union 
law. That concept of the ‘same acts’ also appears, moreover, in Article 54 of the Convention imple-
menting the Schengen Agreement and has, in that context, been interpreted as referring only to 
the nature of the acts, encompassing a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked 
together, irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected. In 
view of the shared objective of Article 54 of that convention and of Article 3(2) of the framework 
decision, which is to ensure that a person is not prosecuted or tried more than once in respect 
of the same acts, the interpretation of that concept given in the context of the Convention im-
plementing the Schengen Agreement is therefore equally valid for the purposes of Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA.
Next, the Court stated that a requested person is considered to have been finally judged in respect 
of the same acts where, following criminal proceedings, further prosecution is definitively barred 
or the accused is finally acquitted. Whether a person has been ‘finally’ judged is determined by the 
law of the Member State in which judgment was delivered. Consequently, a decision which, under 
the law of the Member State which instituted the criminal proceedings, does not definitively bar 
further prosecution at national level in respect of certain acts does not constitute a procedural ob-
stacle to the possible opening or continuation of criminal proceedings in respect of the same acts 
in one of the Member States of the European Union. When, in response to a request for information 
from the executing judicial authority, the authority which issued the arrest warrant has expressly 
stated, on the basis of its national law, that the earlier judgment delivered in its legal order is not 
a final judgment covering the acts referred to in the arrest warrant, the executing judicial authority 
cannot, in principle, refuse execution of the European arrest warrant.
Foreign and security policy
In the context of the common foreign and security policy, the Court, on a reference from the Ober-
landesgericht Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court), clarified the scope of the specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating ter-
rorism (judgment of 29 June 2010 in Case C-550/09 E and F), and provided its interpretation of 
Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 (67).
(66)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).
(67)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons 
and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70).54  Annual Report 2010
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In order to implement certain United Nations Organisation resolutions, the Council adopted Com-
mon Position 2001/931/CFSP (68) and Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, which order the freezing of 
funds as against persons and entities included on a list established and regularly updated by deci-
sions of the Council. Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, moreover, prohibits funds from being made 
available, directly or indirectly, to persons or entities included on that list.
Until June 2007, decisions were adopted without any notice to the persons or entities on the list of 
the specific reasons for their inclusion on that list. Following a judgment of the General Court (69) 
in which the listing of a group was held to be illegal on the grounds, in particular, that the Council 
had failed to state reasons for that listing and substantive review by the courts of the European 
Union was therefore impossible, the Council changed its listing procedure. On the adoption of 
a new decision updating the list (70), which entered into force on 29 June 2007, the Council there-
fore provided the persons and groups concerned with a statement of reasons justifying their in-
clusion on the list. The General Court, in subsequent judgments, held the listing of a number of 
other entities to be illegal on the same grounds as those set out in its judgment in Case T-228/02. 
On 2 May 2002, the organisation Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) was included on 
the list in question. The Council has since adopted various decisions updating that list. DHKP-C has 
always remained on it.
The case in which the Court was requested to rule concerned two German nationals against whom 
criminal proceedings had been brought in Germany. Mr E. and Mr F. were accused of being mem-
bers of DHKP-C between 30 August 2002 and 5 November 2008. They had been placed in pre-trial 
detention for membership of a terrorist group and criminal proceedings had been brought against 
them. Since it had doubts concerning the legality of DHKP-C’s inclusion on the list, the referring 
court asked the Court of Justice whether, in the context of the General Court’s judgments annul-
ling the listing of certain persons and entities owing to infringement of basic procedural guaran-
tees, DHKP-C’s listing must also be regarded as illegal for the period prior to 29 June 2007, notwith-
standing the fact that DHKP-C had not sought annulment of that listing.
At the outset, the Court observed that the case before the national court could lead to criminal 
penalties entailing custodial sentences. In that context, it noted that the European Union is based 
on the rule of law and the acts of its institutions are subject to review by the Court of their com-
patibility with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the general principles 
of law. In proceedings before the national courts, every party has the right to plead the illegality 
of the provisions contained in legislative acts of the European Union which serve as the basis for 
a decision or act of national law relied upon against him and to prompt the national court to put 
that question to the Court by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling if the party in ques-
tion had no right of direct action by which it could challenge those provisions before the General 
Court.
Regarding the legality of the Council’s decisions prior to June 2007, the Court noted that none of 
those decisions was accompanied by a statement of reasons relating to the legal conditions for 
the application to DHKP-C of the regulation or an explanation of the actual and specific reasons 
for which the Council considered that the inclusion of DHKP-C on the list was justified, or remained 
(68)  Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
(OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93).
(69)  Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006] ECR II-4665.
(70)  Council Decision 2007/445/EC of 28 June 2007 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 and repealing 
Decisions 2006/379/EC and 2006/1008/EC (OJ 2007 L 169, p. 58).Annual Report 2010  55
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so. The accused were therefore denied the information necessary to enable them to verify whether 
the inclusion of DHKP-C on the list during the period prior to 29 June 2007 was well founded, 
and to satisfy themselves, in particular, as to the accuracy and relevance of the evidence on which 
that listing was based, despite the fact that it was one of the grounds of the indictment drawn 
up against them. The lack of a statement of reasons which vitiated the listing was also liable to 
frustrate the attempts of the courts to carry out an adequate review of the substantive legality of 
that listing. The possibility of an adequate review by the courts is indispensable if a fair balance 
between the requirements of the fight against international terrorism, on the one hand, and the 
protection of fundamental liberties and rights, on the other, is to be ensured.
As to whether the decision of June 2007 legitimated DHKP-C’s inclusion on the list ex-post facto, 
the Court held that that decision could not, in any circumstances, be relied upon as a basis for 
a criminal conviction in respect of acts relating to the period prior to its entry into force. Such an in-
terpretation would infringe the principle of the non-retroactivity of provisions which may form the 
basis for a criminal conviction. In those circumstances, the Court held that it was for the national 
court to decline to apply, in the proceedings before it, the decisions of the Council adopted be-
fore June 2007, which consequently could not form any part of the basis for criminal proceedings 
against Mr E. or Mr F. in respect of the period prior to 29 June 2007.
Finally, the Court provided a wide interpretation of the prohibition laid down by Article 2(1)(b) 
of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on making funds available for the benefit of persons or enti-
ties included on the list. According to the Court, that prohibition encompasses all the acts nec-
essary if a person, a group or an entity on the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) 
No 2580/2001 is effectively to obtain full power of disposal in respect of the funds, other financial 
assets and economic resources concerned. According to the Court, that meaning is independent of 
the existence or absence of a relationship between the perpetrator of the act of ‘making available’ 
and the beneficiary.
In Case C-340/08 M and Others (judgment of 29 April 2010), the Court addressed the question 
whether social security and social assistance benefits — such as living allowance, child benefit, 
housing benefit — granted to the spouses of presumed terrorists included on the list of Regulation 
(EC) No 881/2002 (71) are covered by the freezing of funds under that regulation.
The Court held that, given that there are certain divergences between the various language ver-
sions of that regulation and of the United Nations Security Council resolution which it is designed 
to implement, the regulation must be construed in terms of its purpose, which is to combat inter-
national terrorism. The objective of the freezing of funds is to stop the persons concerned hav-
ing access to economic or financial resources, whatever their nature, that they could use to sup-
port their terrorist activities. In particular, that objective has to be understood as meaning that the 
freezing of funds applies only to those assets that can be turned into funds, goods or services ca-
pable of being used to support terrorist activities. The Court observed that it had not been argued 
that the spouses concerned handed over those funds to their husbands instead of allocating them 
to their basic household expenses, and it was not disputed that the funds in question were in fact 
used by the spouses to meet the essential needs of the households to which the persons included 
on the list belonged. It was hard to imagine how those funds could be turned into means that 
(71)  Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and 
extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan (OJ 2002 L 139, p. 9).56  Annual Report 2010
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could be used to support terrorist activities, since benefits were fixed at a level intended to meet 
only the strictly vital needs of the persons concerned. Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
benefit that a listed person might indirectly derive from the social payments made to his spouse 
does not compromise the objective pursued by that regulation. In consequence, Regulation (EC) 
No 881/2002 does not apply to the grant of social security or social assistance benefits to the 
spouses of persons included on the freezing of funds list.Annual Report 2010  57
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of State for Trade and Industry during the Italian tenure of the Presi-
dency of the Council; member of the Working Group of the European 
Community on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Director of 
the 1997 session of the research centre of The Hague Academy of Inter-
national Law, devoted to the WTO; Judge at the Court of First Instance 
from 4 March 1998 to 3 May 2006; Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 4 May 2006.
Pernilla Lindh
Born 1945; law graduate of the University of Lund; Legal Secretary and 
Judge at the District Court, Trollhättan (1971–74); Legal Secretary at 
the Court of Appeal, Stockholm (1974–75); Judge at the District Court, 
Stockholm (1975); Adviser on Legal and Administrative Matters to the 
President of the Court of Appeal, Stockholm (1975–78); Special Adviser 
at the Domstolverket (National Courts’ Administration) (1977); Adviser 
in the office of the Chancellor of Justice (1979–80); Associate Judge at 
the Court of Appeal, Stockholm (1980–81); Legal Adviser at the Minis-
try of Trade (1981–82); Legal Adviser, and subsequently Director and 
Director-General for Legal Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(1982–95); title of Ambassador in 1992; Vice-President at the Swedish 
Market Court; responsible for legal and institutional issues at the time 
of the EEA negotiations (Deputy Chairperson, then Chairperson, of the 
EFTA Group) and at the time of the negotiations for the accession of 
the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union; Judge at the Court of 
First Instance from 18 January 1995 to 6 October 2006; Judge at the 
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Yves Bot
Born 1947; graduate of the Faculty of Law, Rouen; Doctor of Laws (Uni-
versity of Paris II, Panthéon-Assas); Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Le 
Mans; Deputy Public Prosecutor, then Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, 
at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Le Mans (1974–82); Public Prosecu-
tor at the Regional Court, Dieppe (1982–84); Deputy Public Prosecutor 
at the Regional Court, Strasbourg (1984–86); Public Prosecutor at the 
Regional Court, Bastia (1986–88); Advocate General at the Court of Ap-
peal, Caen (1988–91); Public Prosecutor at the Regional Court, Le Mans 
(1991–93); Special Adviser to the Minister for Justice (1993–95); Public 
Prosecutor at the Regional Court, Nanterre (1995–2002); Public Pros-
ecutor at the Regional Court, Paris (2002–04); Principal State Prosecutor 
at the Court of Appeal, Paris (2004–06); Advocate General at the Court 
of Justice since 7 October 2006.
Ján Mazák
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University, Košice (1978); 
Professor of Civil Law (1994) and of Community Law (2004); Head of 
the Community Law Institute at the Faculty of Law, Košice (2004); 
Judge at the Krajský súd (Regional Court), Košice (1980); Vice-President 
(1982) and President (1990) of the Mestský súd (City Court), Košice; 
member of the Slovak Bar (1991); Legal Adviser at the Constitutional 
Court (1993–98); Deputy Minister for Justice (1998–2000); President of 
the Constitutional Court (2000–06); member of the Venice Commission 
(2004); Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2006.
Jean-Claude Bonichot
Born 1955; graduated in law at the University of Metz, degree from 
the Institut d’études politiques, Paris, former student at the École na-
tionale d’administration; Rapporteur (1982–85), Commissaire du gou-
vernement (1985–87 and 1992–99), Judge (1999–2000), President of 
the Sixth Sub-Division of the Judicial Division (2000–06), at the Coun-
cil of State; Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice (1987–91); Direc-
tor of the Private Office of the Minister for Labour, Employment and 
Vocational Training, then Director of the Private Office of the Minis-
ter of State for the Civil Service and Modernisation of Administration 
(1991–92); Head of the Legal Mission of the Council of State at the Na-
tional Health Insurance Fund for Employed Persons (2001–06); Lecturer 
at the University of Metz (1988–2000), then at the University of Paris I, 
Panthéon-Sorbonne (from 2000); author of numerous publications on 
administrative law, Community law and European human rights law; 
founder and chairman of the editorial committee of the Bulletin de ju-
risprudence de droit de l’urbanisme, co-founder and member of the edi-
torial committee of the Bulletin juridique des collectivités locales; Presi-
dent of the Scientific Council of the Research Group on Institutions and 
Law governing Regional and Urban Planning and Habitats; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 7 October 2006.68  Annual Report 2010
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Thomas von Danwitz
Born  1962;  studied  at  Bonn,  Geneva  and  Paris;  State  examination 
in law (1986 and 1992); Doctor of Laws (University of Bonn, 1988); 
International  Diploma  in  Public  Administration  (École  nation-
ale  d’administration,  1990);  teaching  authorisation  (University  of 
Bonn,  1996);  Professor  of  German  Public  Law  and  European  Law 
(1996–2003), Dean of the Faculty of Law of the Ruhr University, Bo-
chum (2000–01); Professor of German Public Law and European Law 
(University of Cologne, 2003–06); Director of the Institute of Public Law 
and Administrative Science (2006); Visiting Professor at the Fletcher 
School  of  Law  and  Diplomacy  (2000),  François  Rabelais  University, 
Tours  (2001–06),  and  the  University  of  Paris  I,  Panthéon-Sorbonne 
(2005–06); Doctor honoris causa of François Rabelais University, Tours 
(2010); Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2006.
Verica Trstenjak
Born 1962; judicial service examination (1987); Doctor of Laws of the 
University of Ljubljana (1995); Professor (since 1996) of Theory of Law 
and State (jurisprudence) and of Private Law; researcher; postgradu-
ate study at the University of Zurich, the Institute of Comparative Law 
of the University of Vienna, the Max Planck Institute for Private Inter-
national Law in Hamburg, the Free University of Amsterdam; Visiting 
Professor at the Universities of Vienna and Freiburg (Germany) and 
at the Bucerius School of Law in Hamburg; Head of the Legal Service 
(1994–96) and State Secretary in the Ministry of Science and Technolo-
gy (1996–2000); Secretary-General of the Government (2000); member 
of the Study Group on a European Civil Code since 2003; responsible 
for  a  Humboldt  research  project  (Humboldt  Foundation);  publica-
tion of more than 100 legal articles and several books on European 
and private law; ‘Lawyer of the Year 2003’ prize of the Association of 
Slovene Lawyers; member of the editorial board of a number of legal 
periodicals; Secretary-General of the Association of Slovene Lawyers 
and member of a number of lawyers’ associations, including the Ges-
ellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung; Judge at the Court of First Instance 
from 7 July 2004 to 6 October 2006; Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2006.
Alexander Arabadjiev
Born 1949; legal studies (St Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia); Judge 
at the District Court, Blagoevgrad (1975–83); Judge at the Regional 
Court, Blagoevgrad (1983–86); Judge at the Supreme Court (1986–91); 
Judge at the Constitutional Court (1991–2000); member of the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights (1997–99); member of the Euro-
pean Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–03); member of the 
National Assembly (2001–06); Observer at the European Parliament; 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 12 January 2007.Annual Report 2010  69
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Camelia Toader
Born  1963;  law  degree  (1986),  Doctorate  in  Law  (1997),  Univer-
sity of Bucharest; trainee Judge at the Court of First Instance, Buftea 
(1986–88); Judge at the Court of First Instance, Sector 5, Bucharest 
(1988–92); called to the Bucharest Bar (1992); Lecturer (1992–2005), 
then, from 2005, Professor in Civil Law and European Contract Law 
at the University of Bucharest; doctoral studies and research at the 
Max  Planck  Institute  for  Private  International  Law,  Hamburg  (be-
tween 1992 and 2004); Head of the European Integration Unit at the 
Ministry of Justice (1997–99); Judge at the High Court of Cassation 
and Justice (1999–2007); Visiting Professor at the Vienna University of 
Economics (2000); taught Community law at the National Institute for 
Magistrates (2003 and 2005–06); member of the editorial board of sev-
eral legal journals; from 2010 associate member of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law and honorary researcher at the Centre 
for European Legal Studies of the Legal Research Institute of the Ro-
manian Academy; Judge at the Court of Justice since 12 January 2007.
Jean-Jacques Kasel
Born 1946; Doctor of Laws; Special Degree in Administrative Law (Uni-
versité libre de Bruxelles, 1970); graduated from the Institut d’études 
politiques, Paris (Ecofin, 1972); trainee lawyer; Legal Adviser of the 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (1972–73); Attaché, then Legation 
Secretary, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973–76); Chairman of the 
working groups of the Council of Ministers (1976); First Embassy Secre-
tary, Deputy Permanent Representative to the OECD (Paris, 1976–79); 
Head of the Office of the Vice-President of the Government (1979–80); 
Chairman, European Political Cooperation (1980); Adviser, then Dep-
uty Head of the Cabinet, of the President of the Commission of the 
European Communities (1981); Director, Budget and Staff Matters, at 
the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers (1981–84); Special 
Adviser at the Permanent Representation to the European Communi-
ties (1984–85); Chairman of the Budgetary Committee; Minister Pleni-
potentiary, Director of Political and Cultural Affairs (1986–91); Diplo-
matic Adviser of the Prime Minister (1986–91); Ambassador to Greece 
(1989–91, non-resident); Chairman of the Policy Committee (1991); 
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities 
(1991–98); Chairman of Coreper (first half of 1997); Ambassador (Brus-
sels,  1998–2002);  Permanent  Representative  to  NATO  (1998–2002); 
Marshal of the Court and Head of the Office of HRH the Grand Duke 
(2002–07); Judge at the Court of Justice since 15 January 2008.70  Annual Report 2010
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Marek Safjan
Born 1949; Doctor of Law (University of Warsaw, 1980); habilitated 
Doctor in Legal Science (University of Warsaw, 1990); Professor of Law 
(1998); Director of the Civil Law Institute of the University of Warsaw 
(1992–96); Vice-Rector of the University of Warsaw (1994–97); Secre-
tary-General of the Polish Section of the Henri Capitant Association 
of Friends of French Legal Culture (1994–98); representative of the Re-
public of Poland on the Bioethics Committee of the Council of Europe 
(1991–97); Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Institute of Justice 
(1998); Judge (1997–98), then President (1998–2006), of the Constitu-
tional Court; member (since 1994) and Vice-President (since 2010) of 
the International Academy of Comparative Law; member of the Inter-
national Association of Law, Ethics and Science (since 1995); member 
of the Helsinki Committee in Poland; member of the Polish Academy of 
Arts and Sciences; Pro Merito Medal conferred by the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Council of Europe (2007); author of a very large number of 
publications in the fields of civil law, medical law and European law; 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2009.
Daniel Šváby
Born 1951; Doctor of Laws (University of Bratislava); Judge at the Dis-
trict Court, Bratislava; Judge, Appeal Court, responsible for civil law 
cases, and Vice-President, Appeal Court, Bratislava; member of the Civil 
and Family Law Section at the Ministry of Justice Law Institute; acting 
Judge responsible for commercial law cases at the Supreme Court; 
member of the European Commission of Human Rights (Strasbourg); 
Judge at the Constitutional Court (2000–04); Judge at the Court of First 
Instance from 12 May 2004 to 6 October 2009; Judge at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2009.
Maria Berger
Born 1956; studied law and economics (1975–79), Doctor of Law; As-
sistant Lecturer and Lecturer at the Institute of Public Law and Politi-
cal Sciences of the University of Innsbruck (1979–84); Administrator 
at the Federal Ministry of Science and Research, ultimately Deputy 
Head of Unit (1984–88); official responsible for questions relating to 
the European Union at the Federal Chancellery (1988–89); Head of 
the European Integration Section of the Federal Chancellery (prepa-
ration for the Republic of Austria’s accession to the European Union) 
(1989–92);  Director  at  the  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority,  in  Geneva 
and Brussels (1993–94); Vice-President of Danube University, Krems 
(1995–96); member of the European Parliament (November 1996 to 
January 2007 and December 2008 to July 2009) and member of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs; substitute member of the European Con-
vention on the Future of Europe (February 2002 to July 2003); Council-
lor of the Municipality of Perg (September 1997 to September 2009); 
Federal Minister for Justice (January 2007 to December 2008); Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 7 October 2009.Annual Report 2010  71
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Niilo Jääskinen
Born 1958; law degree (1980), postgraduate law degree (1982), Doctor-
ate (2008) at the University of Helsinki; Lecturer at the University of Hel-
sinki (1980–86); Legal Secretary and acting Judge at the District Court, 
Rovaniemi (1983–84); Legal Adviser (1987–89), and subsequently Head 
of the European Law Section (1990–95), at the Ministry of Justice; Legal 
Adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1989–90); Adviser, and Clerk 
for European Affairs, of the Grand Committee of the Finnish Parliament 
(1995–2000); acting Judge (July 2000 to December 2002), then Judge 
(January 2003 to September 2009), at the Supreme Administrative 
Court; responsible for legal and institutional questions during the ne-
gotiations for the accession of the Republic of Finland to the European 
Union; Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2009.
Pedro Cruz Villalón
Born 1946; law degree (1963–68) and awarded Doctorate (1975) at the 
University of Seville; postgraduate studies at the University of Freiburg 
im Breisgau (1969–71); Assistant Professor of Political Law at the Uni-
versity of Seville (1978–86); Professor of Constitutional Law at the Uni-
versity of Seville (1986–92); Legal Secretary at the Constitutional Court 
(1986–87); Judge at the Constitutional Court (1992–98); President of 
the Constitutional Court (1998–2001); Fellow of the Wissenschaftskol-
leg zu Berlin (2001–02); Professor of Constitutional Law at the Autono-
mous University of Madrid (2002–09); elected member of the Council 
of State (2004–09); author of numerous publications; Advocate General 
at the Court of Justice since 14 December 2009.
Alexandra (Sacha) Prechal
Born 1959; studied law (University of Groningen, 1977–83); Doctor of 
Laws (University of Amsterdam, 1995); Law Lecturer in the Law Fac-
ulty of the University of Maastricht (1983–87); Legal Secretary at the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (1987–91); Lecturer at 
the Europa Institute of the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam 
(1991–95); Professor of European Law in the Law Faculty of the Uni-
versity of Tilburg (1995–2003); Professor of European Law in the Law 
Faculty of the University of Utrecht and board member of the Europa 
Institute of the University of Utrecht (from 2003); member of the edito-
rial board of several national and international legal journals; author 
of numerous publications; member of the Royal Netherlands Academy 
of Arts and Sciences; Judge at the Court of Justice since 10 June 2010.72  Annual Report 2010
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Egidijus Jarašiūnas
Born 1952; law degree at the University of Vilnius (1974–79); Doctor 
of Legal Science of the Law University of Lithuania (1999); member of 
the Lithuanian Bar (1979–90); member of the Supreme Council (Par-
liament) of the Republic of Lithuania (1990–92), then member of the 
Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania and member of the 
Seimas’ State and Law Committee (1992–96); Judge at the Constitu-
tional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (1996–2005), then Adviser to 
the President of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court (from 2006); Lec-
turer in the Constitutional Law Department of the Law Faculty of Myko-
las Romeris University (1997–2000), then Associate Professor (2000–04) 
and Professor (from 2004) in that department, and finally Head of 
Department (2005–07); Dean of the Law Faculty of Mykolas Romeris 
University (2007–10); member of the Venice Commission (2006–10); 
signatory of the act of 11 March 1990 re-establishing Lithuania’s inde-
pendence; author of numerous legal publications; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 6 October 2010.
Roger Grass
Born  1948;  graduate  of  the  Institut  d’études  politiques,  Paris,  and 
awarded  Higher  Degree  in  Public  Law;  Deputy  Procureur  de  la 
République attached to the Tribunal de grande instance, Versailles; 
Principal Administrator at the Court of Justice; Secretary-General in 
the office of the Procureur Général attached to the Court of Appeal, 
Paris; Private Office of the Minister for Justice; Legal Secretary to the 
President  of  the  Court  of  Justice;  Registrar  of  the  Court  of  Justice 
from 10 February 1994 to 6 October 2010.
Alfredo Calot Escobar
Born 1961; law degree at the University of Valencia (1979–84); Business 
Analyst at the Council of the Chambers of Commerce of the Autono-
mous Community of Valencia (1986); Lawyer-linguist at the Court of 
Justice (1986–90); Lawyer-reviser at the Court of Justice (1990–93); Ad-
ministrator in the Press and Information Service of the Court of Justice 
(1993–95); Administrator in the Secretariat of the Institutional Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament (1995–96); Aide to the Regis-
trar of the Court of Justice (1996–99); Legal Secretary at the Court of 
Justice (1999–2000); Head of the Spanish Translation Division at the 
Court of Justice (2000–01); Director, then Director-General, of Transla-
tion at the Court of Justice (2001–10); Registrar of the Court of Justice 
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2.  Change in the composition of the Court of Justice in 2010
Formal sitting on 10 June 2010
Following the resignation of Mr Christian Timmermans, by decision of 2 June 2010 the Representa-
tives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union appointed Ms Alexandra 
Prechal as a Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union for the remainder of Mr Timmer-
mans’ term of office, that is to say, for the period from 10 June 2010 to 6 October 2012.
Formal sitting on 6 October 2010
Following the resignation of Mr Pranas Kūris, by decision of 29 September 2010 the Represent-
atives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union appointed Mr Egidijus 
Jarašiūnas as a Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union for the remainder of Mr Kūris’s 
term of office, that is to say, for the period from 6 October 2010 to 6 October 2012.
Following the resignation of Mr Roger Grass, who had performed the duties of Registrar of the 
Court of Justice since 10 February 1994, Mr Alfredo Calot Escobar was on 14 September 2010 elect-
ed Registrar of the Court of Justice of the European Union by the Judges and the Advocates General 
for a term of office of six years, that is to say, for the period from 7 October 2010 to 6 October 2016.Annual Report 2010  75
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from 1 January 2010 to 10 June 2010
V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
J. N. CUNHA RODRIGUES, President of the Sec-
ond Chamber
K. LENAERTS, President of the Third Chamber
J.-C. BONICHOT, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
P. MENGOZZI, First Advocate General
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, President of the Sev-
enth Chamber
E. LEVITS, President of the Fifth Chamber
P. LINDH, President of the Sixth Chamber
C. TOADER, President of the Eighth Chamber
C.W.A. TIMMERMANS, Judge
A. ROSAS, Judge
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
K. SCHIEMANN, Judge
P. KŪRIS, Judge
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
G. ARESTIS, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
M. ILEŠIČ, Judge
J. MALENOVSKÝ, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
L. BAY LARSEN, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J. MAZÁK, Advocate General
T. von DANWITZ, Judge
V. TRSTENJAK, Advocate General
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
M. BERGER, Judge
N. JÄÄSKINEN, Advocate General
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
R. GRASS, Registrar
from 11 June 2010 to 6 October 2010
V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
J. N. CUNHA RODRIGUES, President of the Sec-
ond Chamber
K. LENAERTS, President of the Third Chamber
J.-C. BONICHOT, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
P. MENGOZZI, First Advocate General
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, President of the Sev-
enth Chamber
E. LEVITS, President of the Fifth Chamber
P. LINDH, President of the Sixth Chamber
C. TOADER, President of the Eighth Chamber
A. ROSAS, Judge
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
K. SCHIEMANN, Judge
P. KŪRIS, Judge
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
G. ARESTIS, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
M. ILEŠIČ, Judge
J. MALENOVSKÝ, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
L. BAY LARSEN, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J. MAZÁK, Advocate General
T. von DANWITZ, Judge
V. TRSTENJAK, Advocate General
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
M. BERGER, Judge
N. JÄÄSKINEN, Advocate General
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
R. GRASS, Registrar
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from 7 October 2010 to 31 December 2010
V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
J.N. CUNHA RODRIGUES, President of the Sec-
ond Chamber
K. LENAERTS, President of the Third Chamber
J.-C. BONICHOT, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
Y. BOT, First Advocate General
K. SCHIEMANN, President of the Eighth 
Chamber
A. ARABADJIEV, President of the Sixth Chamber
J.-J. KASEL, President of the Fifth Chamber
D. ŠVÁBY, President of the Seventh Chamber
A. ROSAS, Judge
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, Judge
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
G. ARESTIS, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
M. ILEŠIČ, Judge
J. MALENOVSKÝ, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
L. BAY LARSEN, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
P. LINDH, Judge
J. MAZÁK, Advocate General
T. von DANWITZ, Judge
V. TRSTENJAK, Advocate General
C. TOADER, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
M. BERGER, Judge
N. JÄÄSKINEN, Advocate General
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, Judge
A. CALOT ESCOBAR, RegistrarAnnual Report 2010  77
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4.  Former members of the Court of Justice
Massimo Pilotti, Judge (1952–58), President from 1952 to 1958
Petrus Serrarens, Judge (1952–58)
Adrianus Van Kleffens, Judge (1952–58)
Jacques Rueff, Judge (1952–59 and 1960–62)
Otto Riese, Judge (1952–63)
Maurice Lagrange, Advocate General (1952–64)
Louis Delvaux, Judge (1952–67)
Charles Léon Hammes, Judge (1952–67), President from 1964 to 1967
Karl Roemer, Advocate General (1953–73)
Nicola Catalano, Judge (1958–62)
Rino Rossi, Judge (1958–64)
Andreas Matthias Donner, Judge (1958–79), President from 1958 to 1964
Alberto Trabucchi, Judge (1962–72), then Advocate General (1973–76)
Robert Lecourt, Judge (1962–76), President from 1967 to 1976
Walter Strauss, Judge (1963–70)
Joseph Gand, Advocate General (1964–70)
Riccardo Monaco, Judge (1964–76)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars, Judge (1967–84), President from 1980 to 1984
Pierre Pescatore, Judge (1967–85)
Alain Louis Dutheillet de Lamothe, Advocate General (1970–72)
Hans Kutscher, Judge (1970–80), President from 1976 to 1980
Henri Mayras, Advocate General (1972–81)
Cearbhall O’Dalaigh, Judge (1973–74)
Max Sørensen, Judge (1973–79)
Gerhard Reischl, Advocate General (1973–81)
Jean-Pierre Warner, Advocate General (1973–81)
Alexander J. Mackenzie Stuart, Judge (1973–88), President from 1984 to 1988
Aindrias O’Keeffe, Judge (1975–85)
Adolphe Touffait, Judge (1976–82)
Francesco Capotorti, Judge (1976), then Advocate General (1976–82)
Giacinto Bosco, Judge (1976–88)
Thymen Koopmans, Judge (1979–90)
Ole Due, Judge (1979–94), President from 1988 to 1994
Ulrich Everling, Judge (1980–88)
Alexandros Chloros, Judge (1981–82)
Simone Rozès, Advocate General (1981–84)
Pieter Verloren van Themaat, Advocate General (1981–86)
Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General (1981–88), then Judge (1988–92)
Fernand Grévisse, Judge (1981–82 and 1988–94)
Kai Bahlmann, Judge (1982–88)
Yves Galmot, Judge (1982–88)
G. Federico Mancini, Advocate General (1982–88), then Judge (1988–99)
Constantinos Kakouris, Judge (1983–97)
Marco Darmon, Advocate General (1984–94)78  Annual Report 2010
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René Joliet, Judge (1984–95)
Carl Otto Lenz, Advocate General (1984–97)
Thomas Francis O’Higgins, Judge (1985–91)
Fernand Schockweiler, Judge (1985–96)
José Luís Da Cruz Vilaça, Advocate General (1986–88)
José Carlos De Carvalho Moitinho de Almeida, Judge (1986–2000)
Jean Mischo, Advocate General (1986–91 and 1997–2003)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, Judge (1986–2003), President from 1994 to 2003
Manuel Diez de Velasco, Judge (1988–94)
Manfred Zuleeg, Judge (1988–94)
Walter Van Gerven, Advocate General (1988–94)
Giuseppe Tesauro, Advocate General (1988–98)
Francis Geoffrey Jacobs, Advocate General (1988–2006)
Paul Joan George Kapteyn, Judge (1990–2000)
John L. Murray, Judge (1991–99)
Claus Christian Gulmann, Advocate General (1991–94), then Judge (1994–2006)
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward, Judge (1992–2004)
Michael Bendik Elmer, Advocate General (1994–97)
Günter Hirsch, Judge (1994–2000)
Georges Cosmas, Advocate General (1994–2000)
Antonio Mario La Pergola, Judge (1994 and 1999–2006), Advocate General (1995–99)
Jean-Pierre Puissochet, Judge (1994–2006)
Philippe Léger, Advocate General (1994–2006)
Hans Ragnemalm, Judge (1995–2000)
Nial Fennelly, Advocate General (1995–2000)
Leif Sevón, Judge (1995–2002)
Melchior Wathelet, Judge (1995–2003)
Peter Jann, Judge (1995–2009)
Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General (1995–2009)
Romain Schintgen, Judge (1996–2008)
Krateros Ioannou, Judge (1997–99)
Siegbert Alber, Advocate General (1997–2003)
Antonio Saggio, Advocate General (1998–2000)
Fidelma O’Kelly Macken, Judge (1999–2004)
Stig Von Bahr, Judge (2000–06)
Ninon Colneric, Judge (2000–06)
Leendert A. Geelhoed, Advocate General (2000–06)
Christine Stix-Hackl, Advocate General (2000–06)
Christiaan Willem Anton Timmermans, Judge (2000–10)
Luís Miguel Poiares Pessoa Maduro, Advocate General (2003–09)
Jerzy Makarczyk, Judge (2004–09)
Ján Klučka, Judge (2004–09)
Pranas Kūris, Judge (2004–10)Annual Report 2010  79
Former Members  Court of Justice
Presidents
Massimo Pilotti (1952–58)
Andreas Matthias Donner (1958–64)
Charles Léon Hammes (1964–67)
Robert Lecourt (1967–76)
Hans Kutscher (1976–80)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars (1980–84)
Alexander John Mackenzie Stuart (1984–88)
Ole Due (1988–94)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglésias (1994–2003)
Registrars
Albert Van Houtte (1953–82)
Paul Heim (1982–88)
Jean-Guy Giraud (1988–94)
Roger Grass (1994–2010)Annual Report 2010  81
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D — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice
General activity of the Court of Justice
  1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2006–10)
New cases
  2.  Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
  3.  Subject-matter of the action (2010)
  4.  Actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations (2006–10)
Completed cases
  5.  Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
  6.  Judgments, orders, opinions (2010)
  7.  Bench hearing action (2006–10)
  8.    Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders involving a judicial determi-
nation (2006–10)
  9.  Subject-matter of the action (2006–10)
  10.  Subject-matter of the action (2010)
  11.    Judgments concerning failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations: outcome 
(2006–10)
  12.    Duration of proceedings (judgments and orders involving a judicial determination) 
(2006–10)
Cases pending as at 31 December
  13.  Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
  14.  Bench hearing action (2006–10)
Miscellaneous
  15.  Expedited and accelerated procedures (2006–10)
  16.  Urgent preliminary ruling procedures (2008–10)
  17.  Proceedings for interim measures (2010)
General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2010)
  18.  New cases and judgments
  19.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State per year)
  20.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by court or tribunal)
  21.  New actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligationsAnnual Report 2010  83
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1.    General activity of the Court of Justice
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2006–10) (1)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
New cases 537 581 593 562 631
Completed cases  546 570 567 588 574
Cases pending 731 742 768 742 799
 New cases  Completed cases   Cases pending
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).84  Annual Report 2010
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2.  New cases — Nature of proceedings (2006–10) (1)
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  The following are considered to be ‘special forms of procedure’: rectification (Article 66 of the Rules of Proce-
dure); taxation of costs (Article 74 of the Rules of Procedure); legal aid (Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure); 
application to set aside a judgment given by default (Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure); third-party proceed-
ings (Article 97 of the Rules of Procedure); revision (Article 98 of the Rules of Procedure); interpretation of 
a judgment (Article 102 of the Rules of Procedure); examination of a proposal by the First Advocate General to 
review a decision of the General Court (Article 62 of the Statute of the Court of Justice); attachment procedure 
(Protocol on Privileges and Immunities); cases concerning immunity (Protocol on Privileges and Immunities).
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
References for a preliminary ruling 251 265 288 302 385
Direct actions 201 222 210 143 136
Appeals 80 79 78 105 97
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions 3 8 8 2 6
Opinions of the Court 1 1
Special forms of procedure (2) 2 7 8 9 7
Total 537 581 593 562 631
Applications for interim measures 1 3 3 2 2
2010
References for   
a preliminary ruling
Special forms of procedure 
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventionsAnnual Report 2010  85
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3.  New cases — Subject-matter of the action (2010) (1)
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Access to documents 4 4
External action by the European Union 5 1 6
Agriculture 5 20 25
State aid 4 4 15 1 24
Citizenship of the Union 2 2
Competition 5 13 2 20
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud and so forth) 1 5 6
Company law 12 1 13
Law governing the institutions 2 1 17 2 22 2
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1
Energy 7 7
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemicals (REACH Regulation) 1 1
Environment  34 26 1 61
Area of freedom, security and justice 5 38 43
Taxation 5 57 62
Freedom of establishment 1 5 6
Free movement of capital 4 3 7
Free movement of goods 5 5
Freedom of movement for persons 2 10 1 13
Freedom to provide services 13 38 51
Public procurement 6 5 4 15
Commercial policy 1 3 4
Economic and monetary policy  1 1
Common foreign and security policy 1 6 7
Industrial policy 6 6 12
Social policy 5 40 45
Principles of European Union law 1 11 12
Intellectual and industrial property 19 30 49
Consumer protection 1 9 10
Approximation of laws 10 16 26
Public health 1 3 4
Social security for migrant workers 2 7 9
Transport 13 11 1 25
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 21 21
TFEU 135 381 97 6 619 2
Privileges and immunities 4 4
Procedure 5
Staff Regulations 1 1
Others 1 4 5 5
OVERALL TOTAL 136 385 97 6 624 7
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).86  Annual Report 2010
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5.  Completed cases — Nature of proceedings (2006–10) (1)
2010
References for   
a preliminary ruling
Special forms   
of procedure
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim  
measures or interventions
Direct actions
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
References for a preliminary ruling 266 235 301 259 339
Direct actions 212 241 181 215 139
Appeals 63 88 69 97 84
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions 2 2 8 7 4
Opinions of the Court 1 1
Special forms of procedure 2 4 8 9 8
Total 546 570 567 588 574
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).Annual Report 2010  89
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6.  Completed cases — Judgments, orders, opinions (2010) (1)
Judgments 
70.88%
Non-interlocutory  
orders
15.52%
Interlocutory orders 
0.96%
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References for a preliminary 
ruling 239 33 21 293
Direct actions 97 42 139
Appeals 34 43 1 3 81
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions 4 4
Opinions of the Court
Special forms of procedure 5 5
Total 370 81 5 66 522
(1)  The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases after joinder on the ground of similarity (a set of 
joined cases = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.
(3)  Orders made following an application on the basis of Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU (former Articles 242 EC 
and 243 EC), Article 280 TFEU (former Article 244 EC) or the corresponding provisions of the EAEC Treaty, or fol-
lowing an appeal against an order concerning interim measures or intervention.
(4)  Orders terminating the case by removal from the register, declaration that there is no need to give a decision or 
referral to the General Court.
Other orders 
12.64%90  Annual Report 2010
Court of Justice  Statistics
7.  Completed cases — Bench hearing action (2006–10) (1)
2010
Chambers (5 judges) 
58.06%
Chambers  
(3 judges)
26.61%
President
1.01%
Grand Chamber 
14.31%
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Full Court 2 2
Grand Chamber 55 55 51 51 66 66 41 41 70 1 71
Chambers (5 judges) 265 13 278 241 8 249 259 13 272 275 8 283 280 8 288
Chambers (3 judges) 67 41 108 105 49 154 65 59 124 96 70 166 56 76 132
President 1 1 2 2 7 7 5 5 5 5
Total 389 55 444 397 59 456 390 79 469 412 83 495 406 90 496
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.Annual Report 2010  91
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8.    Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination (2006–10) (1) (2)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 Judgments/Opinions  Orders
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Judgments/Opinions 389 397 390 412 406
Orders 55 59 79 83 90
Total 444 456 469 495 496
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.92  Annual Report 2010
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9.   Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders involving 
a judicial determination — Subject-matter of the action (2006–10) (1)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Accession of new States 1 1
Agriculture 30 23 54 18 15
Approximation of laws 19 21 21 32 15
Area of freedom, security and justice 9 17 4 26 24
Brussels Convention 4 2 1 2
Budget of the Communities 1
Citizenship of the Union 4 2 7 3 6
Commercial policy 1 1 1 5 2
Common Customs Tariff (3) 7 10 5 13 7
Common fisheries policy 7 6 6 4 2
Common foreign and security policy 4 2 2 2
Community own resources 6 3 10 5
Company law 9 16 17 17 17
Competition 30 17 23 28 13
Consumer protection (2) 3
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff (3) 9 12 8 5 15
Economic and monetary policy  1 1 1 1
Energy 6 4 4 4 2
Environment (2) 9
Environment and consumers (2) 40 50 43 60 48
External action by the European Union 11 9 8 8 10
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud and so forth) 1
Free movement of capital 4 13 9 7 6
Free movement of goods 8 14 12 13 6
Freedom of establishment 21 19 29 13 17
Freedom of movement for persons 20 19 27 19 17
Freedom to provide services 17 24 8 17 30
Industrial policy 11 12 6 9
Intellectual and industrial property 20 21 22 31 38
Justice and home affairs 2 1
Law governing the institutions 15 6 15 29 26
Principles of European Union law 1 4 4 4 4
Privileges and immunities 1 1 2
Regional policy 2 7 1 3 2
Research, information, education and statistics 1
Rome Convention 1
Social policy 29 26 25 33 36
Social security for migrant workers 7 7 5 3 6
State aid 23 9 26 10 16
Taxation 55 44 38 44 66
Transport 9 6 4 9 4
EC Treaty 426 430 445 481 482
EU Treaty 3 4 6 1 4
CS Treaty 1 2
EA Treaty 4 1
Procedure 2 3 5 5 6
Staff Regulations 9 17 11 8 4
Others 11 20 16 13 10
OVERALL TOTAL 444 456 469 495 496
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  The heading ‘Environment and consumers’ has been divided into two separate headings for cases brought after 
1 December 2009.
(3)  The headings ‘Common Customs Tariff’ and ‘Customs union’ have been brought together under a single head-
ing for cases brought after 1 December 2009.Annual Report 2010  93
Statistics  Court of Justice
10.    Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders involving 
a judicial determination — Subject-matter of the action (2010) (1)
Judgments/
Opinions Orders (²) Total
Agriculture 14 1 15
Approximation of laws 15 15
Area of freedom, security and justice 23 1 24
Budget of the Communities 1 1
Commercial policy 2 2
Common Customs Tariff (4) 7 7
Common fisheries policy 1 1 2
Common foreign and security policy 2 2
Community own resources 5 5
Company law 17 17
Competition 8 5 13
Consumer protection (3) 1 2 3
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff (4) 12 3 15
Economic and monetary policy  1 1
Energy 2 2
Environment (3) 9 9
Environment and consumers (3) 44 4 48
European citizenship 6 6
External action by the European Union 10 10
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud and so forth) 1 1
Free movement of capital 5 1 6
Free movement of goods 5 1 6
Freedom of establishment 14 3 17
Freedom of movement for persons 16 1 17
Freedom to provide services 26 4 30
Industrial policy 8 1 9
Intellectual property 19 19 38
Law governing the institutions 11 15 26
Principles of European Union law 2 2 4
Regional policy 1 1 2
Research, information, education and statistics 1 1
Social policy 31 5 36
Social security for migrant workers 4 2 6
State aid 14 2 16
Taxation 58 8 66
Transport 4 4
EC Treaty 399 83 482
EU Treaty 4 4
Procedure 6 6
Staff Regulations 3 1 4
Others 3 7 10
OVERALL TOTAL 406 90 496
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.
(3)  The heading ‘Environment and consumers’ has been divided into two separate headings for cases brought after 
1 December 2009.
(4)  The headings ‘Common Customs Tariff’ and ‘Customs union’ have been brought together under a single head-
ing for cases brought after 1 December 2009.94  Annual Report 2010
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12.    Completed cases — Duration of proceedings (2006–10) (1)
(judgments and orders involving a judicial determination)
20
15
10
5
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
References for a preliminary ruling 19.8 19.3 16.8 17.1 16.1
  Urgent preliminary ruling procedure  2.1 2.5 2.1
Direct actions 20 18.2 16.9 17.1 16.7
Appeals 17.8 17.8 18.4 15.4 14.3
 References for a preliminary ruling  Direct actions  Appeals
(1)  The duration of proceedings is expressed in months and tenths of months. 
  The following types of cases are excluded from the calculation of the duration of proceedings: cases involving 
an interlocutory judgment or a measure of inquiry; opinions; special forms of procedure (namely taxation of 
costs,  legal  aid,  application  to  set  aside,  third-party  proceedings,  interpretation,  revision,  rectification, 
attachment procedure); cases terminated by an order removing the case from the register, declaring that there 
is no need to give a decision or referring the case to the General Court; proceedings for interim measures and 
appeals concerning interim measures and interventions.Annual Report 2010  97
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13.    Cases pending as at 31 December — Nature of proceedings 
(2006–10) (1)
500
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
   References for 
a preliminary ruling
 Direct actions  Appeals
 Opinions of the Court    Special forms of 
procedure
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
References for a preliminary ruling 378 408 395 438 484
Direct actions 232 213 242 170 167
Appeals 120 117 126 129 144
Special forms of procedure 1 4 4 4 3
Opinions of the Court 1 1 1
Total 731 742 768 742 799
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).98  Annual Report 2010
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14.    Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2006–10) (1)
2010
Not assigned 
65.08%
President 
0.50%
Full Court 
0.13%
Grand Chamber
6.13%
Chambers (5 judges)
24.16%
Chambers (3 judges)
4.01%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Not assigned 489 481 524 490 520
Full Court 1
Grand Chamber 44 59 40 65 49
Chambers (5 judges) 171 170 177 169 193
Chambers (3 judges) 26 24 19 15 32
President 1 8 8 3 4
Total 731 742 768 742 799
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the join-
der of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).Annual Report 2010  99
Statistics  Court of Justice
15.    Miscellaneous — Expedited and accelerated procedures 
(2006–10) (1)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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Direct actions 1 1
References for  
a preliminary ruling 5 5 2 6 1 3 4 7
Appeals  1 1
Special forms of procedure 1
Total 5 7 2 6 1 5 4 8
(1)  Since 1 July 2000, it has been possible to deal with a case under an expedited or accelerated procedure pursu-
ant to the provisions of Articles 62a and 104a of the Rules of Procedure.
(2)  Since 1 March 2008, pursuant to the provisions of Article 104b of the Rules of Procedure, an urgent preliminary 
ruling procedure has been available for cases falling within the area of freedom, security and justice.
16.   Miscellaneous — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure 
(2008–10) (2)
2008 2009 2010
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Agriculture 1
Police and judicial cooperation  
in criminal matters 2 1 1
Area of freedom, security and justice  1 1 2 5 1
Total 3 3 2 1 5 1100  Annual Report 2010
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17.  Miscellaneous — Proceedings for interim measures (2010) (1)
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Access to documents 1
State aid 1
Competition 2 3
Law governing the institutions 2 1
Environment 1
Commercial policy 1
Intellectual and industrial property 1 1
OVERALL TOTAL 3 6 5
(1)  The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases after joinder on the ground of similarity (a set of 
joined cases = one case).Annual Report 2010  101
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18.    General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2010) — 
New cases and judgments
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New cases (¹)
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1953 4 4
1954 10 10 2
1955 9 9 2 4
1956 11 11 2 6
1957 19 19 2 4
1958 43 43 10
1959 46 1 47 5 13
1960 22 1 23 2 18
1961 24 1 1 26 1 11
1962 30 5 35 2 20
1963 99 6 105 7 17
1964 49 6 55 4 31
1965 55 7 62 4 52
1966 30 1 31 2 24
1967 14 23 37 24
1968 24 9 33 1 27
1969 60 17 77 2 30
1970 47 32 79 64
1971 59 37 96 1 60
1972 42 40 82 2 61
1973 131 61 192 6 80
1974 63 39 102 8 63
1975 61 69 1 131 5 78
1976 51 75 1 127 6 88
1977 74 84 158 6 100
1978 146 123 1 270 7 97
1979 1 218 106 1 324 6 138
1980 180 99 279 14 132
1981 214 108 322 17 128
1982 217 129 346 16 185
1983 199 98 297 11 151
1984 183 129 312 17 165
1985 294 139 433 23 211
1986 238 91 329 23 174
1987 251 144 395 21 208
1988 193 179 372 17 238
1989 244 139 383 19 188
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1990 221 141 15 1 378 12 193
1991 140 186 13 1 2 342 9 204
1992 251 162 24 1 2 440 5 210
1993 265 204 17 486 13 203
1994 125 203 12 1 3 344 4 188
1995 109 251 46 2 408 3 172
1996 132 256 25 3 416 4 193
1997 169 239 30 5 443 1 242
1998 147 264 66 4 481 2 254
1999 214 255 68 4 541 4 235
2000 197 224 66 13 2 502 4 273
2001 187 237 72 7 503 6 244
2002 204 216 46 4 470 1 269
2003 277 210 63 5 1 556 7 308
2004 219 249 52 6 1 527 3 375
2005 179 221 66 1 467 2 362
2006 201 251 80 3 535 1 351
2007 221 265 79 8 573 3 379
2008 210 288 77 8 1 584 3 333
2009 143 302 104 2 1 552 1 377
2010 136 385 97 6 624 2 370
Total 8 601 7 005 1 118 85 19 16 828 351 8 637
(1)  Gross figures; special forms of procedure are not included.
(2)  Net figures.Annual Report 2010  103
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20.    General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2010) — New 
references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by 
court or tribunal)
Total
Belgium Cour constitutionnelle 17
Cour de cassation 77
Conseil d’État 62
Other courts or tribunals 495 651
Bulgaria Софийски ґрадски съд Търґовско отделение 1
Other courts or tribunals 17 18
Czech Republic         Nejvyšší soud                   1 
Nejvyšší správní soud                   5
Ústavní soud 
Other courts or tribunals 9 15
Denmark Højesteret 29
Other courts or tribunals 106 135
Germany Bundesgerichtshof 130
Bundesverwaltungsgericht 100
Bundesfinanzhof 272
Bundesarbeitsgericht 23
Bundessozialgericht 74
Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen 1
Other courts or tribunals 1 202 1 802
Estonia Riigikohus  1
Other courts or tribunals 5 6
Ireland Supreme Court 18
High Court 15
Other courts or tribunals 22 55
Greece Άρειος Πάγος 10
Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας 44
Other courts or tribunals 97 151
Spain Tribunal Supremo 35
Audiencia Nacional 1
Juzgado Central de lo Penal 7
Other courts or tribunals 201 244
France Cour de cassation 93
Conseil d’État 63
Other courts or tribunals 660 816
Italy Corte suprema di Cassazione 108
Corte Costituzionale 1
Consiglio di Stato 64
Other courts or tribunals 883 1 056
Cyprus Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο 2
Other courts or tribunals 2
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Total
Latvia Augstākā tiesa  9
Satversmes tiesa 
Other courts or tribunals 1 10
Lithuania Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas  1
Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas 3
Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis Teismas 3
Other courts or tribunals 3 10
Luxembourg Cour supérieure de justice 10
Cour de cassation 8
Conseil d’État 13
Cour administrative 7
Other courts or tribunals 35 73
Hungary Legfelsőbb Bíróság  3  
Fővárosi ĺtélőtábla 2
Szegedi Ítélötáblá 1
Other courts or tribunals 27 33
Malta Constitutional Court
Qorti ta’ l- Appel
Other courts or tribunals 1 1
Netherlands Raad van State 74
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 194
Centrale Raad van Beroep 49
College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven 139
Tariefcommissie 34
Other courts or tribunals 277 767
Austria Verfassungsgerichtshof 4
Oberster Gerichtshof 78
Oberster Patent- und Markensenat 3
Bundesvergabeamt 24
Verwaltungsgerichtshof 61
Vergabekontrollsenat 4
Other courts or tribunals 189 363
Poland Sąd Najwyższy 5
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny  12
Trybunał Konstytucyjny
Other courts or tribunals 15 32
Portugal Supremo Tribunal de Justiça 2
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo 40
Other courts or tribunals 35 77
Romania Tribunal Dâmboviţa 2
Other courts or tribunals 17 19
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Total
Slovenia Vrhovno sodišče 
Ustavno sodišče 
Other courts or tribunals 3 3
Slovakia Ústavný Súd 
Najvyšší súd  5
Other courts or tribunals 3 8
Finland Korkein hallinto-oikeus 29
Korkein oikeus 11
Other courts or tribunals 24 64
Sweden Högsta Domstolen 14
Marknadsdomstolen 5
Regeringsrätten 24
Other courts or tribunals 44 87
United Kingdom House of Lords 40
Court of Appeal 64
Other courts or tribunals 401 505
Others Cour de justice Benelux/Benelux Gerechtshof (1) 1 1
Complaints Board of the European Schools (2) 1 1
Total 7 005
(1)  Case C-265/00 Campina Melkunie.
(2)  Case C-196/09 Miles and Others.108  Annual Report 2010
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A — Proceedings of the General Court in 2010
By Mr Marc Jaeger, President of the General Court
For the General Court, 2010 was a year that entailed a partial renewal of its membership affect-
ing 14 Judges. Whilst 11 of those Judges had their term of office renewed, the General Court 
had cause to regret the departure of three members totalling between them more than 27 years’ 
experience at the Court: Mr A. W. H. Meij and Mr M. Vilaras, Judges at the Court since 1998, and 
Mr V. M. Ciucă, Judge at the Court since 2007, who were replaced by Mr M. Van der Woude, 
Mr D. Gratsias and Mr A. Popescu respectively. The Court was also affected by the resignation 
on 29 June 2010 of Mr T. Tchipev, a Judge at the Court since 2007. In January 2011, no candidate had 
yet been proposed to replace him.
Those circumstances had a significant effect on the timetabling of cases (the eight ordinary forma-
tions of the Court each included at least one member whose term of office was coming to an end 
in 2010) and exceptional organisation was required in order to prevent judicial activity from being 
adversely affected.
In addition, this was the first time that the panel provided for in Article 255 TFEU was called 
upon — in exercise of the responsibility entrusted to it by the Treaty of Lisbon — to give an opin-
ion, prior to the decision of the governments of the Member States, on candidates’ suitability to 
perform the duties of Judge. Whilst this procedure, which is intended to guarantee both inde-
pendence and competence of members of the Court of Justice and the General Court, can only be 
welcomed, it nevertheless delayed the carrying out of the partial renewal. It is important that in 
the future all the participants in the appointment process manage to prevent such delays together 
with the serious obstacles to the proper administration of justice to which they give rise. The Gen-
eral Court’s statistics for 2010 cannot be analysed without taking account of these factors beyond 
its control that do not assist its efforts to deal with changes in the nature of proceedings, whose 
increase in number, diversity and complexity is unparalleled.
From a statistical point of view, 2010 was marked by several trends. The first is the large increase 
in the number of new cases brought, rising from 568 (in 2009) to 636 (in 2010), a level never 
reached before (1). The second trend is maintenance of the number of cases completed at ap-
preciably above 500 (527 cases completed), notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances 
referred to above. This was nevertheless not sufficient to contain the increase in pending cases, 
which reached 1 300 as at 31 December 2010. The third trend concerns the duration of proceed-
ings, a fundamental criterion for evaluating the Court’s work. As a result of the emphasis placed 
on dealing with cases quickly, the duration of proceedings was reduced significantly, by an av-
erage of 2.5 months (from 27.2 months in 2009 to 24.7 months in 2010). The reduction is even 
more appreciable as regards cases decided by judgment in the areas that since the Court’s creation 
have been at the heart of its caseload (that is to say, the areas other than appeals and intellectual 
property), for which a reduction of more than seven months in the duration of proceedings was 
recorded.
The reforms to be pursued and the substantial efforts made by the Court should enable those 
figures to be improved to a certain extent. However, that cannot be at the expense of the quality 
of judicial review, quality that guarantees the effectiveness of judicial protection which is a corner-
stone of a European Union governed by the rule of law.
(1)  Except when there have been large groups of identical or similar cases.112  Annual Report 2010
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The following account is intended to provide an overview of the Court’s diverse, and sometimes 
complex, field of activity when it exercises its jurisdiction over proceedings concerning the legal-
ity of measures (I), actions for damages (II), appeals (III) and applications for interim measures (IV).
I.  Proceedings concerning the legality of measures
Admissibility of actions for annulment
1.  Measures against which an action may be brought
Measures against which an action for annulment may be brought under Article 263 TFEU are those 
producing binding legal effects of such a kind as to affect the applicant’s interests by bringing 
about a distinct change in his legal position (2).
In Case T-258/06 Germany v Commission (judgment of 20 May 2010, not yet published), the Court 
examined the circumstances in which a Commission communication published in the C Series of 
the Official Journal may be considered a challengeable measure.
In the case in point, the Federal Republic of Germany sought the annulment of a communica-
tion (3) the aim of which is to make known the Commission’s general approach as regards the ap-
plication, in cases where the award of a contract is not subject, or not subject in full, to the public 
procurement directives (4), of the set of basic rules for the award of public contracts, which flow 
directly from the rules and principles of the Treaty and, in particular, from the principles of non-
discrimination and transparency.
In order to establish whether that communication, claimed by the Commission to be purely inter-
pretative in nature, was open to challenge, the Court sought to determine whether, having regard 
to its content, it is designed to produce legal effects which are new as compared with those entailed 
by the application of the fundamental principles of the Treaty. It therefore had to be determined 
whether the communication merely fleshes out the provisions applicable to contracts which are 
not subject, or not subject in full, to the public procurement directives, and concerning the free 
movement of goods, the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services, the princi-
ples of non-discrimination and equal treatment, the principle of proportionality and the rules on 
transparency and mutual recognition, or whether it lays down obligations which are specific or new 
as compared with those provisions, principles and rules. The mere fact that an interpretative com-
munication does not — by its form, its nature or its wording — purport to be a measure intended 
to produce legal effects is not enough to support the conclusion that it does not produce binding 
legal effects. Nor is the fact that that measure has or has not been published relevant in this regard.
After carrying out a detailed examination of the content of the communication, the Court con-
cluded that the communication does not contain new rules for the award of public contracts which 
(2)  Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 9.
(3)  Commission interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to 
the provisions of the public procurement directives (OJ 2006 C 179, p. 2).
(4)  Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement proce-
dures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 1) and Direc-
tive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).Annual Report 2010  113
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go beyond the obligations under the law as it currently stands; in those circumstances, the com-
munication did not produce binding legal effects liable to affect the legal situation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.
2.  Temporal application of Article 263 TFEU
Under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, the admissibility of actions brought by individuals 
against acts of which they are not the addressees is subject to the twofold condition that the ap-
plicants be directly and individually concerned by the contested act. According to the case-law, 
natural or legal persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may claim to be in-
dividually concerned only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are 
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other per-
sons, and by virtue of those factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person 
addressed (5).
When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009, the conditions governing the 
admissibility of actions for annulment were amended. According to the fourth paragraph of Arti-
cle 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against an act which is of direct 
and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them 
and does not entail implementing measures.
Before even broaching the substantive interpretation of those provisions, the Court was called 
upon in 2010 to decide the issue of their temporal application. Given the importance of this ques-
tion, it was the Grand Chamber of the Court that ruled on this occasion.
The two cases at issue, Case T-532/08 Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta and Umicore v Commission and 
Case T-539/08 Etimine and Etiproducts v Commission (orders of 7 September 2010, not yet pub-
lished), concerned applications for annulment of Directive 2008/58/EC (6) and Regulation (EC) 
No 790/2009 (7), which have the effect of amending the classification of certain nickel carbonate 
compounds and borates.
Since the actions were brought on 5 December 2008, the Commission raised a plea of inadmissibil-
ity, submitting that the contested measures were not of individual concern to the applicants within 
the meaning of Article 230 EC. As the Treaty of Lisbon had entered into force in the meantime, the 
applicants contended that, under the new provisions in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, 
that condition governing admissibility could no longer apply with regard to the contested meas-
ures. The question thus arose whether the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU was applicable, 
ratione temporis, to the actions in question and, more generally, to all actions that were pending 
when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.
Noting that no transitional provision is laid down in the FEU Treaty in this regard, the Court stated 
that it is settled case-law, first, that in accordance with the maxim tempus regit actum the question 
(5)  Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95, at 107.
(6)  Commission Directive 2008/58/EC of 21 August 2008 amending, for the purpose of its adaptation to technical progress, for 
the 30th time, Council Directive 67/548/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions re-
lating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances (OJ 2008 L 246, p. 1).
(7)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 790/2009 of 10 August 2009 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and 
scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling 
and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2009 L 235, p. 1).114  Annual Report 2010
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of the admissibility of an application must be resolved on the basis of the rules in force at the date 
on which it was submitted and, second, that the conditions of admissibility of an action are judged 
at the time of bringing the action, that is, the lodging of the application, a defect in which can be 
rectified only before the expiry of the period for bringing proceedings. The contrary view would 
lead to the danger of arbitrariness in the administration of justice, since the admissibility of an ap-
plication would then depend on the — uncertain — date of delivery of the decision of the Court 
putting an end to the proceedings.
That conclusion is not affected by the argument that Article 263 TFEU forms part of the procedural 
rules in respect of which the case-law has held that, unlike substantive rules, they are generally 
taken to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force. Even if it were 
considered that jurisdictional questions are within the field of procedural rules, the Court held that, 
for the purposes of determining the applicable provisions by reference to which the admissibility 
of an action for the annulment of a European Union act must be assessed, the maxim tempus regit 
actum must be applied.
3.  Legal interest in bringing proceedings
The Court explained various aspects, as addressed below, of the concept of a legal interest in bring-
ing proceedings, a condition governing the admissibility of actions for annulment.
First, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as 
that person has an interest in the annulment of the contested measure. In order for such an inter-
est to be present, the annulment of the measure must of itself be capable of having legal conse-
quences or, in accordance with a different form of words, the action must be liable, if successful, 
to procure an advantage for the party who has brought it (8). The interest in bringing proceedings 
must continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate (9).
In Joined Cases T-355/04 and T-446/04 Co-Frutta v Commission [2010] ECR II-1 (10), the Court ex-
plained how the question of a legal interest in bringing proceedings is to be assessed where, fol-
lowing an application for access to Commission documents, the person concerned brings two ac-
tions in turn, one for annulment of the implied decision of the Commission rejecting the access 
application and the other for annulment of the express decision of the Commission taken after the 
initial implied decision.
In the case in point, Co-Frutta, an undertaking governed by Italian law that engaged in the ripen-
ing of bananas, had applied to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture (Agriculture 
DG) for access to Commission documents relating to banana importers registered in the European 
Community. Following a negative response from the Director-General of the Agriculture DG, the 
applicant addressed a confirmatory application to the Secretary-General of the Commission, to 
which it received an implied negative response on expiry of the 15-day time-limit prescribed by 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (11). The applicant contested the legality of those two decisions be-
fore the Court (the subject of Case T-355/04).
(8)  See Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission [2004] ECR II-3253, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited.
(9)  Case C-362/05 P Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR I-4333, paragraph 42.
(10)  See also the judgment of 10 December 2010 in Joined Cases T-494/08 to T-500/08 and T-509/08 Ryanair v Commission, not yet 
published.
(11)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to         
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).Annual Report 2010  115
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Two months later, the Secretary-General of the Commission adopted an express decision in which 
he confirmed his implied decision for the most part whilst, however, granting access to some of 
the documents requested. The applicant brought a fresh action against that decision (the subject 
of Case T-446/04).
The Court held that, because of the adoption of the subsequent express decision whose annul-
ment it also sought, the applicant had lost its interest in bringing proceedings against the im-
plied decision and that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the action brought in Case 
T-355/04. By adopting the express decision, the Commission had, in fact, withdrawn the implied 
decision adopted previously. The Court also found that annulment of the implied decision on 
grounds of a procedural defect could do no more than give rise to another decision identical in 
substance to the express decision. Moreover, consideration of the action against the implied deci-
sion could not be justified either by the objective of preventing its alleged unlawfulness from re-
curring in the future or by that of facilitating a potential action for damages, since it was possible to 
attain both those objectives through consideration of the action challenging the express decision, 
the sole action held admissible.
Second, in Case T-121/08 PC-Ware Information Technologies v Commission (judgment of 11 May 2008, 
not yet published), the Court applied the case-law according to which, whilst the interest in bring-
ing proceedings is assessed by having regard in particular to the direct advantage that annulment 
of the measure in question would procure to the applicant, the action brought by the applicant is 
also admissible where the annulment sought would have the effect of preventing future repeti-
tion of the alleged illegality (12). It thus held that an action brought by an unsuccessful candidate in 
a public procurement procedure against the Commission’s decision rejecting its tender was admis-
sible although the contract had already been partially performed. The Court held that in the case of 
a framework contract, such as the one at issue creating a single point of purchase for the acquisition 
of software products and licences from the supplier Microsoft, that was likely to serve as a model for 
similar future procurement contracts, there was an interest in preventing the unlawfulness alleged 
by the applicant from recurring in the future.
Third, in Joined Cases T-425/04, T-444/04, T-450/04 and T-456/04 France and Others v Commission 
(not yet published, under appeal), the Court noted the particular situation provided for by the 
Treaty in the case of Member States as regards demonstration of a legal interest in bringing pro-
ceedings, and it distinguished this concept from the concept of a challengeable measure.
Thus, the Court pointed out that the Treaty draws a clear distinction between the right of the in-
stitutions and Member States to bring an action for annulment and that of natural and legal per-
sons; all Member States are given the right to contest the legality of decisions of the Commission 
by means of an action for annulment without having to establish any legal interest in bringing 
proceedings. A Member State need not therefore prove that an act of the Commission which it 
is contesting produces legal effects with regard to that Member State in order for its action to 
be admissible. Furthermore, the concept of a legal interest in bringing proceedings must not be 
confused with the concept of a challengeable act, pursuant to which an act must be intended to 
produce legal effects capable of adversely affecting the interests of those concerned in order for 
it to be capable of being the subject of an action for annulment, a matter which must be deter-
mined by looking to its substance. In the case in point, since the contested decision constituted 
such a challengeable act producing binding legal effects, the French Republic, solely in its capacity 
(12)  Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paragraph 41.116  Annual Report 2010
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as a Member State, was entitled to bring an action for annulment without being required to show 
a legal interest in bringing proceedings in that regard.
Competition rules applicable to undertakings
1.  General
(a)  Concept of an association of undertakings
In Case T-23/09 CNOP and CCG v Commission (judgment of 26 October 2010, not yet published), the 
Court adopted a less restrictive approach towards classification of an association of undertakings 
in the context of Commission inspection decisions. Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (13) 
states that the Commission may conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associa-
tions of undertakings. In the case which gave rise to that judgment, the Conseil national de l’Ordre 
des pharmaciens (CNOP) and the Conseil central de la section G (CCG) de l’Ordre national des phar-
maciens (ONP), the addressees of the contested decision together with the ONP, contested the 
Commission’s classification of them as undertakings or associations of undertakings, and conse-
quently, that the Commission was able to carry out inspections at their premises. The Court stated, 
first of all, that it is necessary to take into account the specific nature of inspection decisions. In 
particular, in view of the fact that such decisions are adopted at the start of an inquiry, there can be 
no question at that stage of assessing definitively whether the acts or decisions of the addressee 
entities or other entities can be regarded as agreements between undertakings, as decisions by as-
sociations of undertakings or as concerted practices contrary to Article 81(1) EC (now Article 101(1) 
TFEU) or else as practices referred to in Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU). It is not a matter at 
that stage of carrying out an assessment of specific conduct, since the very purpose of the inspec-
tion is to obtain evidence relating to alleged conduct. The Court then went on to observe that the 
Commission found that the ONP and the applicants are organisations which bring together and 
represent a number of professionals who may be described as undertakings within the meaning of 
Article 81 EC. The question whether or not, in the exercise of their specific powers, the applicants 
escaped the application of Article 81 EC was clearly premature and would have to be determined 
in the final decision. The Court therefore concluded that the Commission was entitled to consider 
that, at the stage when the contested decision was adopted, the ONP and the applicants were as-
sociations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
(b)  Market definition
Case T-427/08 CEAHR v Commission (judgment of 15 December 2010, not yet published) afforded 
the Court an opportunity to recall the method for defining the relevant market in the case of af-
termarkets. In that judgment, the Court observed that, in the contested decision, the Commis-
sion stated that the spare parts market for primary products of a particular brand might not be 
a separate relevant market in two situations: first, if it is possible for a consumer to switch to spare 
parts manufactured by another producer; second, if it is possible for the consumer to switch to 
another primary product in order to avoid a price increase on the market for spare parts. The Court 
stated, however, in this respect that the Commission must show that in the event of a moderate 
and permanent increase in the price of secondary products, a sufficient number of consumers 
would switch to other primary or secondary products, in order to render such an increase unprofit-
able. The Court added that the demonstration of the existence of a purely theoretical possibility 
(13)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC] (OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  117
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of consumers switching to another primary product is not a sufficient demonstration for the pur-
poses of the definition of the relevant market, since that definition is based on the concept that ef-
fective competition exists. The Court held that, by finding that the primary and secondary products 
were part of the same market in the case in point, without even having shown that a moderate in-
crease in the price of the products of a manufacturer on the secondary market would cause a shift 
in demand to products of other manufacturers on the primary market, the Commission committed 
a manifest error of assessment.
(c)  Inspections
Obligation to state reasons
In CNOP and CCG v Commission, the Court clarified the extent of the Commission’s obligation to 
state reasons in the context of an inspection decision. The Court noted, first of all, that the contest-
ed decision did not contain any specific arguments relating to the reasons why a professional body 
such as that in question and its organs should be regarded as associations of undertakings. How-
ever, the Court then observed that, in view of the stage of the administrative procedure at which 
inspection decisions are taken, the Commission does not at that time have precise information 
enabling it to analyse whether the lines of conduct or acts covered can be categorised as decisions 
by undertakings or associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC. The Court 
pointed out that it is precisely by taking account of the specific nature of inspection decisions that 
the case-law concerning the statement of reasons has made clear the types of information which 
must be contained in an inspection decision in order to enable the addressees to assert their rights 
of defence at that stage of the administrative procedure. To impose a more onerous obligation 
to state reasons on the Commission would not take due account of the preliminary nature of the 
inspection. The Court therefore held that the Commission was not required to set out in the con-
tested decision the specific legal analysis on the basis of which it categorised the addressees as 
associations of undertakings, beyond the explanations contained in that regard in that decision.
Burden of proof
In Case T-141/08 E.ON Energie v Commission (judgment of 15 December 2010, not yet published), 
the Court upheld the fine of EUR 38 million imposed on E.ON Energie AG for having broken a seal 
affixed by the Commission on a room of that undertaking during an inspection. This first case in-
volving application of Article 23(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 led the Court to examine more 
specifically the issue of the burden of proof in this type of situation.
In that connection, the Court recalled the principle that, concerning the burden of proof of an in-
fringement in competition law, where the Commission acts on the basis of direct evidence which 
is in principle sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the infringement, it is not sufficient for 
the undertaking concerned to raise the possibility that a circumstance arose which may affect the 
probative value of that evidence in order for the Commission to bear the burden of proving that 
that circumstance could not have affected the probative value of that evidence. On the contrary, 
it is for the undertaking concerned to prove to the requisite legal standard, on the one hand, the 
existence of the circumstance which it alleges and, on the other, that that circumstance calls in 
question the probative value of the evidence relied on by the Commission, except in cases where 
such evidence cannot be provided by the undertaking concerned due to the conduct of the Com-
mission itself. Moreover, although the onus is on the Commission to prove the breach of seal, it is 
not, on the other hand, its responsibility to demonstrate that the room which had been sealed was 
actually entered or that the documents stored there were tampered with. In any event, the Court 
held in the case in point that it was for the applicant to take the necessary measures to prevent 118  Annual Report 2010
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any tampering with the seal at issue, a fortiori since the applicant had been clearly informed of the 
significance of the seal at issue and of the consequences of a breach of seal.
Fines
In E.ON Energie v Commission, the applicant also claimed that the fine imposed of EUR 38 million was 
disproportionate. The Court noted, however, in its judgment, that the Commission took into con-
sideration the fact that the breach of seal in question was the first case to which Article 23(1)(e) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 had applied, while pointing out that, quite apart from that circumstance, 
first, the applicant had at its disposal extensive legal expertise in antitrust law, second, the amend-
ment of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 dated from more than three years prior to the inspections in 
which the applicant had been involved, third, the applicant had been informed of the consequenc-
es of a breach of seal and, fourth, other seals had already been affixed in the buildings of other 
companies of the applicant’s group a few weeks previously. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that 
the mere fact that the seal is broken nullifies its safeguarding effect and is therefore sufficient to 
constitute the infringement. Lastly, the Court held that a fine of EUR 38 million, which corresponded 
to approximately 0.14% of the applicant’s turnover, cannot be regarded as disproportionate to the 
infringement, in the light of the particularly serious nature of a breach of seal, the size of the appli-
cant and the need to ensure that the fine has a sufficiently deterrent effect, in order that it cannot 
pay for an undertaking to break a seal affixed by the Commission in the context of inspections.
2.  Points raised on the scope of Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU)
(a)  Continuous infringement
In Case T-18/05 IMI and Others v Commission (judgment of 19 May 2010, not yet published) the 
Court’s examination related inter alia to whether or not the applicants’ participation in the infringe-
ment was uninterrupted. The Court stated, in this respect, that, although the period separating 
two manifestations of infringing conduct is a relevant criterion in order to establish the continuous 
nature of an infringement, the fact remains that the question whether or not that period is long 
enough to constitute an interruption of the infringement cannot be examined in the abstract but 
needs to be assessed in the context of the functioning of the cartel in question. In the case in point, 
the Court observed that the period during which there were no contacts or manifestations of col-
lusion on the part of the applicants exceeded by more than one year the intervals at which the 
undertakings which were members of the cartel habitually manifested their respective intentions 
to restrict competition. The Court concluded that, by taking the view that the applicants had par-
ticipated uninterruptedly in the cartel during the period in dispute, the Commission erred in law, 
and the Court amended the amount of the fine imposed on the applicants in order to take account 
of their sequential participation in the cartel, reducing the increase in the amount of the fine in 
respect of the duration of the infringement from 110 to 100%.
(b)  Calculation of the amount of the fine
The actions against the Commission’s decisions imposing fines in respect of the ‘industrial thread’, 
‘plumbing tubes’ and ‘Spanish tobacco’ cartels have enabled the Court to clarify and illustrate 
a number of elements used in the calculation of the amount of fines.
Starting amount
In Case T-452/05 BST v Commission (judgment of 28 April 2010, not yet published), as regards 
the effective economic capacity of undertakings which infringe the competition rules to cause Annual Report 2010  119
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damage to competition, the Court observed that although, depending on the circumstances, ver-
tical integration and the extent of the product range may be relevant factors in the assessment of 
the influence which an undertaking may exercise on the market, and provide a further indication 
of that influence in addition to market shares and turnover in the relevant market, it was necessary 
to hold that, in the case in point, the applicant’s arguments concerning the vertical integration of 
the other undertakings concerned did not show that those undertakings enjoyed any particular 
and significant competitive advantages on the relevant market.
Differential treatment
In Case T-21/05 Chalkor v Commission (judgment of 19 May 2010, not yet published, under appeal) 
and in IMI and Others v Commission, the Commission had concluded that there was no need to 
treat offenders who had participated only in one of the branches of the cartel (the ‘plumbing tunes’ 
cartel) differently from those who had also participated in another branch of that cartel, since the 
cooperation within that second branch had not been significantly closer than that which existed 
within the first branch. The Court held, however, in its judgments, that an undertaking whose liabil-
ity is established in relation to several branches of a cartel contributes more to the effectiveness 
and the seriousness of the cartel than an offender involved in only one branch of it and therefore 
commits a more serious infringement. That assessment necessarily has to be made at the stage 
when a specific starting amount is set, since the taking into account of attenuating circumstances 
only allows the basic amount of the fine to be adjusted by reference to the arrangements for the 
offender’s implementation of the cartel. Consequently, the Court reduced the starting amount of 
the fine by 10% for each of the applicants in those cases.
Upper limit of 10% of turnover
In  Joined  Cases  T-456/05  and  T-457/05  Gütermann  and  Zwicky  v  Commission  (judgment  of 
28 April 2010, not yet published), the Court observed that, at least in situations where there is no 
indication that an undertaking has ceased its commercial activities or has diverted its turnover 
in order to avoid the imposition of a heavy fine, the Commission is obliged to fix the maximum 
limit of the fine by reference to the most recent turnover corresponding to a complete year of 
economic activity. In the case in point, the Court observed that there were serious grounds — such 
as a nil turnover over several years, the lack of employees or the lack of solid evidence that it was 
making use of its real estate or had investment projects for that purpose — for supposing that 
Zwicky & Co. AG did not continue to carry on a normal economic activity within the meaning of 
the case-law. Consequently, the Court held that, for the purposes of determining the upper limit 
of 10% of turnover not to be exceeded when calculating the amount of the fine provided for in Ar-
ticle 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission should have referred to the last turnover 
for Zwicky & Co. arising from real economic activities on its part, and not to that of the undertaking 
which took over Zwicky & Co. after the latter had ceased its activities.
Aggravating circumstances
In Case T-29/05 Deltafina v Commission (judgment of 8 September 2010, not yet published, under 
appeal), the Commission found that the applicant had acted as the leader of the cartel and, first, 
therefore increased the basic amount of the fine by 50% for aggravating circumstances and, sec-
ond, took account of that role in reducing the amount of the fine by only 10% for cooperation. 
In its judgment, the Court held that the Commission had erred in this respect. The Court noted, 
first of all, that, in order to be characterised as a leader, the undertaking in question must have 
represented a significant driving force in the cartel and borne individual and specific liability for 
the operation of the cartel. However, the Court noted that, in the case in point, while the evidence 120  Annual Report 2010
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relied on by the Commission demonstrated that the applicant played an active and direct role in 
the tobacco processors’ cartel, it did not, however, suffice to establish that that company repre-
sented such a driving force in that cartel or even that its role was more important than that of any 
of the Spanish processors. The Court pointed out, in particular, that there was nothing in the file to 
show that Deltafina SpA took any initiatives to create the cartel or that it was instrumental in se-
curing the participation of the Spanish processors, or, moreover, that it assumed responsibility for 
activities usually associated with acting the part of leader of a cartel, such as chairing meetings or 
centralising and distributing certain data. Accordingly, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, 
the Court reduced the fine imposed on Deltafina from EUR 11.88 million to EUR 6.12 million.
(c)  Imputability of the infringement — Joint and several liability for payment of fine
In Case T-40/06 Trioplast Industrier v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2010, not yet pub-
lished), the Court provided some clarification as regards the rules applicable to the joint and sever-
al liability of successive parent companies for the payment of the fine imposed on their subsidiary.
First of all, the Court stated that the approach of ascribing to a parent company the same starting 
amount as that attributed to a subsidiary participating directly in a cartel, without dividing up that 
starting amount in any way even where there are several successive parent companies, is not in 
and of itself inappropriate. Indeed, the objective pursued by the Commission is to make it possible 
to ascribe to a parent company the same starting amount as it would ascribe to it if it had been 
directly involved in the cartel, which is quite in line with the objectives of competition policy.
The Court went on to observe that, where an infringement is committed by a subsidiary which has 
belonged to various successive economic units during the course of the infringement, it cannot be 
said to be necessarily inappropriate for the combined value of the amounts ascribed to the parent 
companies to be greater than the amount, or combined amounts, ascribed to the subsidiary.
However, the Court held that the contested decision was wrong to confer on the Commission an 
unfettered discretion to recover the fine from one or other of the legal persons concerned accord-
ing to their ability to pay. That discretion means that the amount actually recovered from the ap-
plicant will depend on the amounts recovered from the former parent companies, and vice versa, 
although those companies have never formed a common economic unit and are not therefore 
joint and severally liable. The Court added that the principle that penalties should fit the individual 
offence requires that the amount actually paid by the applicant does not exceed its share of its 
joint and several liability, a share that corresponds to the proportion of the fine imposed on the 
applicant relative to the cumulative total of the limits up to which the successive parent compa-
nies are jointly and severally liable for payment of the fine imposed on the subsidiary. In the case 
in point, the Court held that the decision was inconsistent with the obligation which rests upon 
the Commission to enable the applicant to know for certain the exact amount which it must pay 
in respect of the period for which it is held jointly and severally liable with its subsidiary for the in-
fringement. Consequently, the Court partially annulled that decision and set the amount ascribed 
to Trioplast Industrier at EUR 2.73 million, that amount being the basis on which the Commission 
will have to determine the applicant’s share in the joint and several liability of the successive par-
ent companies for payment of the fine imposed on their subsidiary.
3.  Points raised on the scope of Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU)
In Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission (judgment of 1 July 2010, not yet published, under ap-
peal) the Court ruled on the lawfulness of a Commission decision finding that the applicant had 
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second, by deregistering marketing authorisations for a pharmaceutical product whose patent was 
due to expire.
As regards the first abuse, the Court held that the submission to the public authorities of mislead-
ing information liable to lead them into error and therefore to make possible the grant of an ex-
clusive right to which an undertaking is not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, 
constitutes a practice falling outside the scope of competition on the merits which may be particu-
larly restrictive of competition.
The misleading nature of representations made to public authorities must be assessed on the ba-
sis of objective factors, and proof of the deliberate nature of the conduct and of the bad faith of 
the undertaking in a dominant position is not required for the purposes of identifying an abuse 
of a dominant position. However, the fact that the concept of abuse of a dominant position is an 
objective concept and implies no intention to cause harm does not lead to the conclusion that 
the intention to resort to practices falling outside the scope of competition on the merits is in all 
events irrelevant, even if the finding of abuse should primarily be based on an objective finding 
that the conduct in question actually took place.
As regards the second abuse, namely the deregistration of marketing authorisations for a phar-
maceutical product whose patent was due to expire, the Court held that, whilst the fact that an 
undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its entitlement to protect its own com-
mercial interests when they are attacked, it cannot use regulatory procedures in such a way as to 
prevent or make more difficult the entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of grounds 
relating to the defence of the legitimate interests of an undertaking engaged in competition on 
the merits or in the absence of objective justification. The preparation by an undertaking, even in 
a dominant position, of a strategy whose object it is to minimise erosion of its sales and to enable it 
to deal with competition from generic products is legitimate and is part of the normal competitive 
process, provided that the conduct envisaged does not depart from practices coming within the 
scope of competition on the merits.
After the expiry of the period of exclusivity for the use of data relating to the results of pharma-
cological and toxicological tests and clinical trials, conduct designed to prevent manufacturers of 
generic products from making use of their right to benefit from that information produced for the 
purposes of marketing the original product is not based in any way on the legitimate protection 
of an investment which comes within the scope of competition on the merits. The fact that the 
dominant undertaking’s competitors could have obtained marketing authorisations by means of 
alternative procedures does not suffice to make the deregistration of marketing authorisations 
non-abusive, since that conduct serves to exclude from the market, at least temporarily, competing 
manufacturers of generic products.
In Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems and Others v Commission (judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet 
published, under appeal), the Court examined whether the Commission must, in order to prove the 
foreclosure of competitors from the market as a whole, determine the minimum viability threshold 
necessary to operate on the relevant market and then determine whether the non-contestable 
portion of the market (that is to say, the part of demand tied by the practices in question) is suf-
ficiently large to be capable of having an exclusionary effect vis-à-vis competitors. The Court held 
that foreclosure by a dominant undertaking of a substantial part of the market cannot be justified 
by showing that the contestable part of the market is still sufficient to accommodate a limited 
number of competitors. First, customers on the foreclosed part of the market should have the op-
portunity to benefit from whatever degree of competition is possible on the market and com-
petitors should be able to compete on the merits for the entire market and not just for a part of it. 122  Annual Report 2010
General Court  Proceedings
Second, it is not the role of the dominant undertaking to dictate how many viable competitors will 
be allowed to compete for the remaining contestable portion of demand.
4.  Points raised on the scope of the control of concentrations
(a)  Concept of a challengeable act
Case T-58/09 Schemaventotto v Commission (order of 2 September 2010, not yet published) ena-
bled the Court to clarify further the application of Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (14). 
In that case, the proposed concentration between Abertis Infrastructures SA and Autostrade SpA, 
authorised initially by the Commission, was abandoned by those companies in the light, in par-
ticular, of difficulties posed by legislative changes in Italy. Those changes had been the subject 
of a preliminary assessment by the Commission finding that there had been an infringement of 
Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. In the light of proposed legislative amendments, the 
Commission nonetheless communicated to the Italian authorities, on 13 August 2008, its decision 
to terminate the procedure under Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. By letter of 4 Septem-
ber 2008 the Commission informed the applicant of that decision, which was the subject-matter of 
the action before the Court.
First, the Court held in that order that, by the letter, the Commission only gave notice of its decision 
to discontinue the procedure in the Abertis v Autostrade case in relation to possible infringements 
identified in the preliminary assessment, and that that decision did not approve the new national 
legislative provisions.
Second, the Court examined whether that measure constituted a challengeable act, namely 
whether it produced legal effects which were binding on, and capable of affecting the interests 
of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position. In that connection, the 
Court observed that the procedure laid down in Article 21(4) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 re-
lates to the monitoring of specific concentration transactions by the Commission under that regu-
lation. Consequently, the Commission must adopt a decision addressed to the Member State con-
cerned, consisting either in the recognition of the interest at issue in view of its compatibility with 
the general principles and other provisions of European Union law or in the non-recognition of the 
interest by reason of its incompatibility with those principles and provisions. Thus, as the proposed 
concentration was abandoned, the Commission was no longer competent in the case in point to 
terminate the procedure initiated pursuant to Article 21(4) of that regulation by a decision con-
cerning the recognition of a public interest protected by the national measures at issue.
That conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact that the procedure laid down in Ar-
ticle 21(4) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 has not only an objective function, but also a subjec-
tive function, namely, to protect the interests of the undertakings concerned relating to the pro-
posed concentration from the viewpoint of ensuring the legal certainty and the speed of that 
procedure. The subjective function ceased to be relevant because the proposed concentration was 
abandoned.
The Commission could therefore only take the formal decision to take no further action in the 
procedure in question. Since that decision had no other effect, it could not therefore constitute 
a challengeable act.
(14)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L 24, 
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In Case T-279/04 Éditions Jacob v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2010, not published, 
under appeal), the Commission raised an objection of inadmissibility against the applicant’s ac-
tion brought against the decision authorising, subject to the sale of assets, the purchase of Vivendi 
Universal Publishing SA by Lagardère SCA. The Commission took the view that an earlier decision 
by which it had decided to initiate an in-depth control of the proposed concentration had had the 
effect of classifying, implicitly but necessarily, the prior acquisition of the target assets by Natexis 
Banques Populaires SA as an acquisition of securities in an undertaking with a view to reselling 
them. The contested decision was therefore just a purely confirmatory decision. The Court rejected 
the Commission’s interpretation, and observed that the decision to initiate the phase of in-depth 
control does not constitute an act which may be the subject of an action, but a preparatory step 
whose sole aim is to initiate enquiries intended to identify the matters which will allow the Com-
mission to rule, by means of a final decision at the end of that procedure, on the compatibility 
of that transaction with the common market. The Court added that the initiation of the phase of 
in-depth control has the sole purpose of making a preliminary finding on the existence of serious 
doubts raised as to the compatibility of the notified transaction.
(b)  Concept of concentration
In Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus Group v Commission (judgment of 6 July 2010, not yet published), the 
applicant, relying on national legislative provisions, sought the extension of the concept of con-
centration, as defined in European Union law, to cases in which, where control has not been ob-
tained, a shareholding by an undertaking in the capital of another undertaking does not, as such, 
confer the power of exercising decisive influence on the other undertaking. Ryanair Holdings plc 
had launched a public bid for the entire share capital of Aer Lingus Group plc, but had had to aban-
don its plans on account of the Commission’s decision declaring the concentration incompatible 
with the common market. Following that decision, however, Aer Lingus Group had requested the 
Commission to require Ryanair Holdings to divest itself also of its minority shareholding already 
held in the capital of Aer Lingus Group. The Commission rejected that request and Aer Lingus 
Group brought an action against that decision.
In its judgment, the Court observed that the power to require the disposal of all the shares ac-
quired by an undertaking in another undertaking exists only to restore the situation prevailing 
prior to the implementation of the concentration. Accordingly, if control has not been acquired, 
and the concentration has not therefore been implemented, the Commission does not have 
the power to dissolve that ‘concentration’. The Court also stated that, generally, Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 does not seek to protect companies from commercial disputes between them and 
their shareholders or to remove all uncertainty in relation to the approval of important decisions 
by those shareholders, since such disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the national courts. Simi-
larly, the bounds of the powers invested in the Commission for the purposes of merger control 
would be exceeded if it were accepted that the Commission may order the divestment of a minor-
ity shareholding in a competitor undertaking on the sole ground that it represents a theoretical 
economic risk when there is a duopoly, or a disadvantage for the attractiveness of the shares of 
one of the undertakings making up that duopoly.
In Éditions Jacob v Commission, the applicant disputed the legal classification of the acquisition by 
Natexis Banques Populaires of the target assets as an acquisition of securities in an undertaking 
with a view to reselling them falling within Article 3(5)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (15). The 
(15)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (cor-
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applicant claimed that that ‘holding’ transaction was, in fact, a concentration within the meaning 
of Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, since it had enabled Lagardère to acquire either sole control of 
the target assets, through the intermediary of Natexis Banques Populaires, or joint control of them, 
together with Natexis Banques Populaires, and, therefore, to have the possibility of exercising a de-
cisive influence over the activity associated with the target assets.
The Court held that the allegations of sole control could not be upheld. It was apparent from the 
wording of the sale contract that Lagardère did not have either a property right over, or a right to 
use, the target assets before the Commission adopted the conditional authorisation decision, or 
any rights enabling it to exercise a decisive influence over the organs of the companies control-
ling the target assets. As regards joint control, the Court observed that, even on the assumption 
that the holding of the target assets did enable Lagardère to exercise jointly with Natexis Banques 
Populaires a decisive influence over the activity associated with the target assets as of completion 
of the holding transaction, the concentration which would result from this would in any event con-
stitute a concentration distinct from the concentration notified by Lagardère. The error allegedly 
made by the Commission in classifying the holding of the target assets as ‘an acquisition of securi-
ties with a view to reselling them’ and not as an acquisition of sole or joint control had no effect, in 
any event, on the legality of the decision declaring compatible with the common market, subject 
to the sale of assets, the purchase of Vivendi Universal Publishing by Lagardère.
(c)  Efficiency gain — Verifiability
In Ryanair v Commission, the Court observed, first of all, that the Commission took the view that it 
is apparent from both Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and the guidelines on the assessment of hori-
zontal mergers (16) that, to counteract the negative effects of a merger on consumers, the resulting 
efficiency gains need to be verifiable, likely to benefit consumers and could not have been achieved 
to a similar extent by means that are less anti-competitive than the proposed concentration. As re-
gards the first condition, the Court stated that, contrary to the view taken by the Commission in the 
contested decision, pursuant to the guidelines, the condition relating to the verifiability of efficien-
cies does not require the notifying party to provide data capable of being independently verified by 
a third party or documents, dated pre-merger, which serve to objectively and independently assess 
the scope for efficiency gains generated by the acquisition. The Commission was not therefore en-
titled to reject the data submitted by Ryanair Holdings on that basis. The Court added that business 
life does not always allow such documents to be produced in due time and the documents used by 
an undertaking to initiate a public bid, whether they come from that undertaking or from its advis-
ers, are by nature likely to be of some relevance as regards substantiating efficiency claims.
(d)  Commitments
Trustee
In Case T-452/04 Éditions Jacob v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2010, not published, 
under appeal), the Court was called upon to rule on the legality of the decision relating to the ap-
proval of Wendel Investissement as purchaser of the assets sold in accordance with the Commis-
sion’s decision of 7 January 2004 authorising, subject to the sale of assets, the purchase of Vivendi 
Universal Publishing by Lagardère. One of the pleas raised alleged that the approval of Wendel In-
vestissement had been based on the report of a trustee who was not independent. In this respect, 
(16)  Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council regulation on the control of concentrations between 
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the Court observed, first, that the trustee was appointed even though he was a member of the ex-
ecutive board of the company holding the target assets and, second, that he carried out his duties 
as a trustee simultaneously with the duties of a member of the board of that company holding the 
target assets. Accordingly, he was dependant on that company, to an extent that questions might 
be raised as to the neutrality he should exhibit in carrying out his duties as trustee. In so far as in his 
capacity as trustee he drew up the report assessing Wendel Investissement as a prospective pur-
chaser of the assets sold, which had a decisive influence on the approval decision adopted by the 
Commission, the Court held that the illegality established justified the annulment of the decision 
approving Wendel Investissement as purchaser.
State aid
Cases concerning State aid accounted for a significant part of the Court’s activity in 2010, 50 cases 
having been disposed of. It is possible only to give an overview of the Court’s decisions, concerning 
(i) questions of admissibility, (ii) questions of substance, and (iii) procedural questions.
1.  Admissibility
The case-law in 2010 brought further clarification with respect to the assessment of standing to 
bring proceedings, in the case of actions challenging a Commission decision declaring aid incom-
patible with the common market.
First, in Case T-193/06 TF1 v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2010, not yet published), the 
applicant sought annulment of a Commission decision relating to support measures for the cin-
ema and audiovisual industry in France, by which the Commission decided not to raise any objec-
tions to the measures at issue on the conclusion of the preliminary examination stage laid down 
under Article 88(3) EC.
Contending that the contested decision was formally addressed to the French Republic, the Com-
mission disputed the admissibility of the action brought by the applicant, and maintained that the 
applicant was not individually concerned by that decision.
The Court observed that the preliminary examination stage is intended merely to allow the Com-
mission to form a prima facie opinion on the partial or complete conformity of the aid. It is only in 
connection with the examination stage under Article 88(2) EC that the Commission is required to 
give the parties concerned notice to submit their comments. Thus, where, without initiating the 
formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC, the Commission finds that the aid is com-
patible with the common market, the persons intended to benefit from those procedural guaran-
tees, inter alia competitors of the aid recipients, do have standing to bring an action seeking to 
have their procedural rights safeguarded. By contrast, if an applicant calls into question the merits 
of the decision appraising the aid as such, the mere fact that it may be regarded as ‘concerned’ 
within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC cannot suffice for the action to be declared admissible.
In the case in point, the Court first of all examined the nature of the applicant’s pleas before conclud-
ing that none of those pleas for annulment sought to establish the existence of serious difficulties 
raised by the support measures at issue in the light of their classification as State aid or their compat-
ibility with the common market, difficulties which would have obliged the Commission to initiate 
the formal procedure. The applicant did not call into question the Commission’s refusal to initiate 
the formal investigation procedure referred to in Article 88(2) EC and it did not plead infringement of 
procedural rights stemming from that provision, but rather sought exclusively the annulment of the 
decision on the substance, as it confirmed at the hearing in response to a question put by the Court.126  Annual Report 2010
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Accordingly, the action did not seek to safeguard the procedural rights of the applicant, which 
therefore had to show that it had a particular status within the meaning of the case-law resulting 
from Plaumann v Commission (17), inter alia on the ground that its market position was substantially 
affected by the measures covered by the decision, since the effect on its competitive position had 
to be examined in relation to the beneficiaries of the aid measures at issue, namely operators with 
a production activity in the cinematographic and audiovisual fields. In the case in point, since the 
compulsory investment percentage applied to the turnover was the same for all competitors, the 
fact that the applicant’s investment obligations exceeded the expenses of the other competitors, 
in view of its high turnover, was not such as to confer on it a particular status and, therefore, did 
not distinguish it individually just as in the case of the person addressed within the meaning of 
Plaumann v Commission.
Second, in Joined Cases T-415/05, T-416/05 and T-423/05 Greece and Others v Commission (judg-
ment of 13 September 2010, not yet published), the Court held that, as long as the applicants were 
recognised as having, even after being placed in liquidation, a legal interest in seeking the annul-
ment of the contested decision, the intervener retained a corresponding interest in intervening 
in support of the Commission to argue for the legality of that decision, if only for the purposes of 
making claims for compensation, followed by possible actions, based on the unlawful grant of aid 
which caused it injury.
Third, and lastly, in Joined Cases T-231/06 and T-237/06 Netherlands and NOS v Commission (judg-
ment of 16 December 2010, not yet published), the Court recalled that the administrative procedure 
in State aid matters is only initiated against the Member State concerned. Undertakings that receive 
aid are only considered to be interested parties in this procedure. It follows that, far from enjoying 
the same rights of defence as those which individuals against whom a procedure has been insti-
tuted are recognised as having, interested parties have only the right to be involved in the adminis-
trative procedure to the extent appropriate in the light of the circumstances of the case.
2.  Substantive rules
(a)  Individual aid granted under a general aid scheme approved by the Commission
In Joined Cases T-102/07 and T-120/07 Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission (judgment 
of 3 March 2010, not yet published), the Court held that, when the Commission has before it a spe-
cific grant of aid alleged to have been made in pursuance of a previously authorised scheme, it 
cannot at the outset examine it directly in relation to the EC Treaty. Prior to the initiation of any 
procedure, it must first examine whether the aid is covered by the general scheme and satisfies the 
conditions laid down in the decision approving it. If it did not do so, the Commission could, when-
ever it examined an individual aid measure, go back on its decision approving the aid scheme, 
which had already involved an examination in the light of Article 87 EC. Aid which constitutes 
the strict and foreseeable application of the conditions laid down in the decision approving the 
general aid scheme is thus considered to be existing aid which does not need to be notified to the 
Commission or examined in the light of Article 87 EC.
The Court also stated that a Commission decision ruling on whether an aid measure is consistent 
with the relevant scheme falls within the scope of the Commission’s obligation to ensure the appli-
cation of Articles 87 EC and 88 EC. Consequently, the Commission’s examination of the consistency 
of an aid measure with that scheme does not constitute a step that exceeds its powers. Therefore, 
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the Commission’s assessment cannot be limited by the assessment of the national authorities that 
granted the aid.
(b)  Granting of an economic advantage
In Joined Cases T-425/04, T-444/04, T-450/04 and T-456/04 France and Others v Commission (judg-
ment of 21 May 2010, not yet published), the Court held that public declarations made by national 
authorities result in an appreciable advantage for a company inasmuch as they enable the finan-
cial markets to recover confidence. They also make it possible, easier and cheaper for a company 
to gain access to new loans necessary in order finance its short-term debts and ultimately help to 
stabilise a company’s very fragile financial situation. Those declarations decisively influence the re-
action of rating agencies. Any positive influence on a company’s rating, if only as a result of public 
declarations which are likely to create or strengthen investor confidence, produces an immediate 
impact on the level of costs which the company must incur in order to refinance itself on the capi-
tal markets.
The Court also stated that the requirement of the connection between the advantage identified 
and the commitment of State resources presupposes, in principle, that that advantage is closely 
linked to a corresponding charge included in the State budget or to the creation, on the basis of le-
gally binding obligations entered into by the State, of a sufficiently real economic risk to that budg-
et. In order that declarations may be treated in the same way as a State guarantee or interpreted as 
disclosing an irrevocable commitment to provide specific financial assistance, such as repayment 
of short-term debts, they must consist in a concrete, unconditional and irrevocable commitment 
of public resources and set out explicitly either the exact sums to be invested, or the specific debts 
to be guaranteed, or, at the very least, a predefined financial framework, such as a credit line up 
to a certain amount, as well as the conditions for granting the proposed assistance. The mere fact 
that a Member State has used its particular reputation with the financial markets cannot suffice 
to demonstrate that its resources were exposed to a risk such as can be considered to constitute 
a transfer of State resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is sufficiently linked to 
the advantage conferred by its declarations.
In Case T-177/07 Mediaset v Commission (judgment of 15 June 2010, not yet published, under ap-
peal), the Court recalled that the case-law has acknowledged that an advantage granted directly 
to certain natural or legal persons who are not necessarily undertakings may constitute an indirect 
advantage, hence State aid, for other natural or legal persons who are undertakings. The argument 
that a subsidy granted to consumers cannot be categorised as State aid to traders providing con-
sumer goods or services must therefore be rejected.
(c)  Services of general economic interest
In Joined Cases T-568/08 and T-573/08 M6 and TF1 v Commission (judgment of 1 July 2010, not yet 
published, under appeal), the Court held that the view that fulfilment of the fourth condition of the 
conditions set out in paragraphs 88 to 93 of Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg (18) 
is a requirement for application of the derogation provided for in Article 86(2) EC is based on con-
fusion between the conditions which establish the classification as State aid within the meaning 
of Article 87(1) EC and those which are used to assess the compatibility of aid pursuant to Arti-
cle 86(2) EC. The sole purpose of the conditions laid down in Altmark Trans and Regierungsprä-
sidium Magdeburg is the classification of the measure in question as State aid, for the purposes of 
(18)  Case C-280/00 [2003] ECR I-7747.128  Annual Report 2010
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establishing the existence of an obligation to notify the measure to the Commission in the case of 
new aid or to cooperate with the Commission in the case of existing aid.
The Court also stated that the question of whether an undertaking responsible for a broadcast-
ing service of general economic interest could fulfil its public service obligations at lower cost 
is irrelevant for assessing the compatibility of the State funding of that service in the light of the 
Community State aid rules. What Article 86(2) EC seeks to prevent, though the assessment of the 
proportionality of the aid, is that the operator responsible for the service of general economic in-
terest benefits from funding which exceeds the net costs of the public service.
In Netherlands and NOS v Commission, the Court stated that Member States have wide discretion 
to define what they regard as services of general economic interest. Hence, the definition of such 
services by a Member State can be questioned by the Commission only in the event of manifest 
error. As regards the definition of public service in the broadcasting sector, although it is true that it 
is not for the Commission to decide whether a programme is to be provided as a service of general 
economic interest, nor to question the nature or the quality of a certain product, it must, as guard-
ian of the Treaty, be able to intervene in the event of manifest error.
(d)  Private investor in a market economy test
In Case T-163/05 Bundesverband deutscher Banken v Commission (judgment of 3 March 2010, not 
yet published), the Court rejected the argument that the exercise of ascertaining whether the 
transaction took place under normal conditions of a market economy must necessarily be made 
by reference to the single investor or to the single undertaking benefiting from the investment, 
when it is the interaction between the various economic operators which is precisely the feature of 
a market economy. Thus, the Commission can examine whether an undertaking would have been 
able to procure funds entailing the same advantages from other investors and, if necessary, under 
what conditions. Nor, furthermore, does that exercise require the constraints connected with the 
nature of the asset transferred to be disregarded altogether.
Furthermore, the Court held that the fact that one aspect of the transaction entails an increase 
in the risk run by an investor does not justify an increase in the remuneration unless that aspect 
constitutes an advantage for the bank or the bank is not in a position to refuse the funds proposed. 
By contrast, if the increase in risk for the investor stems from a decision which he has taken for his 
own reasons, without being influenced by the bank’s wishes or requirements, the bank will refuse 
to pay a remuneration premium and will obtain funds from other investors.
In Greece and Others v Commission, after recalling that it follows from Article 87(1) EC that the 
concept of aid is an objective one, the test being whether a State measure confers an economic 
advantage on the recipient undertaking that it would not have obtained under normal market 
conditions, the Court held that the fact that the transaction is reasonable for the public authorities 
or public undertaking granting the aid does not dispense with the obligation to apply the private 
investor test.
(e)  Obligation to recover aid
In Greece and Others v Commission, the Court addressed the issue of the recovery of aid in the 
event of financial continuity between two undertakings. Where such continuity exists, the new 
undertaking may be regarded as the effective recipient of the aid benefiting the sector of activity 
in question which had been granted to the former undertaking before those activities were taken 
over by the new undertaking. By contrast, in the absence, after the hiving-off, of economic unity Annual Report 2010  129
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between the two undertakings, the aid granted to the former undertaking after the hiving-off can-
not be recovered from the new undertaking on the sole ground that that undertaking obtained an 
indirect benefit from it. That fact cannot itself lead to the conclusion that the new undertaking is 
the effective recipient of the aid granted to the former undertaking.
As regards apportionment of the recovery obligation between recipients of aid, the Court ob-
served that, in a decision finding that aid is incompatible and requiring its recovery, the Commis-
sion is not required to state to what extent each recipient undertaking has benefited from the 
amount of the aid in question. It is for the Member State concerned to determine the amount 
which must be repaid by each of those undertakings in its recovery of the aid, in cooperation with 
the Commission, in accordance with Article 10 EC.
Moreover, the criteria laid down in the case-law for identifying the effective recipient of aid are 
objective. Financial continuity can be established on the basis of various objective elements, such 
as the absence of payment in consideration for the transferred assets, or of a price consistent with 
market conditions, or the objective fact that the effect of the transfer is to circumvent the obliga-
tion to repay the aid at issue.
The finding that there has been financial continuity between two undertakings cannot lead to the 
presumption that, having regard to the persistence of the financial difficulties of those two com-
panies after the hiving-off, the new measures in favour of the new undertaking, examined in the 
contested decision, constitute the logical continuation of the earlier aid and, therefore, also come 
within the category of State aid. It is in any case for the Courts of the European Union to ascertain 
whether, having regard to the relevant factors, those measures can reasonably be severed from the 
earlier aid measures.
3.  Procedural rules
(a)  Formal investigation procedure
In Case T-36/06 Bundesverband deutscher Banken v Commission (judgment of 3 March 2010, not 
yet published), the Court held that the question whether the Commission misapplied the private 
investor test is not to be confused with the question whether there are serious difficulties which 
require the formal investigation procedure to be initiated. Furthermore, the fact that the Commis-
sion did not respond to certain complaints raised by the applicant in connection with a parallel 
case does not imply that the Commission was not in a position to take a decision on the measure in 
question on the basis of the information available to it or that it was, therefore, required to initiate 
the formal investigation procedure in order to complete its enquiry. Where the Commission has 
initiated the formal investigation procedure in respect of similar transactions and, on that occasion, 
there has been some discussion about the importance of certain characteristics common to all the 
transactions, it may be concluded that the Commission has the information allowing it to assess 
the relevance of those characteristics.
(b)  Obligation to state reasons
In Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission, the Court annulled, because of an inadequate state-
ment of reasons, a Commission decision finding the existence of State aid incompatible with the 
common market, which contained no reference, in its calculation of the amount of aid to the firms 
in difficulty, to the practice of the financial markets on accumulation of risks (firm in difficulty, ab-
sence of collateral, etc.), since the premiums as fixed by the Commission and the specific situation 
of the undertakings at issue did not appear clearly, creating the impression that the premiums 130  Annual Report 2010
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may have been randomly chosen whereas the Commission notice on the method for setting the 
reference and discount rates (19) does not mention anywhere that risks can be cumulative. The 
Commission should have explained why it resorted to additional premiums and how it chose their 
amounts by way of an analysis of market practice in order to allow those companies to question 
whether the premiums were appropriate and the Court to review their legality.
Furthermore, in Mediaset v Commission, the Court stated, with regard to the categorisation of 
a measure as aid, the obligation to state reasons requires that the reasons which led the Commis-
sion to consider that the measure concerned falls within the scope of Article 87(1) EC be stated. As 
regards the existence of a distortion of competition in the common market, while the Commission 
must at the very least refer to the circumstances in which aid was granted in the statement of the 
reasons for its decision where those circumstances show that the aid is such as to affect trade be-
tween Member States and to distort or threaten to distort competition, it is not required to carry 
out an economic analysis of the actual situation on the relevant markets, of the market share of 
the undertakings in receipt of the aid, of the position of competing undertakings or of trade flows 
between Member States. Furthermore, in the case of aid granted illegally, the Commission is not 
required to demonstrate the actual effect which that aid has had on competition and on trade 
between Member States. If that were the case, such a requirement would ultimately give Mem-
ber States which grant unlawful aid an advantage over those which notify the aid at the planning 
stage. In particular, the Commission merely needs to establish that the aid in question is of such 
a kind as to affect trade between Member States and distorts or threatens to distort competition. It 
does not have to define the market in question.
Community trade mark
Decisions relating to the application of Regulations (EC) Nos 40/94 (20) and 207/2009 (21) continued 
to represent in 2010 a significant number of the cases disposed of by the Court (180 cases, that is 
to say 34% of the total number of cases disposed of in 2010).
1.  Absolute grounds for refusal
Article 7(1)(b) of Regulations (EC) Nos 40/94 and 207/2009 prohibits the registration as a Com-
munity trade mark of signs which are devoid of any distinctive character; that distinctive character 
must be assessed by reference to the goods or services for which registration has been sought and 
to the relevant public’s perception of those signs.
In Case T-547/08 X Technology Swiss v OHIM (Orange colouring of the toe of a sock) (judgment 
of 15 June 2010, not yet published, under appeal), the Court dismissed the action brought against 
the decision of the Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), according to which an orange colouration in the form of a hood cover-
ing the toe of hosiery articles is, for the average consumer, a sign which is devoid of any distinctive 
character. First, the Court held that the Board of Appeal did not err in applying the case-law on 
three-dimensional marks to the mark applied for, which was classified by the applicant as a ‘posi-
tional mark’. The Court stated that the classification of a ‘positional mark’ as a figurative or three-
dimensional mark, or as a specific category of marks, is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing its 
distinctive character, the decisive factor governing the applicability of that case-law being the fact 
(19)  Commission Notice 97/C 273/03 on the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ 1997 C 273, p. 3).
(20)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).
(21)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  131
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that a sign is indistinguishable from the appearance of the product designated. Second, the Court 
held that when a sign is not capable of identifying the commercial origin of the goods, it cannot 
be registered as a trade mark, notwithstanding the fact that it relates to goods which are subject to 
fashion trends and that, consequently, numerous similar signs exist or are constantly being created 
within the industrial sector concerned. Lastly, the Court clarified the fact that the risk that a feature 
of the presentation of a product or a service may be copied by a competitor does not affect the 
interpretation of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, since a trader who uses, in the course 
of trade, a sign which does not meet the requirement laid down in that provision may, where rel-
evant, be able to establish that the sign has become distinctive in consequence of the use which 
has been made of it within the meaning of Article 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, or seek other 
legal means which may be open to it, such as the law on designs or proceedings alleging unfair 
competition.
Furthermore, in Case T-404/09 Deutsche Bahn v OHIM (Horizontal combination of the colours grey 
and red) and Case T-405/09 Deutsche Bahn v OHIM (Vertical combination of the colours grey and red) 
(judgments of 12 November 2010, not published) the Court returned to the issue of the distinctive 
character of a combination of colours. In those two judgments, the Court confirmed the restric-
tive approach to applications for registration as a mark with a combination of colours and found 
that, for the public concerned, the combination of colours was not perceptibly different from the 
colours commonly used for the services in question and was therefore devoid of any distinctive 
character.
2.  Relative grounds for refusal
In  Case  T-255/08  Montero  Padilla  v  OHIM  —  Padilla  Requena  (JOSE  PADILLA)  (judgment 
of 22 June 2010, not yet published), the Court further clarified the grounds on which an opposition 
may be based. The applicant had requested, in essence, that the Court should review the legality of 
the decision of the Board of Appeal of OHIM in the light of Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 re-
lating to the scope of the right conferred by a Community trade mark. The Court stated that 
the grounds on which opposition may be based, as laid down in Article 42(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No 40/94, are solely the relative grounds for refusal in Article 8 of that regulation, since Article 9 of 
that regulation defines the scope of the right conferred by a Community trade mark and, therefore, 
the effects of its registration, but does not concern the conditions for registration. Consequently, 
Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 does not form part of the legal framework to be taken into 
consideration by OHIM when it examines an application for registration or a notice of opposition. 
The Court further held that it follows from the wording of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, 
which uses the expression ‘for which the earlier trade mark is registered’, that this provision applies 
to earlier trade marks within the meaning of Article 8(2) of that regulation only in so far as they 
have been registered. Consequently, Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 protects, in relation 
to goods or services which are not similar, only those well-known marks within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 6bis of the Paris Convention (22) for which proof of registration has been provided. Lastly, the 
Court stated that copyright cannot constitute a ‘sign used in the course of trade’ within the mean-
ing of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, as is apparent from the scheme of Article 52 of that 
regulation. Article 52(1)(c) provides that a Community trade mark is to be declared invalid where 
there is an earlier right as referred to in Article 8(4) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 and the conditions 
set out in that paragraph are fulfilled. Article 52(2)(c) provides that a Community trade mark is also 
to be declared invalid where the use of such trade mark may be prohibited pursuant to any ‘other’ 
(22)  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, as revised and amended.132  Annual Report 2010
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earlier right and in particular a copyright. It follows that copyright is not one of the earlier rights as 
referred to in Article 8(4) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94.
3.  Relationship between absolute grounds for refusal and relative grounds for refusal
In JOSE PADILLA, the Court stated that it follows from the wording of Article 42(1), and from the 
scheme of Articles 42 and 43 of that regulation, that the absolute grounds for refusal in Article 7 of 
that regulation do not fall to be examined in opposition proceedings. The grounds on which oppo-
sition may be based, as laid down in Article 42(1) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, are solely the relative 
grounds for refusal in Article 8 of the regulation.
4.  Procedural issues
In Case T-225/09 Claro v OHIM — Telefónica (Claro) (judgment of 28 April 2010, not published, un-
der appeal), the Court dismissed the action brought against the decision of the Board of Appeal of 
OHIM, by which the Board of Appeal found an appeal inadmissible on the ground that no written 
statement setting out the grounds had been lodged within the period laid down in Article 59 of 
Regulation (EC) No 40/94. The applicant had claimed that the submission of a written statement 
served no useful purpose on account, first, of the fact that it was disputing in its entirety the deci-
sion of the Opposition Division upholding the opposition on the basis of the relative ground for 
refusal referred to in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 and, second, of the continuity of 
functions between the departments of OHIM, which are required to base their decisions by refer-
ence to the procedure before the lower adjudicating body. The Court stated that the submission 
of a written statement setting out the grounds of appeal did serve a useful purpose, since it is 
for the party which has brought an appeal before a Board of Appeal to set out the grounds on 
which that appeal is based. By contrast, it is not the task of the Board of Appeal to determine, by 
deductions, the grounds on which the appeal that it is hearing is based. Furthermore, as regards 
continuity of functions, the Court again applied the principles established by the Court of Justice in 
OHIM v Kaul (23), stating that it follows from Article 62(1) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 that, through 
the effect of the appeal brought before it, the Board of Appeal is called upon to carry out a new, 
full examination of the merits of the opposition, in terms of both law and fact. However, such an 
examination presupposes that the appeal before the Board of Appeal is admissible, since, if it is 
inadmissible, the Board of Appeal must dismiss it without examining the substance.
Next, in Case T-487/08 Kureha v OHIM — Sanofi-Aventis (KREMEZIN) (judgment of 16 June 2010, not 
published), the Court adjudicated on the probative value of a publication of the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) submitted late with a view to proving the existence of the earlier 
mark. The Court held that no provision of Regulations (EC) Nos 40/94 or 2868/95 (24) precludes 
the various levels of OHIM from considering that publication by WIPO of international registra-
tion meets the requirements of Rule 19(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95. Consequently, a possible 
challenge to the probative value of a WIPO publication of international registration is governed by 
Rule 20(2) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95, since those two provisions govern the exchange 
of observations and evidence between the parties through OHIM, whereas Rule 19 of that regu-
lation concerns only communication between OHIM and the opposing party. Furthermore, the 
Court held that it is apparent from a combined reading of the applicable provisions of Regulations 
(EC) Nos 40/94 and 2868/95 that, in the context of the application of Rule 20 of Regulation (EC) 
No 2868/95, OHIM may, first, invite the parties to file observations as often as it deems necessary 
(23)  Case C-29/05 P [2007] ECR I-2213.
(24)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  133
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and, second, take into account, if it considers it to be appropriate, evidence communicated to it by 
the parties out of time.
Furthermore, Case T-292/08 Inditex v OHIM — Marín Díaz de Cerio (OFTEN) (judgment of 13 Septem-
ber 2010, not yet published) afforded the Court an opportunity to clarify whether the issues of the 
proof of genuine use of an earlier mark and of the similarity of the goods at issue, which have not 
been raised before a Board of Appeal of OHIM, form part of the context of the dispute before that 
department if they have been raised before an Opposition Division. As regards the issue of genu-
ine use, the Court held that it is specific and preliminary in character, since it leads to a determina-
tion whether, for the purposes of the examination of the opposition, the earlier trade mark can be 
deemed to be registered in respect of the goods or services in question. Consequently, that issue 
does not fall within the context of the examination of the opposition proper if the plea alleging that 
the proof of genuine use was insufficient was not part of the subject-matter of the dispute before the 
Board of Appeal, which was limited to an examination of the existence of a likelihood of confusion. 
On the other hand, opposition based on the existence of a likelihood of confusion requires OHIM to 
adjudicate on both whether the goods and services covered by the marks in question are identical or 
similar and whether those marks themselves are identical or similar in view of the interdependence 
of the factors taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
Lastly, in Case T-303/08 Tresplain Investment v OHIM — Hoo Hing (Golden Elephant Brand) (judgment 
of 9 December 2010, not yet published), the Court recalled that pleas which have not been raised 
by the applicant before the departments of OHIM are not admissible before the Court. However, 
according to settled case-law, OHIM may be called upon to take account of the national law of 
a Member State in which the earlier mark, on which the application for a declaration of invalidity is 
based, is protected, on account of the fact that restricting the factual basis of the examination by 
OHIM does not preclude it from taking into consideration, in addition to the facts which have been 
expressly put forward by the parties, facts which are well known, where those facts are necessary in 
order for OHIM to assess the applicability of the ground for invalidity in question and, in particular, 
the probative value of the documents lodged. In the case in point, the applicant claimed that the 
Board of Appeal of OHIM ought, in its examination as to whether there was misrepresentation, to 
have taken account of the fact that the intervener had adduced no evidence of any instance of con-
fusion. If the applicant claims that the laws of a Member State (in this instance the United Kingdom) 
require, in the event of coexistence of two trade marks on the market, that evidence of specific 
instances of confusion be adduced in the context of an action for passing-off at national level, such 
an argument is admissible even if the applicant has not advanced it before OHIM, provided that it 
is apparent from the documents in the case that the marks have coexisted. Furthermore, the Court 
held that the fact that the intervener became aware of the legal position only in the course of the 
procedure, in so far as, at the time when the intervener lodged its response, the Court had not yet 
dismissed the separate action brought by that party as inadmissible, cannot constitute a new mat-
ter of law or of fact within the meaning of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.
5.  Community designs
During 2010, the Court was called upon to apply Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (25) for the first time.
In Case T-9/07 Grupo Promer Mon Graphic v OHIM — PepsiCo (Representation of a circular promotion-
al item) (judgment of 18 March 2010, not yet published, under appeal), the Court stated that the 
grounds on which a Community design may be declared invalid listed in Article 25(1) of Regula-
(25)  Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (OJ 2002 L 3, p. 1).134  Annual Report 2010
General Court  Proceedings
tion (EC) No 6/2002 must be regarded as exhaustive and do not include the bad faith of the proprie-
tor of a contested Community design. The Court also defined certain fundamental concepts of Reg-
ulation (EC) No 6/2002. As regards the concept of ‘conflict’, the Court observed that Article 25(1)(d) 
of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 must be interpreted as meaning that a Community design is in conflict 
with a prior design when, taking into consideration the freedom of the designer in developing the 
Community design, that design does not produce on the informed user a different overall impres-
sion from that produced by the prior design relied on. Moreover, the Court clarified the scope of 
the concepts of ‘the degree of freedom of the designer in developing his design’, of ‘informed user’ 
and of ‘overall impression’. As regards a designer’s degree of freedom in developing his design, the 
Court held that it must be established, inter alia, by the constraints of the features imposed by the 
technical function of the product or an element thereof, or by statutory requirements applicable to 
the product. As regards the informed user, the Court stated that he is neither a manufacturer nor 
a seller of the products in which the designs at issue are intended to be incorporated or to which 
they are intended to be applied, although he is particularly observant and has some awareness of 
the state of the prior art, that is to say the previous designs relating to the product in question that 
had been disclosed on the date of filing of the contested design, or, as the case may be, on the date 
of priority claimed. Lastly, the Court stated that, in the specific assessment of the overall impression 
of the designs at issue, the designer’s degree of freedom in developing the contested design must 
be taken into account. Thus, in so far as similarities between the designs at issue relate to common 
features, those similarities will have only minor importance in the overall impression produced by 
those designs on the informed user. Consequently, the more the designer’s freedom in developing 
the contested design is restricted, the more likely minor differences between the designs at issue 
will be sufficient to produce a different overall impression on the informed user.
Next, in Case T-148/08 Beifa Group v OHIM — Schwan-Stabilo Schwanhaüßer (Instrument for writ-
ing) (judgment of 12 May 2010, not yet published), the Court brought further clarification to the 
interpretation of Article 25(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002, which provides that a Community 
design may be declared invalid only if a distinctive sign is used in a subsequent design, and Com-
munity law or the law of the Member State governing that sign confers on the right holder of the 
sign the right to prohibit such use. According to the Court, that article also covers the situation of 
similarity between signs and not only that of identity, so that the Board of Appeal did not err in 
law by interpreting the provision in question as meaning that the proprietor of a distinctive sign 
may rely on that provision for the purposes of applying for a declaration of invalidity in respect of 
a subsequent Community design, where use is made in that design of a sign similar to its own. The 
Court also examined the issue of the procedure for requesting proof of genuine use, to be followed 
by the proprietor of the Community design in respect of which an application for a declaration of 
invalidity has been brought in the absence of specific provisions in that regard in Regulation (EC) 
No 6/2002. The Court observed that that request must be submitted to OHIM expressly and in due 
time. On the other hand, a request for proof of genuine use of the earlier sign relied on in support 
of an application for a declaration that a Community design is invalid cannot be made for the first 
time before the Board of Appeal.
Lastly, in Case T-153/08 Shenzhen Taiden v OHIM — Bosch Security Systems (Communications Equip-
ment) (judgment of 22 June 2010, not yet published), the Court stated that, as is apparent from re-
cital 14 in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 6/2002, in the assessment as to whether a design has 
individual character, within the meaning of Article 6 of that regulation, account should be taken of 
the nature of the product to which the design is applied or in which it is incorporated, and in par-
ticular the industrial sector to which it belongs. In addition, the Court clarified the concept of ‘in-
formed user’, noting that the status of ‘user’ implies that the person concerned uses the product in 
which the design is incorporated in accordance with the purpose for which that product is intend-
ed and that the qualifier ‘informed’ suggests that the user, without being a designer or a technical Annual Report 2010  135
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expert, knows the various designs which exist in the sector concerned, possesses a certain degree 
of knowledge with regard to the features which those designs normally include, and, as a result of 
his interest in the products concerned, shows a relatively high degree of attention when he uses 
them. However, that factor does not imply that the informed user is able to distinguish, beyond the 
experience gained by using the product concerned, the aspects of the appearance of the product 
which are dictated by the product’s technical function from those which are arbitrary.
Environment
1.  System for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
Since 2007 the Court has found a fresh, unceasing source of cases in the system for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading, introduced by Directive 2003/87/EC (26).
This  year  mention  is  made  of  Case  T-16/04  Arcelor  v  Parliament  and  Council  (judgment 
of 2 March 2010, not yet published). In the context of an action for damages seeking compensa-
tion for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant in consequence of the adoption of that 
directive, the Court held that the Community legislature enjoys broad discretion when exercising 
its powers in the field of environmental issues under Article 174 EC and Article 175 EC. The exer-
cise of that discretionary power implies first, the need for the Community legislature to anticipate 
and evaluate ecological, scientific, technical and economic changes of a complex and uncertain 
nature and, second, the weighing up and arbitration by that legislature of the various objectives, 
principles and interests set out in Article 174 EC. That is reflected in Directive 2003/87/EC in the 
establishment of a series of objectives and sub-objectives which are in part contradictory.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Community institutions must, in the same way as the Mem-
ber States, respect the fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of establishment, which serve to 
attain one of the essential objectives of the Union, inter alia, that of the completion of the internal 
market. It does not follow that the Community legislature is required to regulate the area at issue 
in such a way that the Community legislation, particularly where that legislation takes the form of 
a directive, must provide an exhaustive, definitive solution to certain problems raised from the per-
spective of completing the internal market or effect a complete harmonisation of national legisla-
tion in order to exclude any conceivable barriers to intra-Community trade. When the Community 
legislature is called on to restructure or establish a complex scheme, such as the allowance trading 
scheme, it is entitled to have recourse to a step-by-step approach and to carry out only a progres-
sive harmonisation of the national legislation at issue.
The Court stressed that, by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, European Union legislation in the 
sphere of environmental protection does not seek to effect complete harmonisation, the Mem-
ber States being free to adopt more stringent protective measures, subject only to the conditions 
that those be compatible with the EC Treaty and be notified to the Commission. The mere fact 
that the Community legislature left open a particular question falling within the scope of Direc-
tive 2003/87/EC and of a fundamental freedom does not in itself justify that omission’s being clas-
sified as contrary to the rules of the Treaty. In addition, the implementation of Directive 2003/87/EC 
being subject to review by the national courts, it is incumbent upon those courts, if they should 
(26)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for green-
house gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, 
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encounter difficulties relating to the interpretation or validity of that directive, to refer a question 
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
Last, the applicant claimed that Directive 2003/87/EC infringes the principle of legal certainty, be-
cause there is no provision governing the extent of the financial consequences which may result 
from both a possible insufficiency of allowances allocated to an installation and the price of those 
allowances, that price being determined exclusively by the market forces which came into being 
following the establishment of the allowance trading scheme. The Court found that regulation of 
the prices of allowances might thwart the main objective of Directive 2003/87/EC, which is to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions through an efficient allowance trading scheme in which the cost 
of emissions and investments made to reduce such emissions is essentially determined by market 
forces. In the event of an insufficiency of allowances, the incentive for operators to reduce, or not 
to reduce, their greenhouse gas emissions will depend on a complex economic decision taken in 
the light of the price of emission allowances available on the exchange market and of the costs of 
possible measures to reduce emissions which may aim either to reduce production or to invest in 
more efficient methods of production in terms of energy output. In such a scheme, the increase 
in the cost of emissions cannot be regulated in advance by the legislature without reducing, or 
even completely removing, the economic incentives which constitute its very basis and thereby 
adversely affecting the effectiveness of the allowance trading scheme.
The fact that it is not possible to predict how the exchange market will develop constitutes an 
element inherent in and inseparable from the economic mechanism characterising the allowance 
trading scheme subject to the classic rules of supply and demand and cannot be contrary to the 
principle of legal certainty.
2.  Air transport — External relations
In Case T–319/05 Swiss Confederation v Commission (judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet pub-
lished, under appeal), the Court adjudicated in a dispute concerning the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (27) and German measures 
relating to the approaches to Zurich airport (Switzerland).
Given the proximity to the German border, most flights landing in Zurich and most take-offs in 
the early morning and late evening must use German airspace. From 1984 to 2001 the use of that 
airspace was the subject of a bilateral agreement, and then of negotiations, between the Swiss 
Confederation and the Federal Republic of Germany. In 2003 the German federal aviation authori-
ties adopted national air traffic regulations. Those were designed, essentially, to prevent, in normal 
weather conditions, overflight at low altitude over the German territory close to the Swiss border 
between 21.00 hours and 7.00 hours on weekdays and between 20.00 hours and 9.00 hours at 
weekends and on public holidays, with a view to reducing the noise to which the local population 
was exposed.
On the basis of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Federation on Air 
Transport (applying, for the purpose of the agreement, Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92) (28), the Swiss 
Confederation made a complaint to the Commission, requesting the latter to take a decision to the 
effect that the Federal Republic of Germany should cease to apply the measures introduced by the 
(27)  Agreement  between  the  European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  Air Transport,  signed  at  Luxembourg 
on 21 June 1999 (OJ 2002 L 114, p. 73).
(28)  Council regulation on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes (OJ 1992 L 240, p. 8).Annual Report 2010  137
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domestic regulations. That complaint being rejected, the Swiss Confederation brought an action 
claiming, in particular, breach of the principles of equal treatment, proportionality and freedom to 
provide services in the air transport sector.
The Court found, first of all, that the Commission did not err in law in considering that the German 
measures did not impose conditions on, limit or refuse the exercise of traffic rights. The German 
measures in no way involve, even conditionally or in part, any prohibition whatsoever of passage 
through German airspace for flights leaving or arriving at Zurich airport, but merely alter the path 
of the flights concerned, after take-off from or before landing at Zurich airport.
Furthermore, so far as concerns breach of the principle of equal treatment to the detriment of 
Swiss air carriers using Zurich airport as a hub, the Court emphasised that the finding that a meas-
ure leads to the same result as discrimination on grounds of nationality is not sufficient to conclude 
that it is incompatible with Article 3 of the agreement in question, and that it is to be ascertained 
whether that measure is not justified by objective considerations and whether it is not proportion-
ate to the objective pursued. Closeness to a tourist destination which is, as such, particularly vul-
nerable to noise emissions constitutes an objective circumstance justifying the adoption of those 
measures with regard solely to Zurich airport. In addition, the Court considered that the German 
measures at issue were justified by objective considerations and were proportionate to the objec-
tive pursued, namely, the reduction of noise pollution by aircraft at night and during the weekend, 
in a part of German territory bordering Switzerland, and that the Federal Republic of Germany 
had no other means at its disposal to obtain the desired reduction in noise pollution. In particular, 
compliance with a noise quota could be very difficult to check, and its infringement impossible to 
penalise, unlike the obligations connected with the fixing of minimum flight altitudes.
Lastly, when considering whether there had been any breach of freedom to provide services in the 
air transport sector, the Court emphasised that the objective of reducing noise pollution consti-
tutes a specific aspect of environmental protection, which is one of the overriding reasons related 
to the general interest capable of justifying restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the EC Treaty, including, in particular, freedom to provide services, and that the measures at is-
sue are proportionate to that objective.
Common foreign and security policy
In 2010 the Court delivered five judgments concerning restrictive measures taken against per-
sons in connection with the common foreign and security policy. In particular, in two judgments 
of 9 and 30 September 2010, the Court was prompted to develop its already extensive case-law on 
the combating of terrorism.
First, concerning the extent of judicial review of fund-freezing measures adopted in order to give 
effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the judgment in Case T-85/09 Kadi 
v Commission (judgment of 30 September 2010, not yet published, under appeal) draws the appro-
priate conclusions from the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council and Commission (29), setting aside the judgment of the Court of 
First Instance in T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission (30). In that judgment, the Court of Justice 
overturned the decision of the Court of First Instance and held that the [European Union] judica-
(29)  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR 
I-6351.
(30)  T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649.138  Annual Report 2010
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ture has full jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Community which 
give effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Deciding the case, the Court of 
Justice then annulled the fund-freezing regulation on the grounds that it had been adopted in 
breach of the fundamental rights of the person concerned, but maintained its effects in force for 
a period not to exceed three months, in order to allow for the remedying of the infringements 
found by the Court of Justice.
Following the judgment of the Court of Justice, the Commission informed the applicant of its in-
tention to maintain his inclusion in Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 (31), on the basis of a summary of 
reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council for the inclusion of the ap-
plicant in the list of persons to whom the freezing of funds was to be applied, and invited him to 
submit his observations in that connection. On 28 November 2008 the Commission adopted a new 
regulation maintaining the freezing of the applicant’s funds (32).
Hearing the action brought by the applicant for annulment of that regulation, the Court consid-
ered that, in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission, its task was to ensure in the circumstances of the case a full 
and rigorous review of the lawfulness of the regulation, without affording the latter any immunity 
from jurisdiction on the ground that it is intended to give effect to resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council of the United Nations. That must remain the case, at the very least, so long as the 
re-examination procedure operated by the Sanctions Committee clearly fails to offer guarantees 
of effective judicial protection. That review must concern, indirectly, the substantive assessments 
of the Sanctions Committee itself and the evidence underlying them. That is all the more justified 
given that the measures at issue have a marked and long-lasting effect on the fundamental rights 
of the applicant, who for nearly 10 years now has been subject to measures freezing all his funds 
indefinitely. In the scale of a human life, 10 years in fact represent a substantial period of time and 
the classification of the measures in question as preventative or punitive, protective or confisca-
tory, civil or criminal seems now to be an open question.
In the context of that full review, and transposing the criteria used by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in its judgment in A. and Others v United Kingdom (33), the Court considered that the 
applicant’s rights of defence had been ‘observed’ only in the most formal and superficial sense. 
The Commission failed to take due account of the applicant’s comments and did not grant him 
even the most minimal access to the evidence against him, and no balance was struck between 
his interests and the need to protect the confidential nature of the information in question. In 
those circumstances, the few pieces of information and the imprecise allegations in the summary 
of reasons appear clearly insufficient to enable the applicant to launch an effective challenge to 
the allegations against him.
The Court held that the contested regulation had been adopted in breach of the applicant’s rights 
of defence. Furthermore, given the lack of any proper access to the information and evidence used 
against him, the applicant has also been unable to defend his rights with regard to that evidence 
in satisfactory conditions before the [Union] judicature, with the result that it must be held that 
his right to effective judicial review had also been infringed. Lastly, the Court found that, given 
(31)  Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and enti-
ties associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban (OJ 2002 L 139, p. 9).
(32)  Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008 amending for the 101st time Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 (OJ 2008 L 322, p. 25).
(33)  Judgment of 19 February 2009 (not yet published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions).Annual Report 2010  139
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the general application and the duration of the fund-freezing measures, the regulation also consti-
tuted an unjustified restriction of his right to property.
Second, concerning national decisions that may form the basis of a fund-freezing measure adopt-
ed by the Council, in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in Case T-348/07 Al-Aqsa v Council (judg-
ment of 9 September 2010, not yet published), the Court clarified the conditions in which an or-
der of the court hearing an application for interim measures in the context of an action seeking 
the suspension, by way of interlocutory order, of operation of a national fund-freezing measure 
(the Sanctieregeling), constitutes a ‘decision’ taken by a competent authority, within the mean-
ing of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (34) and of Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) 
No 2580/2001 (35).
Here the Court noted that the order of the court hearing the application for interim measures 
did not, any more than the Sanctieregeling, constitute, in the proper sense, a decision ‘instigat[ing] 
investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act’, nor did it lead to the ‘conviction’ of the applicant, 
within the strictly criminal meaning of the term. Nonetheless, in the light of its content, effect and 
context, the order of the court hearing the application for interim measures, taken together with 
the Sanctieregeling, did indeed constitute a ‘decision’ taken by a competent authority, within the 
meaning of the abovementioned provisions of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and of Regula-
tion (EC) No 2580/2001, which do not require the national ‘decision’ to be taken in criminal pro-
ceedings stricto sensu.
Moreover, a national decision to ‘instigat[e] … investigations or prosecut[e]’ must, if the Council is 
to be able validly to invoke it, form part of national proceedings seeking, directly and chiefly, the 
imposition on the person concerned of measures of a preventative or punitive nature, in connec-
tion with the combating of terrorism. The Court considered that, unlike a decision of a national 
judicial authority ruling only incidentally and indirectly on the possible involvement of the person 
concerned in such activity, the order of the court hearing the application for interim measures 
relied upon by the Council in the present case formed a sufficiently direct part of national proceed-
ings seeking chiefly to impose an economic sanction on the person concerned, namely, the freez-
ing of its funds under the Sanctieregeling itself, as a result of that person’s involvement in terrorist 
activity.
The question also arose whether the order of the court hearing the application for interim meas-
ures could provide a basis for the Council’s decision when the Sanctieregeling had been repealed 
by the national authorities after the dismissal of the application for interim measures. The Court 
held that it could not. By that order, the court hearing the application for interim measures simply 
refused to suspend the effects of the Sanctieregeling by way of an interim ruling. The Sanctierege-
ling definitively ceased to have any legal effects as a result of its repeal. The same must neces-
sarily apply, in consequence, to the legal effects attaching to the order of the court hearing the 
application for interim measures, all the more so because that order contained only an interim 
ruling, without prejudice to a subsequent substantive ruling at the end of the proceedings. It was 
not, moreover, compatible with the general scheme of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, a feature 
of which is the precedence that matters of national procedure must have in the Council’s assess-
ment, for the Sanctieregeling, which no longer has any effects within the Netherlands legal order, to 
(34)  Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
(OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93).
(35)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with 
a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70).140  Annual Report 2010
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continue to have effect indirectly and indefinitely within the Community legal order, by means of 
the order of the court hearing the application for interim measures. The Council had overstepped 
the bounds of its discretion by continuing to include the applicant indefinitely in the list at issue, 
when periodically reviewing the latter’s situation, solely on the ground that the decision of the 
court hearing the application for interim measures had not been challenged, in the Netherlands 
legal order, by the judicial body hearing an appeal in interlocutory proceedings or by the judicial 
body adjudicating on the substance, when the administrative decision whose effects that court 
had been asked to suspend had in the meantime been repealed by the body which issued it.
Access to documents of the institutions
The procedure for access to Commission documents, governed in particular by Articles 6 to 8 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, comprises two stages. First, the applicant must send the Commis-
sion an initial application for access to documents. Second, in the event of a total or partial refusal, 
the applicant may make a confirmatory application to the Secretary-General of the Commission. 
Only the measure adopted by the Secretary-General is capable of producing legal effects such as to 
affect the interests of the applicant and, therefore, of being the subject of an action for annulment.
In Joined Cases T–355/04 and T–446/04 Co-Frutta v Commission [2010] ECR II-1 (36), the Court found 
it necessary to describe the consequences of the expiry of the period of 15 working days — which 
may be extended — within which the institution must reply to the confirmatory application. Ac-
cording to the Court, that period, laid down in Article 8(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, 
is mandatory. However, the expiry of that period does not have the effect of depriving the institu-
tion of the power to adopt a decision. No legal principle makes the administration lose its power to 
respond to an application, even outside the time-limits laid down for that purpose. The mechanism 
of an implied refusal decision was established in order to counter the risk that the administra-
tion would choose not to reply to an application for access to documents and escape review by 
the courts, not to render unlawful every late decision. On the other hand, the administration is 
required, in principle, to provide, even late, a reasoned response to every application by a citizen. 
That approach is consistent with the function of the mechanism of the implied refusal decision, 
which is to enable citizens to challenge inaction on the part of the administration with a view to 
obtaining a reasoned response.
Likewise, an institution which has received a request for access to a document originating from 
a Member State must, once that request has been notified by the institution to the Member 
State, immediately commence, together with that Member State, a genuine dialogue concern-
ing the possible application of the exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001. On that occasion, they must pay attention to the need to enable the institution 
to adopt a position within the time-limits laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of that regulation, which 
require it to decide on the request for access. Nonetheless, failure to comply with the time-limits 
laid down in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 does not automatically lead to annulment 
of the decision adopted after the deadline. Annulment of a decision solely because of failure to 
comply with the time-limits laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 would merely cause the 
administrative procedure for access to documents to be reopened. In any event, compensation for 
any loss resulting from the lateness of the Commission’s response may be sought through an ac-
tion for damages.
(36)  See also the judgment of 10 December 2010 in Joined Cases T-494/08 to T-500/08 and T-509/08 Ryanair v Commission, not yet 
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Furthermore, in Joined Cases T–494/08 to T–500/08 and T–509/08 Ryanair v Commission, (judgment 
of 10 December 2010, not yet published), the Court drew the appropriate conclusions from the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (37).
The Court recalled that, in accordance with that judgment, for the purposes of interpreting the 
exception laid down in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, concerning 
protection of the objectives of investigation activities, it is appropriate to take account of the fact 
that interested parties other than the Member State concerned in the procedures for reviewing 
State aid do not have the right to consult the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, 
and, therefore, to acknowledge the existence of a general presumption that disclosure of docu-
ments in the administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objectives of investiga-
tion activities.
Thus,  the  Commission  may,  pursuant  to  the  third  indent  of  Article  4(2)  of  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1049/2001, refuse access to all the documents relating to the procedure for the review of State 
aid, and may do so without first making a concrete, individual examination of those documents. 
That general presumption does not exclude the right of those interested parties to demonstrate 
that a given document whose disclosure has been requested is not covered by that presumption, 
or the possibility that there is a higher public interest justifying the disclosure of the document 
concerned by virtue of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
The applicant having put forward no argument to the effect that the documents at issue were not 
covered by the general presumption, the Court dismissed the action.
A similar problem was dealt with by the Court in Case T-237/05 Éditions Jacob v Commission (judg-
ment of 9 June 2010, not yet published). In the circumstances of the case, however, the documents 
to which access was sought related to a procedure concerning a concentration between undertak-
ings which had been closed by the date on which the request for access was made. In that context, 
the Court held that the exception relating to protection of the objectives of inspection, investiga-
tion and audit activities applies only if disclosure of the documents in question may endanger the 
completion of those activities. Admittedly, the various acts performed during the investigation 
may remain covered by that exception as long as the investigations or inspections continue, even 
if the particular investigation or inspection giving rise to the report to which access is sought has 
been completed. Nevertheless, to concede, as claimed by the Commission, that the documents 
sought in this case remained covered by that exception until the decisions closing the procedure 
became final, that is to say, until such time as the General Court and, possibly, the Court of Justice, 
should have dismissed the actions brought against those decisions or, in the event of annulment, 
until one or more new decisions should have been adopted by the Commission, would make ac-
cess to those documents dependent on an uncertain, future and possibly distant event. It followed 
that, when the decision to refuse access was adopted, the documents sought no longer fell within 
the scope of the exception relating to protection of the objectives of investigation activities. Even 
if they had fallen within the ambit of that exception, it was in no way apparent from the statement 
of reasons for the contested decision that the Commission had carried out any specific, individual 
examination of those documents.
In addition, the Court stated that the duty of professional secrecy under Article 17 of Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004 and Article 287 EC is not so extensive that it can justify any general, abstract re-
fusal of access to documents sent in the context of the notification of a concentration. Assessing 
(37)  Judgment of 29 June 2010, not yet published.142  Annual Report 2010
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whether or not information is confidential requires the legitimate interests opposing its disclosure 
to be weighed against the public interest which is that activities of the Community institutions 
should be conducted in the greatest observance possible of the principle of openness. By car-
rying out a specific, individual examination of the documents sought, the Commission is thus in 
a position to ensure the practical effect of the provisions applicable in the field of concentrations in 
a manner fully consistent with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The Court added, in particular, that 
in the field of concentrations, correspondence between the Commission and interested parties is 
not to be regarded as obviously covered by the exception relating to the protection of commercial 
interests and that the Commission must check whether that exception does apply, by means of 
a proper, specific examination of each document.
Status of the Members of the European Parliament
1.  Privileges and immunities
Case T-42/06 Gollnisch v Parliament (judgment of 19 March 2010, not yet published) arose out of 
certain statements made at a press conference by Mr Gollnisch, at that time a Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament, which were capable of amounting to a criminal offence. Following the opening 
of an investigation into denial of crimes against humanity, and at the request of Mr Romagnoli, 
another Member of the European Parliament, the President of the Parliament referred to the Com-
mittee on Legal Affairs a request for defence of the applicant’s parliamentary immunity, pursuant 
to Rule 6(3) of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (38). After considering that request and following 
the proposal to this effect by the Committee, the Parliament rejected the request for immunity by 
decision of 13 December 2005, on the grounds that, in accordance with Article 9 of the Protocol on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities (39), the immunity of Members of the 
Parliament concerned opinions expressed or votes cast by them in the performance of their duties, 
which was not the case in that instance.
Hearing an application for compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by Mr Gollnisch as 
a result of that decision, the Court held that, while the privileges and immunities conferred by the 
protocol have a functional character, inasmuch as they are intended to prevent any interference 
with the functioning and independence of the Communities, the fact remains that the protocol 
creates an individual right for the persons concerned, observance of which is ensured by the sys-
tem of legal remedies established by the Treaty.
Furthermore, referring to point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 10 of the protocol, Mr Romagnoli 
had stated that the parliamentary immunity enjoyed by Mr Gollnisch was that provided for by the 
French Constitution, which provides that the assembly to which a member belongs may require 
a prosecution to be suspended. Under that article of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities, 
during the sessions of the Parliament, its Members enjoy, in the territory of their own State, the 
immunities accorded to members of their parliament. It followed that the Parliament was dealing 
with a request for suspension of the prosecution of Mr Gollnisch in France, and not with a request 
for defence of immunity on the basis of Article 9 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities. 
Although the Parliament has a broad discretion as to the direction it wishes to give to a decision 
following a request such as that made in this case, the fact remained that the question whether the 
decision must be taken on the basis of Article 9 or on that of point (a) of the first paragraph of Arti-
cle 10 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities did not fall within the ambit of the Parliament’s 
(38)  OJ 2005 L 44, p. 1.
(39)  Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities of 8 April 1965 (OJ 1967, 152, p. 13).Annual Report 2010  143
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discretion. The Court thus found that the Parliament had not adopted a decision on a possible 
suspension of prosecution, whereas Article 10 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities refers 
to national laws to determine the extent and implications of the immunity enjoyed by Members 
in their national territory and Article 26(3) of the French Constitution provides for suspension of 
criminal proceedings during their Parliamentary mandate. In the circumstances of this case, the 
applicant might, therefore, in his action for damages, rely on the unlawfulness of the Parliament’s 
refusal to take a decision on the basis of point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Protocol 
on Privileges and Immunities.
The claim for compensation for the loss caused by the damage to his reputation was, however, 
dismissed, on the grounds that there was no direct, causal link between that loss and the unlawful-
ness established. Having regard to the wide discretion enjoyed by the Parliament, if the latter had 
relied on point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immuni-
ties, it could properly have adopted either a decision to request suspension of the prosecution or 
a decision not to request suspension of the prosecution. Thus, the illegality vitiating the contested 
decision could not be the direct and determining cause of the damage to his reputation claimed 
by the applicant.
2.  Expenses and allowances
In Case T-276/07 Martin v Parliament (judgment of 16 December 2010, not published), the Court 
heard an application for annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Par-
liament declaring unjustified the payment to Mr Martin, a Member of the Parliament, of the sum of 
EUR 163 381.54 by way of secretarial allowance and informing him that steps would be taken for 
its recovery.
In the interest of transparency, the Parliament adopted the Rules governing the payment of ex-
penses and allowances to Members [of the European Parliament] (‘the Rules’), Article 14 of which 
provides that the Members of the Parliament are to submit an application for the assistance allow-
ance including, in particular, the assistant’s name, address, nationality, country and place and date 
of birth, and also the assistant’s signature confirming that the information is correct. The Court 
found that as time passed those requirements had been reinforced, in particular, by the obligation 
to enclose with the application a copy of the contract between the Member of Parliament and his 
assistant, and to make notification of any changes made in respect of the application. Likewise, the 
Court observed that every Member of the Parliament, on commencement of his term of office, was 
to receive a copy of the Rules and to acknowledge receipt thereof in writing. Lastly, the Member of 
the Parliament formally undertook to pay the secretarial allowance to the assistant, appointed by 
name, from the start of his activities, the list of declared Parliamentary assistants being, moreover, 
accessible to the public.
From all the foregoing, the Court inferred that the conditions laid down in Article 14 of the Rules, 
especially as regards the information to be included in the application for the allowance, submitted 
by the Member of the Parliament, concerning the assistant(s) employed by him, are substantive in 
nature. In the circumstances of the case, the Court noted that the applicant had not declared to the 
Parliament certain final recipients of payments and that the Parliament had not been notified of 
the termination of certain contracts. In addition, not only had the applicant failed to reimburse the 
sums unused at the end of the year but also he had used the sums paid for certain assistants in or-
der to pay other persons. In those circumstances, the applicant had infringed the Rules and might 
not, therefore, in his action for annulment, plead an unconditional right to use the sums received.144  Annual Report 2010
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Furthermore, the Court emphasised that Article 71(3) of the Financial Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002 (40) imposes on the Parliament an unconditional duty to recover amounts wrongly 
paid. That duty is also imposed on the Secretary-General by Article 27(3) of the Rules.
II.  Actions for damages
1.  Whether the dispute is of a contractual or non-contractual nature
In Case T-19/07 Systran and Systran Luxembourg v Commission (judgment of 16 December 2010, not 
yet published), the Court recalled that its jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to 
compensation for damage varies, depending on the contractual or non-contractual nature of the 
liability in question. Thus, in respect of contractual liability, the Court has jurisdiction only if there is 
an arbitration clause for the purpose of Article 238 EC. If there is no such clause, the Court may not, 
on the basis of Article 235 EC, adjudicate, in actual fact, on an action for damages of a contractual 
origin. To do so would extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits placed by Article 240 EC on the 
disputes of which it may take cognisance, for that article gives national courts jurisdiction over the 
disputes to which the Community is a party. In contrast, in the sphere of non-contractual liability, 
the Court of Justice has jurisdiction without any need for the parties to the proceedings to express 
their agreement beforehand. The Court of Justice’s jurisdiction arises directly out of Article 235 EC 
and the second paragraph of Article 288 EC.
In order to establish whether it has jurisdiction under Article 235 EC, the General Court must con-
sider, in the light of the various relevant matters in the documents before it, whether the obliga-
tions on which the claim for damages put forward by the applicants is based are, objectively and 
generally, contractual or non-contractual in origin. Those matters may be deduced, in particular, 
from an examination of the claims of the parties, from the event giving rise to the damage for 
which compensation is claimed and from the content of the contractual or non-contractual provi-
sions relied on to settle the question at issue. In this context, jurisdiction is conferred on the Court 
in derogation from the ordinary rules of law and must, therefore, be construed narrowly, with the 
result that the Court may hear and determine only claims arising from the contract or claims di-
rectly connected with the obligations stemming therefrom.
So, in the instant case, the Court must examine the content of the various contracts concluded 
between the Systran group and the Commission. Such analysis forms part of the determination of 
jurisdiction, lack of which constitutes an absolute bar to proceeding with an action, and it cannot 
have the effect of altering the nature of the case by giving it a contractual basis.
Carrying out a thorough examination of the arguments raised by the parties, the Court concluded 
that the dispute in question was non-contractual in nature. The issue was to assess the allegedly 
wrongful, damaging nature of the Commission’s conduct in disclosing to a third party information 
protected by an intellectual property right or know-how without the holder’s express authorisa-
tion, in the light of the general principles common to the laws of the Member States applicable in 
that sphere and not of contractual terms.
(40)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget 
of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1).Annual Report 2010  145
Proceedings  General Court
2.  Causal link
In Joined Cases T-252/07, T-271/07 and T-272/07 Sungro and Others v Council and Commission 
[2010] ECR II-55, the Court dismissed the actions for damages brought by the applicants, seeking 
compensation for loss allegedly caused by a scheme of State aid for the cotton sector annulled by 
the Court of Justice in Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285. In this respect, it relied on 
the consideration that, in order to determine the harm attributable to a wrongful act of a Com-
munity institution, account must be taken of the effects of the failure which caused liability to 
be incurred and not of those of the measure of which it forms part, provided that the institution 
could or should have adopted a measure having the same effect without breaching any rule of 
law. In other words, the analysis of the causal link may not start from the incorrect premise that, in 
the absence of unlawful conduct, the institution would have refrained from acting or would have 
adopted a contrary measure, which could also amount to unlawful conduct on its part, but must 
be based on a comparison between the situation arising, for the third party concerned, from the 
wrongful act and the situation which would have arisen for that third party if the institution’s con-
duct had been in conformity with the law.
3.  Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals
For the Union to incur non-contractual liability, it is necessary for the applicant to establish a suf-
ficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals (41).
In the context of an action for compensation for damage allegedly caused to the applicant by 
a Commission decision ordering, on the basis of Article 15a of second Directive 75/319/EEC (42), the 
withdrawal of marketing authorisations for medicinal products for human use containing amfe-
pramone, the Court, in Case T-429/05 Artegodan v Commission (judgment of 3 March 2010, not yet 
published, under appeal), recalled that the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach is intended 
to prevent any hindering of the exercise of the institution’s general-interest powers by the risk of 
having to bear the losses alleged by the undertakings concerned.
It also stated that, when the institution in question has only considerably reduced, or even no, 
discretion, there is no automatic link between that institution’s lack of discretion and classifying 
the infringement as a sufficiently serious breach of Community law. The extent of the discretion 
enjoyed by the authorities concerned is, admittedly, determinative, but it is not an exclusive yard-
stick. It is for the Community courts to take account of the complexity of the situation to be re-
solved, difficulties in applying or interpreting provisions, the degree of clarity and precision of the 
rule infringed and whether the error committed was inexcusable. It follows that only the finding of 
an irregularity which, in comparable circumstances, would not have been committed by normally 
prudent and diligent authorities makes it possible for the Union to incur liability.
In the instant case, the Court noted that, in the context of application of Directive 65/65/EEC (43), 
the authority competent to adopt a decision withdrawing or suspending marketing authorisation 
is bound to observe the general principle of the supremacy of protection of public health, spe-
cifically enunciated in the substantive provisions of that directive. That principle requires, in the 
(41)  Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraphs 42 and 43.
(42)  Second Council Directive 75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
ministrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products (OJ 1975 L 147, p. 13).
(43)  Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action relating to proprietary medicinal products (OJ, English Special Edition 1965–66, p. 20).146  Annual Report 2010
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first place, account to be taken exclusively of considerations relating to the protection of pub-
lic health, in the second place, re-evaluation of the benefit/risk balance of a medicinal product 
when new data give rise to doubts as to its efficacy or safety and, in the third place, application of 
rules of evidence in accordance with the precautionary principle. In the circumstances of the case, 
the applicant could not, therefore, in the context of its action for damages, plead infringement of 
Article 11 of Directive 65/65/EEC. Difficulties linked to the systematic interpretation of the condi-
tions for the withdrawal or suspension of marketing authorisation might, in the light of the whole 
Community system of prior authorisation of medicinal products, reasonably explain, there being 
no similar precedent, the Commission’s error in law. In addition, the Court stressed that, for want 
of any identification, in the applicable guidelines, of changes in the decisive scientific criterion 
for marketing authorisation of medicinal products for human use containing amfepramone, the 
Commission had to adopt its decision on the basis of a complex examination of successive pre-
paratory scientific reports written during the examination procedure leading to the final opinion 
on amfepramone, and on the basis of the guidelines mentioned in that final opinion. In those cir-
cumstances, the Court considered that the breach of Community law was not sufficiently serious.
It is also to be noted that, with regard to the condition that the alleged breach must be of a rule 
of law intended to confer rights on individuals, the Court held that it is not the purpose of the 
relevant provisions of Directive 75/319/EEC defining the respective spheres of competence of the 
Commission and of the Member States to confer rights on individuals. Those provisions are specifi-
cally designed to arrange the division of powers between national authorities and the Commission 
so far as concerns the mutual recognition of national marketing authorisations. In the circumstanc-
es, the applicant could not, therefore, in its action for damages, plead the fact that the Commis-
sion’s decision lacked a basis in law, by reason of the Community’s lack of competence, and that for 
that reason in particular the applicant had obtained its annulment.
4.  Infringement of copyright and of know-how
Case T-19/07 Systran and Systran Luxembourg v Commission (judgment of 16 December 2010, not 
yet published) indicated some innovating developments concerning actions for compensation 
and observance of copyright and know-how, and settled a complicated dispute between the com-
pany Systran and the Commission, arising from a call for tenders relating to the maintenance and 
linguistic enhancement of the Commission’s machine translation system.
Between 22 December 1997 and 15 March 2002, the company Systran Luxembourg adapted, un-
der the name EC-Systran Unix, its Systran-Unix machine translation software to the Commission’s 
specific needs in that sphere. On 4 October 2003 the Commission issued a call for tenders relating 
to the maintenance and linguistic enhancement of its machine translation system.
Following that call for tenders, Systran — Systran Luxembourg’s parent company — made contact 
with the Commission in order to inform the latter that the planned work appeared likely to infringe 
its intellectual property rights. After several contacts between Systran and the Commission, the 
latter took the view that Systran had not produced ‘probative documents’ capable of establishing 
the rights that Systran might claim in respect of its EC-Systran Unix machine translation system. 
The Commission thus considered that the Systran group had no right to object to the work carried 
out by the company that had been successful in the call for tenders and it therefore awarded the 
contract that was the subject-matter of that call. 
Taking the view that the Commission had unlawfully disclosed their know-how to a third party 
and had committed an act of infringement when the successful tenderer carried out unauthorised 
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for damages against the Commission. The Court considered that, by giving itself the right to carry 
out work necessarily entailing alteration of elements of the EC-Systran Unix version of the Systran 
software, without first obtaining the consent of the Systran group, the Commission had acted un-
lawfully, infringing the general principles common to the laws of the Member States applicable to 
copyright and know-how. That wrongful act, which is a sufficiently serious breach of the copyright 
and know-how held by Systran in the EC-Systran Unix version of the Systran software, is such as to 
give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Commission.
The Commission’s wrongful act having been established, the Court found that the loss alleged, 
namely, in essence, commercial damage caused by the loss of potential customers and the com-
plicating of discussions with Systran’s current customers, and financial damage caused by Systran’s 
becoming less attractive in economic terms to investors and by depreciation of its intangible as-
sets, were the direct result of the Commission’s infringement of Systran’s copyrights and know-how.
The  Court  fixed  the  compensation  for  the  losses  sustained  by  Systran  at  the  sum  of 
EUR 12 001 000 damages and interest, including the amount of the fees that would have been pay-
able if the Commission had sought permission to use Systran’s intellectual property rights in order 
to carry out the work specified in the call for tenders, for the effect that the Commission’s conduct 
could have had on Systran’s turnover and compensation for non-material damage. In addition, it 
is to be noted that, exceptionally, the Court stated that the publication of a press release was also 
a form of non-pecuniary compensation for the non-material damage caused by the harm done to 
Systran’s reputation as a result of the Commission’s unlawful conduct.
III.  Appeals
During the course of the year 2010, 24 appeals were brought against decisions of the Civil Service 
Tribunal and 37 cases were brought to a close by the Appeal Chamber of the General Court. Two of 
those cases merit particular attention.
First, in Case T-160/08 P Commission v Putterie-De-Beukelaer (judgment of 8 July 2010, not yet pub-
lished), the Court held that the incompetence of the author of an act adversely affecting the ap-
plicant is a ground involving a question of public policy which the Union judicature must examine, 
if necessary of its own motion, and that failure to comply with the procedural rules relating to the 
adoption of an act adversely affecting an individual constitutes a breach of essential procedural 
requirements, which the Union judicature may examine, even of its own motion. Thus, refusal to 
examine an internal appeal, provided for in the procedural rules applicable to the adoption of an 
act adversely affecting an individual, constitutes a breach of essential procedural requirements and 
may therefore be raised by the Civil Service Tribunal of its own motion.
Second, attention is drawn to the fact that for the first time a case was referred back to the Court 
by the Court of Justice after review of a judgment given on appeal. In Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX 
M v EMA (judgment of 8 July 2010, not yet published), the Court held that the appeal court may, 
in certain circumstances, rule on the substance of an action, even though the proceedings at first 
instance were confined to a plea of inadmissibility which that court upheld. That may be so where, 
first, the setting aside of the judgment or order under appeal necessarily brings about a definitive 
resolution of the substance of the action in question or, second, the examination of the substance 
of the application for annulment is based on arguments exchanged by the parties in the appeal 
proceedings following reasoning adopted by the court at first instance. If no such special circum-
stances exist, the state of the proceedings does not permit the Court to give final judgment in the 
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and Article 13(1) of Annex I to the Statute. The appeal court cannot, therefore, do other than refer 
the case back to the court of first instance for the latter to rule on the claims that are the substance 
of the action. So, the Court in its turn referred the case back to the Civil Service Tribunal.
IV.  Applications for interim relief
In 2010, 41 applications for interim measures were brought before the President of the Gener-
al Court, an appreciable increase compared with the number of applications (24) made in 2009. 
In 2010 the judge hearing such applications disposed of 38 cases, as against 20 in 2009.
In Cases T–95/09 R II and T-95/09 R III United Phosphorus v Commission (orders of 15 January 
and 25 November 2010, not published), the President of the Court allowed two applications for ex-
tension of suspension of the operation of a decision (prohibiting the marketing of an active plant 
protection substance). In Case T-95/09 R United Phosphorus v Commission (order of 28 April 2009, 
not published), the President of the Court had already recognised urgency, considering conclu-
sive the fact that, following the adoption of that decision, the applicant had instituted a newly 
created accelerated, administrative procedure in which its chances of success appeared greater 
than they had been in the procedure leading to the prohibition decision, and that that acceler-
ated assessment procedure was likely to be concluded only a few months after the date imposed 
for the withdrawal from the market of the active substance at issue. He deduced therefrom that 
it would be unreasonable to allow the prohibition of the marketing of a substance in respect of 
which it was not improbable that its marketing would be authorised only a few months later. In 
consequence, after recognising the existence of a prima facie case, and finding that the balance of 
interests tipped in favour of the applicant, the President of the Court had suspended operation of 
the prohibition decision until 7 May 2010.
The applicant then obtained, by order of 15 January 2010, extension of the suspension granted un-
til 30 November 2010, on the grounds that it had been confirmed that the accelerated procedure 
would not be concluded before 7 May 2010 and that there was no change in the circumstances 
justifying the original grant of suspension of operation. Early in November 2010, the applicant 
made a new application for extension, relying on the fact that the accelerated assessment proce-
dure was to end in success for the applicant. The Commission had, in fact, launched the procedure 
to authorise the substance in question, and a directive authorising the substance was to enter into 
force on 1 January 2011. In those circumstances, by order of 25 November 2010 the President of 
the Court extended until 31 December 2011 suspension of the operation of the prohibition deci-
sion, in so far as it refused to authorise the substance in question. With regard to plant protection 
products containing that substance, he recalled that the prohibition decision obliged the Member 
States to withdraw the authorisations for such products and that the suspension granted by the 
earlier orders applied to the withdrawal of authorisation of those products also. Even after the 
entry into force of authorisation of the substance in question, the applicant would have to make 
fresh applications to the national authorities for authorisation of its plant protection products con-
taining that substance, those products having had to be withdrawn from the market before the 
national authorisations were granted. In this connection, the President of the Court found that the 
new authorising directive did not contain any provision repealing the prohibition decision, with 
the result that the latter ordered the withdrawal of product authorisations currently held by the 
applicant, unless the suspension of operation previously granted were to be extended. In addi-
tion, there was no provision in the new directive taking account of the suspension granted in the 
orders of 28 April 2009 and 15 January 2010, for the purpose of preventing a gap in the marketing 
of those plant protection products and of providing for a reasonable transitional period between 
the prohibition decision and implementation of the new directive. The President of the Court Annual Report 2010  149
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extended, therefore, until 31 December 2011 the suspension previously granted, as regards the 
withdrawal of authorisations of plant protection products containing the active substance at issue, 
emphasising that such a measure took into consideration the innocuousness of that substance, as 
finally revealed at the end of the accelerated assessment procedure.
So far as concerns applications for interim measures based on the applicant’s alleged inability 
to pay fines imposed by the Commission for contravention of the rules on competition, in Case 
T-410/09 R Almamet v Commission (order of 7 May 2010, not published), the President of the Court 
reaffirmed the case-law in accordance with which the applicant must produce specific particulars, 
supported by detailed certified documents giving a true and comprehensive picture of its financial 
situation, enabling the judge hearing the application to assess the precise consequences that the 
party would, in all probability, have to bear if the interim measures sought were not granted. Fol-
lowing that case-law, the President considered it insufficient for the applicant to plead the purely 
oral refusal of the bank it had approached with a view to obtaining a bank guarantee. He added 
that, although the case-law on taking the group into consideration has often been applied with re-
gard to the majority shareholder, the underlying reasoning does not make it impossible for it to re-
tain, in an appropriate case, all its relevance with regard to minority shareholders, for the interests 
of certain minority shareholders, having regard to the structure of the shareholders, may just as 
much warrant account’s being taken of their financial resources. In the case in point, the sharehold-
ings in the applicant company consisting of two principal shareholders, holding respectively 50% 
and 30% of its capital, that company ought to have given the judge hearing the application for 
interim measures precise information concerning the minority member with a 30% holding (44).
Moreover,  the  first  application  for  interim  measures  made  in  the  context  of  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1907/2006 (45) raised the question of a causal link between the damage alleged and the meas-
ure whose suspension was sought. In Case T-1/10 R SNF v ECHA (order of 26 March 2010, not pub-
lished), the President of the Court dismissed the claim for suspension of operation of the inclusion 
of a chemical substance in the ‘list of substances of very high concern’, on the grounds that Regu-
lation (EC) No 1907/2006 contains no provision that would have the legal effect of prohibiting or 
restricting the manufacture, marketing or use of a chemical merely because the latter was included 
in that list. So far as concerns the fear that the list in question might be perceived by the industry 
and by consumers as a ‘blacklist’ of substances to be avoided, it was considered that, given that in-
clusion of substances in the list at issue did not lead automatically to their progressive replacement 
by suitable alternative substances, negative reactions of the applicant’s customers could not be 
regarded as conclusions that an economic operator could reasonably have drawn from the mere 
identification of the substance as being of very high concern. The President of the Court held that, 
assuming that those negative reactions were explained by a change of policy by the economic op-
erators in question, based on increased awareness with regard to dangerous substances, it would 
(44)  Another case may be mentioned in this connection — covered by confidentiality, having regard to the risk of precipitating 
the applicant’s bankruptcy, were its precarious financial situation to be revealed — concerning a request to be released from 
the obligation, imposed by the Commission, to provide a bank guarantee as a condition for the fine imposed by the decision’s 
not being recovered immediately. The applicant having already put in hand a plan of staggered payments to the Commission, 
the President of the Court adopted a suspending order, pursuant to Article 105(2) of the Rules of Procedure, followed by 
a hearing, in order to encourage the parties to reach a judicial agreement. The parties’ efforts having in fact borne fruit, the 
application for interim measures was removed from the register.
(45)  Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the registra-
tion, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending 
Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well 
as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ 2006 L 396, 
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be an independent choice made by those economic operators that constituted the decisive cause 
of the damage pleaded.
As regards tendering procedures, it is appropriate to mention Case T-299/10 R Babcock Noell v Euro-
pean Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (order of 31 August 2010, not 
published), a case concerning the international project to build and operate an international ther-
monuclear experimental reactor (ITER), intended to demonstrate the scientific and technical feasi-
bility of fusion energy. In connection with that project a European Joint Undertaking for ITER was 
set up, whose task it is to contribute to the rapid realisation of fusion energy. To that end, the joint 
undertaking conducts procurement procedures relating to the supply of assets, the performance 
of works or the provision of services. In respect of a call for tenders launched for the purpose of 
awarding a contract for the supply of ITER toroidal field coils winding packs, the applicant, a com-
pany active in the field of nuclear technology, submitted a bid for that contract, which was rejected 
on the grounds that it did not comply with the tender specifications. The applicant brought an ac-
tion for annulment of that rejection decision and of the decision awarding the contract to another 
undertaking, together with an application for interim measures which was dismissed, none of the 
conditions for the grant of the provisional measures sought having been satisfied in the case in 
point.
So far as the condition relating to urgency was concerned, the alleged damage to the applicant’s 
reputation was not accepted by the judge hearing the application, for participation in a public 
tendering procedure involves risks for all the participants and the rejection of a tenderer’s bid un-
der the tender rules is not in itself in any way prejudicial. In the case of the unlawful rejection of 
an undertaking’s bid, there is even less reason to believe that the undertaking would be liable 
to suffer serious and irreparable harm to its reputation, its exclusion being unconnected with its 
competence and because the annulling judgment would, in principle, enable any harm to its repu-
tation to be made good. In addition, as regards the weighing up of interests, the judge hearing 
the application stated that the applicant’s interest in being able to refer to the contract at issue for 
advertising purposes must yield to the general interest of the European Union, including that of its 
citizens, in prompt completion of the ITER project, the political and economic importance of which 
is evident, on account of the fact that that project is designed to harness fusion as a potentially 
limitless, safe, sustainable, environmentally responsible and economically competitive source of 
energy, from which the European Union could derive significant benefit (46).
Last,  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  the  legal,  economic,  social  and  cultural  effect  of  the  or-
ders that the President of the Court found it necessary to make in Cases T-18/10 R, T-18/10 R II, 
T-18/10 R II INTP and T-18/10 R II Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council (or-
ders of 30 April, 19 August, 19 October and 25 October, respectively, not published, under appeal). 
Those orders arose from Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 (47) which, in the interest of animal welfare 
and for the purpose of establishing harmonised rules on the marketing of seal products, prohib-
ited, from 20 August 2010, the placing of seal products on the market except those resulting from 
hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit communities and contributing to their subsistence. This 
exception was justified by the fundamental economic and social interests of Inuit communities 
engaged in the hunting of seals, the hunt being an integral part of the culture and identity of those 
(46)  As regards public procurement, mention may be made of the unpublished orders dismissing applications for interim meas-
ures in Case T-415/10 R Nexans France v European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (order 
of 15 October 2010); Case T-6/10 R Sviluppo Globale v Commission (order of 26 March 2010); Case T-514/09 R De Post v Commis-
sion (order of 5 February 2010); and Case T-443/09 R Agriconsulting Europe v Commission (order of 20 January 2010).
(47)  Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products 
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communities. Authorisation for those Inuit communities was to be put into effect by means of an 
implementing regulation to be adopted by the Commission.
In January 2010, several seal hunters and trappers, seal-product processors and companies active 
in marketing such products or using them for medical purposes brought an action for annulment 
of Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 and, in February 2010, made an application for suspension of op-
eration of that regulation. By order of 30 April 2010, the President of the Court dismissed that ap-
plication. After finding that it could not be excluded that the main action was admissible and that 
the pleas in law supporting the claim for annulment appeared to be relevant and serious enough 
to constitute a prima facie case, he nonetheless decided that there was no urgency, noting, in par-
ticular, that the Commission had not yet adopted the implementing regulation intended to give 
effect to the authorisation in favour of the Inuit communities.
In July 2010, the applicants made a fresh application for interim measures, based on a new fact, 
namely: the publication of the Commission draft implementing regulation. They argued that 
the future implementing regulation, which was to enter into force on 20 August 2010, was com-
pletely inappropriate in that it would render the authorisation in favour of the Inuit meaning-
less. By order of 19 August 2010, the President of the Court allowed that new application, pursu-
ant to Article 105(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and suspended the operation of Regulation (EC) 
No 1007/2009 in that it restricted, so far as concerned the applicants, the placing on the market of 
seal products, until the order bringing the proceedings for interim measures to an end should be 
adopted.
By order of 25 October 2010, the President of the Court closed the proceedings for interim meas-
ures and dismissed, for want of urgency, the new application made in July 2010. First of all, the 
applicants not including any entity governed by public law, they could not plead the general 
economic, social and cultural interests of the Inuit; rather, it was for each of them to show that 
Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 could cause him, individually, serious and irreparable harm if the 
application for interim relief were dismissed. Such evidence was not, however, adduced by the ap-
plicants. The seal hunters, seal trappers and processors of seal products did not specify the income 
they received from hunting or other activities or their personal fortunes, or produce attestations 
from a competent authority stating their right to social assistance, unemployment benefit or other 
form of allowance, whereas a report, produced by the applicants themselves, set out the subsidy 
schemes in Greenland and Canada, their countries of origin, to support seal hunting. The com-
mercial companies active in that sector did not produce any figures enabling an assessment of 
the seriousness of the damage alleged, having regard to the size and turnover of each individual 
company.
Last, so far as concerns the Commission’s implementing regulation, the applicants failed to show 
that it would be impossible to create the traceability system required by the regulation that would 
make it possible to identify seal products derived from hunting by the Inuit. On the contrary, the 
report they had themselves produced referred to traceability systems already actually in use in 
Greenland (use of a label with a bar-code and the words ‘Traditional hunt conducted by Inuit com-
munities for subsistence purposes’). The applicants failed to set out the reasons why it would be 
impossible to adapt those Greenland traceability systems to the requirements of the implement-
ing regulation.Annual Report 2010  153
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torney of Luxembourg (1983); Judge at the Luxembourg District Court 
(1984); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities (1986–96); President of the Institut Universitaire International 
Luxembourg (IUIL); Judge at the General Court since 11 July 1996; Pres-
ident of the General Court since 17 September 2007.
Josef Azizi
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws and Master of Sociology and Economics of 
the University of Vienna; Lecturer and Senior Lecturer at the Vienna 
School of Economics, the Faculty of Law of the University of Vienna and 
various other universities; Honorary Professor at the Faculty of Law of 
the University of Vienna; Ministerialrat and Head of Department at the 
Federal Chancellery; member of the Steering Committee on Legal Co-
operation of the Council of Europe (CDCJ); representative ad litem be-
fore the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) in proceedings 
for review of the constitutionality of federal laws; Coordinator responsi-
ble for the adaptation of Austrian federal law to Community law; Judge 
at the General Court since 18 January 1995.
Arjen W. H. Meij
Born 1944; Justice at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (1996); 
Judge and Vice-President at the College van Beroep voor het Bed-
rijfsleven (Administrative Court for Trade and Industry) (1986); Judge 
Substitute at the Court of Appeal for Social Security, and substitute 
member of the Administrative Court for Customs Tariff Matters; Le-
gal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(1980); Lecturer in European Law at the Law Faculty of the University 
of Groningen and Research Assistant at the University of Michigan 
Law School; staff member of the International Secretariat of the Am-
sterdam Chamber of Commerce (1970); Judge at the General Court 
from 17 September 1998 to 13 September 2010.
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Mihalis Vilaras
Born 1950; lawyer (1974–80); national expert with the Legal Service 
of the Commission of the European Communities, then Principal Ad-
ministrator in Directorate-General V (Employment, Industrial Relations, 
Social Affairs); junior officer, junior member and, since 1999, member 
of the Greek Council of State; associate member of the Superior Spe-
cial Court of Greece; member of the Central Legislative Drafting Com-
mittee of Greece (1996–98); Director of the Legal Service in the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Greek Government; Judge at the General Court 
from 17 September 1998 to 25 October 2010.
Nicholas James Forwood
Born 1948; Cambridge University BA 1969, MA 1973 (Mechanical Sci-
ences and Law); called to the English Bar in 1970, thereafter practising 
in London (1971–99) and also in Brussels (1979–99); called to the Irish 
Bar in 1981; appointed Queen’s Counsel 1987; Bencher of the Middle 
Temple 1998; representative of the Bar of England and Wales at the 
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the EU (CCBE) and Chairman 
of the CCBE’s Permanent Delegation to the European Court of Justice 
(1995–99); governing board member of the World Trade Law Associa-
tion and European Maritime Law Organisation (1993–2002); Judge at 
the General Court since 15 December 1999.
Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro
Born 1956; studied in Lisbon, Brussels and Strasbourg; member of 
the Bar in Portugal and Brussels; independent researcher at the In-
stitut  d’études  européennes  de  l’Université  libre  de  Bruxelles  (In-
stitute  of  European  Studies,  Free  University  of  Brussels);  Legal 
Secretary to the Portuguese Judge at the Court of Justice, Mr Moit-
inho de Almeida (1986–2000), then to the President of the Court of 
First Instance, Mr Vesterdorf (2000–03); Judge at the General Court 
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Franklin Dehousse
Born 1959; law degree (University of Liege, 1981); Research Fellow 
(Fonds national de la recherche scientifique, 1985–89); Legal Adviser to 
the Chamber of Representatives (1981–90); Doctor of Laws (University 
of Strasbourg, 1990); Professor (Universities of Liege and Strasbourg; 
College of Europe; Institut royal supérieur de Défense; Université Mon-
tesquieu, Bordeaux; Collège Michel Servet of the Universities of Paris; 
Faculties of Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur); Special Representative of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (1995–99); Director of European Studies 
of the Royal Institute of International Relations (1998–2003); assesseur 
at the Council of State (2001–03); consultant to the European Com-
mission (1990–2003); member of the Internet Observatory (2001–03); 
Judge at the General Court since 7 October 2003.
Ena Cremona
Born 1936; Bachelor’s degree (BA) in languages, Royal University of 
Malta (1955); Doctor of Laws (LLD) of the Royal University of Malta 
(1958); practising at the Malta Bar from 1959; Legal Adviser to the 
National Council of Women (1964–79); member of the Public Service 
Commission (1987–89); board member at Lombard Bank (Malta) Ltd, 
representing the government shareholding (1987–93); member of the 
Electoral Commission since 1993; examiner for doctoral theses in the 
Faculty of Laws of the Royal University of Malta; Member of the Europe-
an Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2003–04); Judge 
at the General Court since 12 May 2004.
Ottó Czúcz
Born 1946; Doctor of Laws of the University of Szeged (1971); Adminis-
trator at the Ministry of Labour (1971–74); Lecturer (1974–89), Dean of 
the Faculty of Law (1989–90), Vice-Rector (1992–97) at the University of 
Szeged; lawyer; member of the Presidium of the National Retirement 
Insurance Scheme; Vice-President of the European Institute of Social 
Security (1998–2002); member of the Scientific Council of the Interna-
tional Social Security Association; Judge at the Constitutional Court 
(1998–2004); Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.158  Annual Report 2010
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Irena Wiszniewska-Białecka
Born 1947; Magister Juris, University of Warsaw (1965–69); Researcher 
(Assistant Lecturer, Associate Professor, Professor) at the Institute of Le-
gal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (1969–2004); Assistant 
Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich (award from the Al-
exander von Humboldt Foundation, 1985–86); lawyer (1992–2000); 
Judge at the Supreme Administrative Court (2001–04); Judge at the 
General Court since 12 May 2004.
Irena Pelikánová
Born 1949; Doctor of Laws, assistant in economic law (before 1989), Dr 
Sc., Professor of Business Law (since 1993) at the Faculty of Law, Charles 
University, Prague; member of the Executive of the Securities Com-
mission (1999–2002); lawyer; member of the Legislative Council of the 
Government of the Czech Republic (1998–2004); Judge at the General 
Court since 12 May 2004.
Vilenas Vadapalas
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws (University of Moscow); Doctor habil. in Law 
(University of Warsaw); taught, at the University of Vilnius, internation-
al law (from 1981), human rights law (from 1991) and Community law 
(from 2000); Adviser to the Lithuanian Government on foreign relations 
(1991–93); member of the coordinating group of the delegation negoti-
ating accession to the European Union; Director-General of the Govern-
ment’s European Law Department (1997–2004); Professor of European 
Law at the University of Vilnius, holder of the Jean Monnet Chair; Presi-
dent of the Lithuanian European Union Studies Association; Rapporteur 
of the parliamentary working group on constitutional reform relating to 
Lithuanian accession; member of the International Commission of Ju-
rists (April 2003); Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.Annual Report 2010  159
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Küllike Jürimäe
Born 1962; law degree, University of Tartu (1981–86); Assistant to the 
Public Prosecutor, Tallinn (1986–91); Diploma, Estonian School of Diplo-
macy (1991–92); Legal Adviser (1991–93) and General Counsel at the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1992–93); Judge, Tallinn Court of 
Appeal (1993–2004); European Masters in Human Rights and Democra-
tisation, Universities of Padua and Nottingham (2002–03); Judge at the 
General Court since 12 May 2004.
Ingrida Labucka
Born 1963; Diploma in Law, University of Latvia (1986); Investigator at 
the Interior Ministry for the Kirov Region and the City of Riga (1986–89); 
Judge, Riga District Court (1990–94); lawyer (1994–98 and July 1999 to 
May  2000);  Minister  for  Justice  (November  1998  to  July  1999  and 
May 2000 to October 2002); member of the International Court of Ar-
bitration in The Hague (2001–04); Member of Parliament (2002–04); 
Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.
Savvas S. Papasavvas
Born 1969; studies at the University of Athens (graduated in 1991); 
DEA (Diploma of Advanced Studies) in public law, University of Paris 
II (1992), and PhD in law, University of Aix-Marseille III (1995); admit-
ted to the Cyprus Bar, member of the Nicosia Bar since 1993; Lecturer, 
University of Cyprus (1997–2002), Lecturer in Constitutional Law since 
September 2002; Researcher, European Public Law Centre (2001–02); 
Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.160  Annual Report 2010
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Enzo Moavero Milanesi
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws (La Sapienza University, Rome); specialised 
in Community law (College of Europe, Bruges); member of the Bar, le-
gal practice (1978–83); Lecturer in Community Law at the Universities 
of La Sapienza (Rome) (1993–96), Luiss (Rome) (1993–96 and 2002–06) 
and Bocconi (Milan) (1996–2000); adviser on Community matters to the 
Italian Prime Minister (1993–95); official at the European Commission: 
Legal Adviser and subsequently Head of Cabinet of the Vice-President 
(1989–92), Head of Cabinet of the Commissioner responsible for the in-
ternal market (1995–99) and competition (1999), Director, Directorate-
General for Competition (2000–02), Deputy Secretary-General of the 
European Commission (2002–05), Director-General of the Bureau of 
European Policy Advisers (BEPA) at the European Commission (2006); 
Judge at the General Court since 3 May 2006.
Nils Wahl
Born 1961; Master of Laws, University of Stockholm (1987); Doctor of 
Laws,  University  of  Stockholm  (1995);  Associate  Professor  (docent) 
and holder of the Jean Monnet Chair of European Law (1995); Profes-
sor of European Law, University of Stockholm (2001); assistant lawyer 
in private practice (1987–89); Managing Director of an educational 
foundation (1993–2004); Chairman of the Nätverket för europarättslig 
forskning (Swedish Network for European Legal Research) (2001–06); 
member of the Rådet för konkurrensfrågor (Council for Competition 
Law Matters) (2001–06); Assigned Judge at the Hovrätten över Skåne 
och Blekinge (Court of Appeal for Skåne and Blekinge) (2005); Judge at 
the General Court since 7 October 2006.
Miro Prek
Born 1965; law degree (1989); called to the Bar (1994); performed vari-
ous tasks and functions in public authorities, principally in the Gov-
ernment Office for Legislation (Under-Secretary of State and Deputy 
Director, Head of Department for European and Comparative Law) 
and in the Office for European Affairs (Under-Secretary of State); mem-
ber of the negotiating team for the association agreement (1994–96) 
and for accession to the European Union (1998–2003), responsible 
for legal affairs; lawyer; responsible for projects regarding adaptation 
to European legislation, and to achieve European integration, princi-
pally in the western Balkans; Head of Division at the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (2004–06); Judge at the General Court 
since 7 October 2006.Annual Report 2010  161
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Teodor Tchipev
Born 1940; law degree, St Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia (1961); 
Doctorate in Law (1977); lawyer (1963–64); Legal Adviser, State Auto-
mobile Enterprise for International Transport (1964–73); Research Fel-
low at the Institute of Law, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1973–88); 
Associate Professor of Civil Procedure at the Faculty of Law of St Kli-
ment Ohridski University, Sofia (1988–91); Arbitrator at the Court of 
Arbitration of the Chamber of Trade and Industry (1988–2006); Judge 
at the Constitutional Court (1991–94); Associate Professor at Paisiy 
Hilendarski University, Plovdiv (February 2001 to 2006); Minister for 
Justice (1994–95); Associate Professor of Civil Procedure at the New 
Bulgarian University, Sofia (1995–2006); Judge at the General Court 
from 12 January 2007 to 29 June 2010.
Valeriu M. Ciucă
Born 1960; law degree (1984), Doctorate in Law (1997), Alexandru 
Ioan Cuza University, Iaşi; Judge at the Court of First Instance, Suceava 
(1984–89); Military Judge at the Military Court, Iaşi (1989–90); Profes-
sor at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iaşi (1990–2006); stipended stu-
dent specialising in private law at the University of Rennes (1991–92); 
Assistant Professor at Petre Andrei University, Iaşi (1999–2002); Lec-
turer at the Université du Littoral Côte d’Opale, Dunkirk (Research 
Unit on Industry and Innovation) (2006); Judge at the General Court 
from 12 January 2007 to 26 November 2010.
Alfred Dittrich
Born  1950;  studied  law  at  the  University  of  Erlangen-Nuremberg 
(1970–75); articled law clerk in the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court 
district (1975–78); Adviser at the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(1978–82); Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to the European Communities (1982); Adviser at 
the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, responsible for Community 
law and competition issues (1983–92); Head of the EU Law Section at 
the Federal Ministry of Justice (1992–2007); Head of the German del-
egation on the Council Working Party on the Court of Justice; Agent of 
the Federal Government in a large number of cases before the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities; Judge at the General Court 
since 17 September 2007.162  Annual Report 2010
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Santiago Soldevila Fragoso
Born 1960; graduated in law from the Autonomous University of Barce-
lona (1983); Judge (1985); from 1992 Judge specialising in contentious 
administrative proceedings, assigned to the High Court of Justice of 
the Canary Islands at Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1992 and 1993), and to 
the National High Court (Madrid, May 1998 to August 2007), where he 
decided judicial proceedings in the field of tax (VAT), actions brought 
against general legislative provisions of the Ministry of the Economy 
and against its decisions on State aid or the government’s financial li-
ability, and actions brought against all agreements of the central eco-
nomic regulators in the spheres of banking, the stock market, energy, 
insurance and competition; Legal Adviser at the Constitutional Court 
(1993–98); Judge at the General Court since 17 September 2007.
Laurent Truchot
Born 1962; graduate of the Institut d’études politiques, Paris (1984); 
former student of the École nationale de la magistrature (National 
School for the Judiciary) (1986–88); Judge at the Regional Court, Mar-
seilles (January 1988 to January 1990); Law Officer in the Directorate 
for Civil Affairs and the Legal Professions at the Ministry of Justice (Jan-
uary 1990 to June 1992); Deputy Section Head, then Section Head, in 
the Directorate-General for Competition, Consumption and the Com-
bating of Fraud at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Indus-
try (June 1992 to September 1994); Technical Adviser to the Minister 
for Justice (September 1994 to May 1995); Judge at the Regional Court, 
Nîmes (May 1995 to May 1996); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
in the Chambers of Advocate General Léger (May 1996 to Decem-
ber 2001); Auxiliary Judge at the Court of Cassation (December 2001 to 
August 2007); Judge at the General Court since 17 September 2007.
Sten Frimodt Nielsen
Born 1963; graduated in law from Copenhagen University (1988); civil 
servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988–91); tutor in interna-
tional and European law at Copenhagen University (1988–91); Em-
bassy Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United 
Nations in New York (1991–94); civil servant in the Legal Service of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994–95); external lecturer at Copenhagen 
University (1995); Adviser, then Senior Adviser, in the Prime Minister’s 
Office (1995–98); Minister Counsellor at the Permanent Representation 
of Denmark to the European Union (1998–2001); Special Adviser for 
legal issues in the Prime Minister’s Office (2001–02); Head of Depart-
ment and Legal Counsel in the Prime Minister’s Office (March 2002 to 
July 2004); Assistant Secretary of State and Legal Counsel in the Prime 
Minister’s Office (August 2004 to August 2007); Judge at the General 
Court since 17 September 2007.Annual Report 2010  163
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Kevin O’Higgins
Born 1946; educated at Crescent College Limerick, Clongowes Wood 
College, University College Dublin (BA degree and Diploma in Euro-
pean Law) and the King’s Inns; called to the Bar of Ireland in 1968; Bar-
rister (1968–82); Senior Counsel (Inner Bar of Ireland, 1982–86); Judge 
of the Circuit Court (1986–97); Judge of the High Court of Ireland 
(1997–2008); Bencher of King’s Inns; Irish Representative on the Con-
sultative Council of European Judges (2000–08); Judge at the General 
Court since 15 September 2008.
Heikki Kanninen
Born 1952; graduate of the Helsinki School of Economics and of the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Helsinki; Legal Secretary at the Su-
preme Administrative Court of Finland; General Secretary to the Com-
mittee for Reform of Legal Protection in Public Administration; Principal 
Administrator at the Supreme Administrative Court; General Secretary 
to the Committee for Reform of Administrative Litigation, Counsel-
lor in the Legislative Drafting Department of the Ministry of Justice; 
Assistant Registrar at the EFTA Court; Legal Secretary at the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities; Judge at the Supreme Admin-
istrative  Court  (1998–2005);  member  of  the  Asylum  Appeal  Board; 
Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the Development of the Finnish 
Courts; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal from 6 October 2005 to 6 Oc-
tober 2009; Judge at the General Court since 7 October 2009.
Juraj Schwarcz
Born 1952; Doctor of Law (Comenius University, Bratislava, 1979); com-
pany lawyer (1975–90); Registrar responsible for the commercial reg-
ister at the City Court, Košice (1991); Judge at the City Court, Košice 
(January to October 1992); Judge and President of Chamber at the 
Regional Court, Košice (November 1992 to 2009); temporary Judge at 
the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, Commercial Law Division 
(October 2004 to September 2005); Head of the Commercial Law Divi-
sion at the Regional Court, Košice (October 2005 to September 2009); 
external member of the Commercial and Business Law Department at 
Pavol Josef Šafárik University, Košice (1997–2009); external member of 
the teaching staff of the Judicial Academy (2005–09); Judge at the Gen-
eral Court since 7 October 2009.164  Annual Report 2010
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Marc van der Woude
Born 1960; law degree (University of Groningen, 1983); studies at the 
College of Europe (1983–84); Assistant Lecturer at the College of Europe 
(1984–86); Lecturer at Leiden University (1986–87); Rapporteur in the 
Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European 
Communities (1987–89); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (1989–92); Policy Coordinator in the Directorate-
General for Competition of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties (1992–93); member of the Legal Service of the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities (1993–95); member of the Brussels Bar from 1995; 
Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam from 2000; author of numer-
ous publications; Judge at the General Court since 13 September 2010.
Dimitrios Gratsias
Born 1957; graduated in law from the University of Athens (1980); 
awarded DEA (Diploma of Advanced Studies) in public law by the Uni-
versity of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne (1981); awarded Diploma by the 
University Centre for Community and European Studies (University of 
Paris I) (1982); junior officer of the Council of State (1985–92); junior 
member of the Council of State (1992–2005); Legal Secretary at the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (1994–96); supplemen-
tary member of the Superior Special Court of Greece (1998 and 1999); 
member of the Council of State (2005); member of the Special Court 
for Actions against Judges (2006); member of the Supreme Council 
for Administrative Justice (2008); Inspector of Administrative Courts 
(2009–10); Judge at the General Court since 25 October 2010.
Andrei Popescu
Born 1948; graduated in law from the University of Bucharest (1971); 
postgraduate studies in international labour law and European social 
law, University of Geneva (1973–74); Doctor of Laws of the Universi-
ty of Bucharest (1980); trainee Assistant Lecturer (1971–73), Assistant 
Lecturer with tenure (1974–85) and then Lecturer in Labour Law at the 
University of Bucharest (1985–90); Principal Researcher at the National 
Research Institute for Labour and Social Protection (1990–91); Deputy 
Director-General (1991–92), then Director (1992–96) at the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection; Senior Lecturer (1997), then Professor at 
the National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Bu-
charest (2000); State Secretary at the Ministry of European Integration 
(2001–05); Head of Department at the Legislative Council of Romania 
(1996–2001 and 2005–09); Agent of the Romanian Government be-
fore the Courts of the European Union (2009–10); Judge at the General 
Court since 26 November 2010.Annual Report 2010  165
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Emmanuel Coulon
Born 1968; law studies (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris); manage-
ment studies (Université Paris Dauphine); College of Europe (1992); en-
trance examination for the Centre régional de formation à la profession 
d’avocat (regional training centre for the bar), Paris; certificate of ad-
mission to the Brussels Bar; practice as a lawyer in Brussels; successful 
candidate in an open competition for the Commission of the European 
Communities; Legal Secretary at the Court of First Instance (Chambers 
of the Presidents Mr Saggio (1996–98) and Mr Vesterdorf (1998–2002)); 
Head  of  Chambers  of  the  President  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance 
(2003–05); Registrar of the General Court since 6 October 2005.Annual Report 2010  167
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2.  Change in the composition of the General Court in 2010
Formal sitting on 13 September 2010
By decisions of 23 June 2010 and 8 July 2010, the Representatives of the Governments of the Mem-
ber States renewed, for the period from 1 September 2010 to 31 August 2016, the terms of office 
as Judges at the General Court of Mr Marc Jaeger, Mr Josef Azizi, Ms Eugénia Martins de Nazaré 
Ribeiro, Mr Ottó Czúcz, Ms Irena Wiszniewska-Białecka, Mr Franklin Dehousse, Ms Küllike Jürimäe, 
Mr Savvas S. Papasavvas, Mr Sten Frimodt Nielsen, Mr Heikki Kanninen and Mr Juraj Schwarcz.
To replace Mr Arjen W. H. Meij, the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, by 
decision of 8 July 2010, appointed Mr Marc van der Woude as a Judge at the General Court for the 
period from 1 September 2010 to 31 August 2016.
Formal sitting on 25 October 2010
By decision of 21 October 2010, the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States ap-
pointed Mr Dimitrios Gratsias as a Judge at the General Court for the period from 25 October 2010 
to 31 August 2016, replacing Mr Mihalis Vilaras.
Formal sitting on 26 November 2010
By decision of 18 November 2010, the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
appointed Mr Andrei Popescu as a Judge at the General Court for the period from 26 Novem-
ber 2010 to 31 August 2016, replacing Mr Valeriu M. Ciucă.Annual Report 2010  169
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from 1 January 2010 to 14 September 2010
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
A. W. H. MEIJ, President of Chamber
M. VILARAS, President of Chamber
N. J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
M. E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, President of 
Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
E. CREMONA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
S. PAPASAVVAS, Judge
E. MOAVERO MILANESI, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
T. TCHIPEV, Judge
V. M. CIUCĂ, Judge
A. DITTRICH, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
L. TRUCHOT, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
H. KANNINEN, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
E. COULON, Registrar
from 15 September 2010 to 24 October 2010
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N. J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
E. MOAVERO MILANESI, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
M. VILARAS, Judge
M. E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
E. CREMONA, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
V.M. CIUCĂ, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
H. KANNINEN, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
E. COULON, Registrar
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from 25 October 2010 to 25 November 2010
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N. J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
E. MOAVERO MILANESI, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
M. E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
E. CREMONA, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
V. M. CIUCĂ, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
H. KANNINEN, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
E. COULON, Registrar
from 26 November 2010 to 31 December 2010
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N. J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
E. MOAVERO MILANESI, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
M. E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
E. CREMONA, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
H. KANNINEN, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
E. COULON, RegistrarAnnual Report 2010  171
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4.  Former members of the General Court
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (1989–92)
Christos Yeraris (1989–92)
José Luis Da Cruz Vilaça (1989–95), President from 1989 to 1995
Jacques Biancarelli (1989–95)
Donal Patrick Michael Barrington (1989–96)
Romain Alphonse Schintgen (1989–96)
Heinrich Kirschner (1989–97)
Antonio Saggio (1989–98), President from 1995 to 1998
Cornelis Paulus Briët (1989–98)
Koen Lenaerts (1989–2003)
Bo Vesterdorf (1989–2007), President from 1998 to 2007
Rafael García-Valdecasas y Fernández (1989–2007)
Andreas Kalogeropoulos (1992–98)
Christopher William Bellamy (1992–99)
André Potocki (1995–2001)
Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos (1995–2003)
Pernilla Lindh (1995–2006)
Virpi Tiili (1995–2009)
John D. Cooke (1996–2008)
Jörg Pirrung (1997–2007)
Paolo Mengozzi (1998–2006)
Arjen W.H. Meij (1998–2010)
Mihalis Vilaras (1998–2010)
Hubert Legal (2001–07)
Verica Trstenjak (2004–06) 
Daniel Šváby (2004–09)
Teodor Tchipev (2007–10)
Valeriu M. Ciucă (2007–10)
Presidents
José Luis Da Cruz Vilaça (1989–95)
Antonio Saggio (1995–98)
Bo Vesterdorf (1998–2007)
Registrar
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C — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court
General activity of the General Court
  1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2006–10)
New cases
  2.  Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
  3.  Type of action (2006–10)
  4.  Subject-matter of the action (2006–10)
Completed cases
  5.  Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
  6.  Subject-matter of the action (2010)
  7.  Subject-matter of the action (2006–10) (judgments and orders)
  8.  Bench hearing action (2006–10)
  9.  Duration of proceedings in months (2006–10) (judgments and orders)
Cases pending as at 31 December
  10.  Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
  11.  Subject-matter of the action (2006–10)
  12.  Bench hearing action (2006–10)
Miscellaneous
  13.  Proceedings for interim measures (2006–10)
  14.  Expedited procedures (2006–10)
  15.  Appeals against decisions of the General Court to the Court of Justice (1989–2010)
  16.    Distribution of appeals before the Court of Justice according to the nature of the pro-
ceedings (2006–10)
  17.  Results of appeals before the Court of Justice (2010) (judgments and orders)
  18.  Results of appeals before the Court of Justice (2006–10) (judgments and orders)
  19.  General trend (1989–2010) (new cases, completed cases, cases pending)Annual Report 2010  175
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1.    General activity of the General Court — New cases, 
completed cases, cases pending (2006–10) (1)
(1)  Unless otherwise indicated, this table and the following tables take account of special forms of procedure. 
  The following are considered to be ‘special forms of procedure’: application to set a judgment aside (Article 41 
of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court); third-party 
proceedings (Article 42 of the Statute of the Court of Justice;  Article 123 of the Rules of Procedure); revision of 
a judgment (Article 44 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 125 of the Rules of Procedure); interpretation 
of a judgment (Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 129 of the Rules of Procedure); taxation 
of costs (Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure); legal aid (Article 96 of the Rules of Procedure); and rectification 
of a judgment (Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure).
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
New cases 432 522 629 568 636
Completed cases 436 397 605 555 527
Cases pending 1 029 1 154 1 178 1 191 1 300
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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1 200
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2.  New cases — Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
250
200
150
100
50
0
 State aid
   Other direct 
actions
   Competition
   Appeals    Appeals concerning 
interim measures
 Staff cases
   Special forms 
of procedure
 Intellectual property
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State aid 28 37 56 46 42
Competition 81 62 71 42 79
Staff cases 1 2 2
Intellectual property 143 168 198 207 207
Other direct actions 135 197 178 158 207
Appeals 10 27 37 31 23
Appeals concerning interim measures 1
Special forms of procedure 34 29 87 84 77
Total 432 522 629 568 636Annual Report 2010  177
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3.  New cases — Type of action (2006–10)
Distribution in 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Actions for annulment 223 251 269 214 304
Actions for failure to act 4 12 9 7 7
Actions for damages 9 27 15 13 8
Arbitration clauses 8 6 12 12 9
Intellectual property 143 168 198 207 207
Staff cases 1 2 2
Appeals 10 27 37 31 23
Appeals concerning interim measures 1
Special forms of procedure 34 29 87 84 77
Total 432 522 629 568 636
Actions for annulment 
47.80%
Actions for failure to act
1.10%
Actions for damages
1.26%
Arbitration clauses 
1.42%
Intellectual property 
32.55%
Appeals 
3.62%
Appeals concerning 
interim measures 
0.16%
Special forms  
of procedure 
12.11%178  Annual Report 2010
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4.  New cases — Subject-matter of the action (2006–10) (1)
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the pe-
riod 2006–09 have been revised accordingly.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Access to documents 4 11 22 15 19
Accession of new States 1
Agriculture 26 46 14 19 24
Approximation of laws 1
Arbitration clause 8 6 12 12 9
Area of freedom, security and justice 3 3 2
Commercial policy 18 9 10 8 9
Common foreign and security policy 1
Company law 1 1
Competition 81 62 71 42 79
Consumer protection 2
Culture 1 1 1
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 2 5 1 5 4
Economic and monetary policy 2 4
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 16 17 6 6 24
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1
Energy 2
Environment 9 27 7 4 15
External action by the European Union 2 1 2 5 1
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own 
resources, combatting fraud) 1 1 1
Fisheries policy 5 23 1 19
Free movement of goods 1 1 1 1
Freedom of establishment 1
Freedom of movement for persons 4 4 1 1 1
Freedom to provide services 1 3 4 1
Intellectual and industrial property 145 168 198 207 207
Law governing the institutions 12 19 23 32 17
Public health 1 1 2 2 4
Public procurement 14 11 31 19 15
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH Regulation) 8
Research and technological development and space 4 6 3
Restrictive measures (external action) 5 12 7 7 21
Social policy 2 5 6 2 4
State aid 28 37 55 46 42
Taxation 1 2 1
Transport 1 4 1 1
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 386 464 502 452 533
Total CS Treaty 1
Total EA Treaty 1 1
Staff Regulations 11 29 39 32 25
Special forms of procedure 34 29 87 84 77
OVERALL TOTAL 432 522 629 568 636Annual Report 2010  179
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5.  Completed cases — Nature of proceedings (2006–10)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
250
200
150
100
50
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State aid 55 36 37 70 50
Competition 42 48 31 31 38
Staff cases 71 51 33 1
Intellectual property 90 128 171 168 180
Other direct actions 144 101 229 171 149
Appeals 7 21 31 37
Appeals concerning interim measures 1
Special forms of procedure 34 26 83 83 72
Total 436 397 605 555 527
 State aid
 Other direct actions
   Competition
   Appeals    Appeals concerning 
interim measures
 Staff cases
   Special forms 
of procedure
 Intellectual property180  Annual Report 2010
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6.    Completed cases — Subject-matter of the action (2010) (1)
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2006–09 have been revised accordingly.
Judgments Orders Total
Access to documents 14 7 21
Agriculture 9 7 16
Arbitration clause 10 2 12
Commercial policy 8 8
Company law 1 1
Competition 26 12 38
Consumer protection 2 2
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 1 3 4
Economic and monetary policy 2 2
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 1 1 2
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1
Energy 2 2
Environment 2 4 6
External action by the European Union 1 3 4
Freedom to provide services 2 2
Intellectual and industrial property 132 48 180
Law governing the institutions 9 17 26
Public health 2 2
Public procurement 10 6 16
Research and technological development and space 2 1 3
Restrictive measures (external action) 8 2 10
Social policy 1 5 6
State aid 28 22 50
Taxation 1 1
Transport 1 1 2
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 266 151 417
Staff Regulations 22 16 38
Special forms of procedure 72 72
OVERALL TOTAL 288 239 527Annual Report 2010  181
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7.    Completed cases — Subject-matter of the action (2006–10) (1)
(judgments and orders)
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2006–09 have been revised accordingly.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Access to documents 7 7 15 6 21
Accession of new States 1 1
Agriculture 27 13 48 46 16
Approximation of laws 1 1
Arbitration clause 5 10 9 10 12
Area of freedom, security and justice 2 1 3
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories 2
Commercial policy 13 4 12 6 8
Company law 1 1 1
Competition 42 38 31 31 38
Consumer protection 2
Culture 1 2
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 2 3 6 10 4
Economic and monetary policy 1 1 1 2
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 6 5 42 3 2
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1
Energy 2
Environment 11 10 17 9 6
External action by the European Union 5 4 2 4
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud) 4 2 2
Fisheries policy 24 4 4 17
Free movement of goods 2 3
Freedom of establishment 1
Freedom of movement for persons 4 4 2 1
Freedom to provide services 2 1 2 2
Industrial policy 1
Intellectual and industrial property 91 129 171 169 180
Law governing the institutions 8 10 22 20 26
Public health 3 2 1 1 2
Public procurement 4 7 26 12 16
Research and technological development and space 1 1 1 1 3
Restrictive measures (external action) 4 3 6 8 10
Social policy 5 4 2 6 6
State aid 54 36 37 70 50
Taxation 1 2 1
Transport 2 1 3 2
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 330 302 468 439 417
Total CS Treaty 1 10
Total EA Treaty 1 1
Staff Regulations 71 58 54 32 38
Special forms of procedure 34 26 83 83 72
OVERALL TOTAL 436 397 605 555 527182  Annual Report 2010
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8.  Completed cases — Bench hearing action (2006–10)
Distribution in 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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Grand Chamber 2 2 2 2
Appeal Chamber 3 4 7 16 10 26 20 11 31 22 15 37
President  
of the General Court 19 19 16 16 52 52 50 50 54 54
Chambers (5 judges) 22 33 55 44 8 52 15 2 17 27 2 29 8 8
Chambers (3 judges) 198 157 355 196 122 318 228 282 510 245 200 445 255 168 423
Single Judge 7 7 2 2 3 3
Total 227 209 436 247 150 397 259 346 605 292 263 555 288 239 527
Chambers (3 judges) 
80.27%
Appeal Chamber 
7.02%
President  
of the General Court 
10.25% Chambers (5 judges) 
1.52%
Grand Chamber 
0.38%
Single Judge 
0.57%Annual Report 2010  183
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9.    Completed cases — Duration of proceedings in months 
(2006–10) (1) (judgments and orders)
(1)  The calculation of the average duration of proceedings does not take account of: cases ruled upon by interlocu-
tory judgment; special forms of procedure; appeals concerning interim measures; cases referred by the Court of 
Justice following the amendment of the division of jurisdiction between it and the Court of First Instance (now 
the  General  Court);  cases  referred  by  the  Court  of  First  Instance  after  the  Civil  Service  Tribunal 
began operating.
  The duration of proceedings is expressed in months and tenths of months.
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0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State aid 29.0 32.4 48.1 50.3 32.4
Competition 41.1 42.6 40.2 46.2 45.7
Staff cases 24.8 32.7 38.6 52.8
Intellectual property 21.8 24.5 20.4 20.1 20.6
Other direct actions 24.2 21.5 20.6 23.9 23.7
Appeals 7.1 16.1 16.1 16.6
 State aid    Competition  Staff cases
 Other direct actions    Appeals  Intellectual property
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010184  Annual Report 2010
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10.    Cases pending as at 31 December — Nature of proceedings 
(2006–10)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State aid 165 166 185 161 153
Competition 182 196 236 247 288
Staff cases 82 33 2 1 1
Intellectual property 249 289 316 355 382
Other direct actions 326 422 371 358 416
Appeals 10 30 46 46 32
Special forms of procedure 15 18 22 23 28
Total 1 029 1 154 1 178 1 191 1 300
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 State aid
 Other direct actions
   Competition
   Appeals
 Staff cases
   Special forms of procedure
 Intellectual propertyAnnual Report 2010  185
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11.    Cases pending as at 31 December — Subject-matter of the 
action (2006–10) (1)
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the pe-
riod 2006–09 have been revised accordingly.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Access to documents 24 28 35 44 42
Agriculture 85 118 84 57 65
Approximation of laws 1 1
Arbitration clause 21 17 20 22 19
Area of freedom, security and justice 1 3 2 2
Commercial policy 28 33 31 33 34
Common foreign and security policy 1
Company law 1 1
Competition 172 196 236 247 288
Consumer protection 1 1 3 3 1
Culture 1 2 1
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 14 16 11 6 6
Economic and monetary policy 2 1 2
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 37 49 13 16 38
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1 1
Energy 2
Environment 23 40 30 25 34
External action by the European Union 6 3 3 8 5
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework,  
own resources, combatting fraud) 4 5 3 2 2
Fisheries policy 4 5 24 8 27
Free movement of goods 2 3 2
Freedom of movement for persons 3 3 2 2 3
Freedom to provide services 1 3 5 4
Industrial policy 1
Intellectual and industrial property 251 290 317 355 382
Law governing the institutions 19 28 29 41 32
Public health 3 2 3 4 6
Public procurement 25 29 34 41 40
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH Regulation) 8
Research and technological development and space 1 4 3 8 8
Restrictive measures (external action) 9 18 19 18 29
Social policy 5 6 10 6 4
State aid 165 166 184 160 152
Taxation 2
Transport 1 4 2 2 1
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 910 1 072 1 106 1 119 1 235
Total CS Treaty 10 1 1 1
Total EA Treaty 2 1 1 1
Staff Regulations 92 63 48 48 35
Special forms of procedure 15 18 22 23 28
OVERALL TOTAL 1 029 1 154 1 178 1 191 1 300186  Annual Report 2010
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12.   Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2006–10)
Distribution in 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Grand Chamber 2
Appeal Chamber 10 30 46 46 32
President of the General Court 1 3
Chambers (5 judges) 117 75 67 49 58
Chambers (3 judges) 825 971 975 1 019 1 132
Single Judge 2 2
Not assigned 72 78 90 75 75
Total 1 029 1 154 1 178 1 191 1 300
Chambers  
(3 judges) 
87.08%
Appeal Chamber 
2.46%
President of the 
General Court 
0.23%
Not assigned 
5.77%
Chambers (5 judges) 
4.46%Annual Report 2010  187
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13.  Miscellaneous — Proceedings for interim measures (2006–10)
Distribution in 2010
New 
applications 
for interim 
measures
Applications 
for interim 
measures 
brought to 
a conclusion
Outcome 
Dismissed Granted
Removal 
from the 
register/no 
need to 
adjudicate
Agriculture 3 4 1 2 1
Arbitration clause 1 2 2
Common foreign and security policy 1 1 1
Competition 8 4 3 1
Customs union and Common  
Customs Tariff 1 1
Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion 2 2 2
Environment 2 3 3
External action by the European Union 1 1 1
Law governing the institutions 8 8 6 2
Public procurement 3 5 5
Registration, evaluation,  
authorisation and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH Regulation) 1 1 1
Research and technological 
development and space 2 2 2
Staff Regulations 2 2 1 1
State aid 7 2 2
Total 41 38 30 3 5
 New    Brought to a conclusion
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14.  Miscellaneous — Expedited procedures (2006–10) (1) (2)
(1)  The General Court may decide pursuant to Article 76a of the Rules of Procedure to deal with a case before it 
under an expedited procedure. That provision has been applicable since 1 February 2001.
(2)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2006–09 have been revised accordingly.
(3)  The category ‘Not acted upon’ covers the following instances: withdrawal of the application for expedition, 
discontinuance of the action and cases in which the action is disposed of by way of order before the application 
for expedition has been ruled upon.
25
20
15
10
5
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
B
r
o
u
g
h
t
Outcome
B
r
o
u
g
h
t
Outcome
B
r
o
u
g
h
t
Outcome
B
r
o
u
g
h
t
Outcome
B
r
o
u
g
h
t
Outcome
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
R
e
f
u
s
e
d
N
o
t
 
a
c
t
e
d
 
u
p
o
n
 
(
3
)
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
R
e
f
u
s
e
d
N
o
t
 
a
c
t
e
d
 
u
p
o
n
 
(
3
)
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
R
e
f
u
s
e
d
N
o
t
 
a
c
t
e
d
 
u
p
o
n
 
(
3
)
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
R
e
f
u
s
e
d
N
o
t
 
a
c
t
e
d
 
u
p
o
n
 
(
3
)
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
R
e
f
u
s
e
d
N
o
t
 
a
c
t
e
d
 
u
p
o
n
 
(
3
)
Access to documents 1 1 2 2 4 4
Agriculture 3 1 3 1 1 2 3
Arbitration clause 1 1
Commercial policy 2 1 1 2 2
Competition 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 1 1
Environment 2 1 1 7 1 6 1 1
External action by the European Union 1 1
Financial provisions (budget, financial 
framework, own resources, combatting fraud) 2
Freedom to provide services 1 1
Law governing the institutions 1 1 1 1
Procedure 1 1
Public health 1 1
Public procurement 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 2 2
Restrictive measures (external action) 3 2 1 4 4 5 1 2 1 10 10
Staff Regulations 1 1
State aid 1 1 2 1 1 7 5
Total 10 4 6 2 17 4 13 0 15 6 7 2 22 3 18 2 24 0 22 0
 Brought     Granted  Refused  Not acted upon (3)
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15.    Miscellaneous — Appeals against decisions of the 
General Court to the Court of Justice (1989–2010)
(1)  Total number of decisions open to challenge — judgments, orders concerning interim measures or refusing leave to 
intervene, and all orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register or transferring 
a case — in respect of which the period for bringing an appeal expired or against which an appeal was brought.
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Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1)
Percentage of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
1989
1990 16 46 35%
1991 13 62 21%
1992 25 86 29%
1993 17 73 23%
1994 12 105 11%
1995 47 143 33%
1996 27 133 20%
1997 35 139 25%
1998 67 224 30%
1999 60 180 33%
2000 67 225 30%
2001 69 230 30%
2002 47 224 21%
2003 66 260 25%
2004 53 261 20%
2005 64 297 22%
2006 77 281 27%
2007 77 290 27%
2008 84 339 25%
2009 92 371 25%
2010 98 340 29%
   Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
   Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1)190  Annual Report 2010
General Court  Statistics
16.   Miscellaneous — Distribution of appeals before the Court of 
Justice according to the nature of the proceedings (2006–10)
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17.    Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the Court of Justice 
(2010) (judgments and orders)
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Agriculture 2 2
Commercial policy 1 1
Competition 8 3 11
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 2 2
Economic and monetary policy 1 1
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1
Environment and consumers 1 1
Fisheries policy 1 1
Free movement of goods 1 1
Freedom of movement for persons 1 1
Intellectual and industrial property 23 1 1 3 28
Law governing the institutions 20 2 1 23
Regional policy 2 2
Social policy 1 1
Staff Regulations 3 3
State aid 7 2 9
Total 74 6 4 4 88192  Annual Report 2010
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18.    Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the Court of Justice 
(2006–10) (judgments and orders)
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 Appeal dismissed
   Decision totally or partially 
set aside and referral back
   Decision totally or partially 
set aside and no referral back
   Removal from the register/
no need to adjudicate
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Appeal dismissed 51 72 51 84 74
Decision totally or partially set aside and no referral back 8 8 16 12 6
Decision totally or partially set aside and referral back 1 6 7 3 4
Removal from the register/no need to adjudicate 5 4 3 5 4
Total 65 90 77 104 88
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19.    Miscellaneous — General trend (1989–2010)
New cases, completed cases, cases pending
(1)  1989: the Court of Justice referred 153  cases to the newly created Court of First Instance (now the General Court). 
  1993: the Court of Justice referred 451 cases as a result of the first extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of First 
Instance.
  1994: the Court of Justice referred 14 cases as a result of the second extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of First 
Instance.
  2004–05: the Court of Justice referred 25 cases as a result of the third extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
First Instance.
(2)  2005–06: the Court of First Instance referred 118 cases to the newly created Civil Service Tribunal.
New cases (1) Completed cases (2) Cases pending on  
31 December
1989 169 1 168
1990 59 82 145
1991 95 67 173
1992 123 125 171
1993 596 106 661
1994 409 442 628
1995 253 265 616
1996 229 186 659
1997 644 186 1 117
1998 238 348 1 007
1999 384 659 732
2000 398 343 787
2001 345 340 792
2002 411 331 872
2003 466 339 999
2004 536 361 1 174
2005 469 610 1 033
2006 432 436 1 029
2007 522 397 1 154
2008 629 605 1 178
2009 568 555 1 191
2010 636 527 1 300
Total 8 611 7 311Chapter III
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A — Proceedings of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2010
By Mr Paul Mahoney, President of the Civil Service Tribunal
1. The judicial statistics of the Civil Service Tribunal reveal that the number of cases brought 
in  2010  (139)  is  significantly  higher  than  the  number  of  applications  lodged  in  2009  (113) 
and 2008 (111).
The number of cases brought to a close (129), on the other hand, is lower (1) than that for the previ-
ous year (155).
Thus, the number of pending cases (2) is slightly higher than the previous year (185 at 31 Decem-
ber 2010 compared with 175 at 31 December 2009). The average duration of proceedings is also 
increasing (18.1 months in 2010 compared with 15.1 months in 2009 (3)(4).
Appeals to the General Court of the European Union were brought against 24 decisions of the Civil 
Service Tribunal. Ten decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal were set aside or set aside in part by the 
General Court and six of those cases were referred back to the Civil Service Tribunal.
Twelve cases were brought to a close by amicable settlement, which is the highest figure since 
the creation of the Civil Service Tribunal (5). Thus, the statistics for 2010 seem to attest to a greater 
readiness to resolve conflicts in this way.
2. As regards procedural tools, it is of note that, in 2010, the Civil Service Tribunal made use for the 
first time of the option open to it under its Rules of Procedure (6) of sitting as a single Judge (7).
3. Finally, as 2010 was the fifth anniversary of the Civil Service Tribunal, a colloquium (8) was held to 
mark the occasion, bringing together judges, professors and lawyers specialising in the field of the 
(1)  The increase in 2010 in the percentage of cases brought to a close by judgment compared with those brought to a close by 
the less onerous procedure of an order has doubtless been a factor in the reduction in the number of cases brought to a close. 
In addition, account must be taken of the fact that the Civil Service Tribunal did not have its full complement of judges be-
cause of the continued unavailability of one of its seven judges.
(2)  The cases still pending include 15 brought by 327 officials and other staff, seeking the annulment of their salary adjustment 
slips for the period from July to December 2009 and the salary slips issued since 1 January 2010 in so far as those salary slips 
apply a salary increase based on a rate of 1.85% rather than the rate of 3.7% which would have been the result of the applica-
tion of Article 65 of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) and Annex XI thereto. 
Those cases are closely linked to Case C-40/10 Commission v Council (judgment of 24 November 2010), by which the Court 
annulled Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1296/2009 of 23 December 2009 adjusting with effect from 1 July 2009 the 
remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied 
thereto.
(3)  Not including the duration of any stay of proceedings.
(4)  That increase in the duration of proceedings must doubtless be seen as a parallel development to the increase in the percent-
age of cases brought to a close by judgment compared with those brought to a close by order.
(5)  Interestingly, for the first time, an amicable settlement was reached between parties in an application for interim measures, 
regarding  the  question  of  the  implementation  of  the  interim  measures  applied  for  (Case  F-50/10  R  De Roos-Le Large 
v Commission).
(6)  Article 14 of the Rules of Procedure.
(7)  That option was used in Case F-1/10 Marcuccio v Commission (judgment of 14 December 2010).
(8)  The proceedings of the colloquium will be published in 2011 in the Revue universelle des droits de l’homme (RUDH), Éditions 
N. P. Engel. The speeches given on the day are already available on the Curia website.198  Annual Report 2010
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European and international civil service, officials of the European institutions and representatives 
of professional and trade union organisations. The views aired at that colloquium will certainly 
serve as a source of inspiration for the discussion within the Civil Service Tribunal, and in particular 
for its planned discussion with regard to the revision of its Rules of Procedure in the light of the ex-
perience it has gained since its creation. The events to mark the fifth anniversary of the Civil Service 
Tribunal included an ‘open day’ reserved for the staff of the institution.
4. The account given below will describe the most significant decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal 
as regards procedure and merits. As there are no significant new developments as regards pro-
ceedings for interim relief (9), costs and legal aid, the sections usually devoted to those questions 
will not appear in the 2010 report.
I.  Procedural aspects
Conditions for admissibility
1.  Pre-contentious procedure: rule of concordance between complaint and action
In its judgment of 1 July 2010 in Case F-45/07* (10) Mandt v Parliament, the Civil Service Tribunal 
relaxed the rule of concordance between the pre-contentious complaint and the application, hold-
ing that the concordance rule is infringed only where the judicial action alters the relief sought in 
the complaint or its cause of action, and that the concept of ‘cause of action’ must be given a broad 
interpretation. As regards claims for annulment, the ‘cause of action of the dispute’ must be under-
stood as the applicant’s challenge to the substantive legality of the contested decision or, in the 
alternative, the challenge to its procedural legality. Consequently, and subject to pleas alleging 
illegality (which are intrinsically legal in nature and not easy for non-lawyers to understand), and 
to grounds raising a public-policy issue, the cause of action of the dispute will normally be altered, 
and the action therefore inadmissible on the ground that it fails to observe the concordance rule, 
only where the applicant, who criticises in his complaint solely the formal validity of the act ad-
versely affecting him, raises substantive pleas in the application, or conversely where the applicant, 
having disputed in the complaint only the substantive legality of the act adversely affecting him, 
submits an application containing pleas relating to the formal validity of that act.
It must be observed that, in its judgment of 23 November 2010 in Case F-50/08* Bartha v Commis-
sion, the Civil Service Tribunal, for the first time, held a plea admissible in the light of the judgment 
in Mandt v Parliament.
2.  Definition of act adversely affecting an official
In its judgment of 13 January 2010 in Joined Cases F-124/05 and F-96/06* A and G v Commission, 
the Civil Service Tribunal, following the judgment of the Court of First Instance (now the General 
Court) of 15 October 2008 in Case T-345/05 Mote v Parliament, which concerned the waiver of the 
(9)  Four orders for interim measures were made in 2010 by the President of the Civil Service Tribunal (order of 23 February 2010 in 
Case F-99/09 R Papathanasiou v OHIM; order of 14 July 2010 in Case F-41/10 R Bermejo Garde v EESC; order of 10 Septem-
ber 2010 in Case F-62/10 R Esders v Commission, and order of 15 December 2010 in Joined Cases F-95/10 R and F-105/10 R Böm-
cke v EIB). In those four cases, the applications for interim measures were dismissed.
(10)  The judgments marked with an asterisk have been translated into all the official languages of the European Union except 
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immunity from legal proceedings of a Member of the European Parliament, held that the waiver 
of the immunity from legal proceedings of an official was an act adversely affecting that official. In 
the case in question, however, the applicant’s reliance, in the action for damages he brought, on 
the illegality of the decision waiving his immunity was no longer admissible as he had not con-
tested that decision within the time-limits laid down by Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations.
By a judgment of 23 November 2010 in Case F-8/10* Gheysens v Council, the Civil Service Tribunal 
held that a decision not to renew a fixed-term contract was an act adversely affecting a person 
for which reasons had to be stated in accordance with Article 25 of the Staff Regulations, where it 
is distinct from the contract in question, which will be the case, in particular if it is based on new 
factors or if it constitutes an expression of the position of the administration adopted following 
a request from the member of staff concerned and dealing with the possibility, provided for in the 
contract, of renewing that contract.
3.  Interest in bringing proceedings
In its judgment of 5 May 2010 in Case F-53/08* Bouillez and Others v Council, the Civil Service Tri-
bunal held that officials eligible for promotion to a particular grade have, in principle, a personal 
interest in challenging not only the decision not to promote them but also the decisions promot-
ing other officials to that grade.
4.  Time-limits
In its judgment of 30 September 2010 in Case F-29/09* Lebedef and Jones v Commission (in a dis-
pute concerning the legality of the provision in the first subparagraph of Article 3(5) of Annex XI 
to the Staff Regulations, according to which no correction coefficient is to be applicable not only 
in Belgium (the country of reference for the determination of the cost of living) but also in Lux-
embourg), the Civil Service Tribunal first recalled the case-law according to which an official who 
fails to contest, within the time-limits for lodging a complaint and bringing an action, the salary 
slip documenting, for the first time, the implementation of a measure of general application es-
tablishing financial entitlements, may not, once those time-limits have passed, contest the salary 
slips for subsequent months, relying on the illegality allegedly vitiating the first salary slip. How-
ever, in this case, the Civil Service Tribunal found that the applicants were essentially criticising 
the Commission for continuing to apply the first subparagraph of Article 3(5) of Annex XI to the 
Staff Regulations without having undertaken a study into the possible difference in purchasing 
power between Brussels and Luxembourg, whereas they claim that new economic circumstances 
have arisen which they allege no longer justify the application of that provision, in the light, inter 
alia, of the principle of equal treatment. Moreover, the Civil Service Tribunal pointed to the dif-
ficulties of a procedural nature which an individual would encounter in bringing an action under 
Article 265 TFEU against an institution for failure to act in order to have a rule adopted by the Un-
ion legislature repealed. Against that background, the Civil Service Tribunal held that to exclude, 
in accordance with the case-law set out above, the possibility open to an official of contesting his 
salary slip on the ground of a change in circumstances, such as a change in economic conditions, 
and raising in that connection a plea of illegality against a provision of the Staff Regulations which, 
while it appeared valid at the time it was adopted, has, according to the official concerned, become 
illegal because of that change of circumstances would render it impossible in practice to bring an 
action to ensure respect for the principle of equal treatment recognised by European Union law 
and would thus have a disproportionate effect on the right to effective judicial protection.
In its order of 16 December 2010 in Case F-25/10 AG v Parliament, the Civil Service Tribunal held, 
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letter who is not at home when the postman calls does not take any action whatsoever or does not 
collect the letter within the period for which the postal services usually retain letters, it must be 
found that the addressee was duly notified of the decision at issue on the date that period ends. 
If such conduct on the part of the addressee were allowed to prevent the proper notification of 
a decision by registered letter, the guarantees offered by this method of notification would be 
considerably weakened, whereas it is a particularly safe and objective method of notification of 
administrative measures. Moreover, the addressee would thereby be allowed a certain amount of 
latitude in the establishment of the starting point for the time-limit for bringing an action, whilst 
that time-limit may not be at the discretion of the parties and must meet the requirements of 
legal certainty and the sound administration of justice. Nonetheless, the presumption that the ad-
dressee has been notified of the decision on expiry of the usual period for retention of a registered 
letter by the postal services is not absolute in nature. Application of that presumption is subject 
to proof, by the administration, of proper notification by registered letter, in particular by the fact 
that a delivery advice note was left at the last address given by the addressee. Furthermore, that 
presumption is not irrebuttable. The addressee may, for example, seek to establish that he was 
prevented, inter alia, by illness or an act of force majeure outside his control, from taking proper 
cognisance of the delivery advice note.
Confidential documents
In Case F-2/07 Matos Martins v Commission (judgment of 15 April 2010), the Civil Service Tribunal 
found that certain documents, whose production it had requested by way of measure of organisa-
tion of the procedure, were confidential vis-à-vis the applicant, limited access to those documents 
to the lawyer of the person concerned, excluding the applicant himself, and ordered that they 
be consulted at the premises of the Registry without giving authorisation for any copies of those 
documents to be made.
By two orders of 17 March 2010 and 20 May 2010 given in Case F-50/09 Missir Mamachi di Lusig-
nano v Commission (11), the Civil Service Tribunal ordered the defendant to produce certain docu-
ments classified as ‘restricted EU’, specifying the security measures to which access to those doc-
uments would be subject, and pointing out inter alia that neither the applicant nor his lawyer 
would be authorised to consult those documents. It made clear, in particular, that, although it 
planned to base its decision on the dispute on the documents in question, it was appropriate 
to discuss the rules for applying in this case the principle that both parties should be heard in 
the proceedings and the provisions of Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure, as that principle 
and those provisions could imply that the applicant should have at least partial access to those 
documents (12).
Raising a plea of the Tribunal’s own motion
By 11 judgments of 29 June 2010 (13), the Civil Service Tribunal recalled that respect for the rights of 
the defence is an essential procedural requirement breach of which may be raised of the Tribunal’s 
own motion, and in this case annulled decisions of the European Police Office (Europol) refusing to 
grant contracts of indefinite duration to the applicants for breach of that principle.
(11)  The decision closing the proceedings in this case has not yet been delivered.
(12)  Order of 17 March 2010.
(13)  Judgments in Cases F-27/09, F-28/09, F-34/09, F-35/09, F-36/09, F-37/09, F-38/09, F-39/09, F-41/09, F-42/09 and F-44/09.Annual Report 2010  201
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II.  Merits
General principles
1.  Non-contractual liability of the institutions
In its judgment of 11 May 2010 in Case F-30/08* Nanopoulos v Commission (under appeal to the 
General Court), the Civil Service Tribunal recalled that where it is put in issue under the provisions 
of Article 236 EC (now, after amendment by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 270 TFEU), the non-con-
tractual liability of the institutions may be incurred on the ground solely of the illegality of an act 
adversely affecting an official (or of non-decision-making conduct), without there being any need 
to consider whether it is a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on 
individuals. The Civil Service Tribunal stressed that that case-law does not preclude the Tribunal 
from determining the extent of the administration’s discretion in the field concerned; on the con-
trary, that criterion is an essential parameter in the examination of the legality of the decision or 
conduct at issue, since the judicial review carried out and its intensity depend on the degree of 
latitude available to the administration on the basis of the relevant law and of the requirements of 
proper functioning to which that administration is subject.
In its judgment of 9 March 2010 in Case F-26/09 N v Parliament, the Civil Service Tribunal, having 
recalled that annulment of a measure contested by an official will in itself constitute appropriate 
and, generally, sufficient reparation for any non-material harm suffered by the applicant, specified 
the situations in which the Courts of the European Union had allowed certain exceptions to that 
rule. For instance, it pointed out that the annulment of an unlawful act of the administration can-
not constitute full reparation for the non-material harm suffered, first, if that act entails an explicitly 
negative appraisal of the abilities of the applicant such as to injure him, second where the unlawful 
act committed is particularly serious and, third, where annulment of an act has no useful effect.
2.  Fundamental rights and general principles of civil service law
(a)  Fundamental right to the inviolability of the home
In its judgment of 9 June 2010 in Case F-56/09 Marcuccio v Commission, the Civil Service Tribunal 
recalled that the fundamental right to the inviolability of the home must be recognised in the 
Community legal order as a general principle common to the laws of the Member States in regard 
to the private dwellings of natural persons, and that, in addition, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), to which Article 6(2) of the EU 
Treaty refers, provides in Article 8(1) that ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence’. In this case it was held that, by entering the serv-
ice accommodation of the applicant without observing any formalities, the administration had 
breached the right of the person concerned to respect for his property, his home and his private 
life, and that wrongful maladministration of that sort is such as to give rise to the liability of the 
defendant.
(b)  Presumption of innocence
In Case F-75/09 Wenig v Commission (judgment of 23 November 2010), the Civil Service Tribunal 
had to consider a plea by which the applicant argued that, by refusing to grant his requests for as-
sistance, the Commission had breached the principle of the presumption of innocence, since that 
refusal implied that, in the eyes of the Commission, he had actually committed certain acts which 
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the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6(2) of the ECHR is not limited to a procedural 
guarantee in criminal matters, but that its scope is wider and requires that no representative of the 
State declare that a person is guilty of an offence before his guilt has been established by a court. It 
went on to hold, in this case, that, as the Commission had made no statement which implied that, 
in its view, the applicant had committed or could have committed an offence, the applicant was 
not justified in claiming that the Commission had breached the principle of the presumption of 
innocence merely by refusing to give him assistance.
(c)  Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials
In its judgment of 28 October 2010 in Case F-92/09* U v Parliament, the Civil Service Tribunal made 
the point that the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials requires the administration, where 
there is doubt as to the medical origin of the difficulties encountered by an official in performing 
the tasks falling to him or her, to take all necessary steps to dispel that doubt before a decision 
dismissing that official is adopted. Moreover, the obligations imposed on the administration by 
the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials are substantially reinforced when what is at issue 
is the particular situation of an official in respect of whom there are doubts regarding his or her 
mental health, and, consequently, regarding his or her capacity to defend his or her own interests 
adequately.
3.  Application of private international law by an institution of the European Union
In its judgment in Mandt v Parliament, the Civil Service Tribunal made clear, as regards the applica-
tion by an institution of a provision concerning the marital status of individuals, that the adminis-
tration was not obliged to determine the applicable law and/or the relevant legal order by means 
of reasoning based purely on private international law but was entitled simply to select as a con-
necting factor the existence of ‘very close’ links with the dispute.
In this case, two people claimed a survivor’s pension under Article 79 of the Staff Regulations as 
the surviving spouse of the same official. Faced with that situation the Parliament had decided to 
apportion the pension between the two claimants. Having dismissed an action brought by one of 
those two claimants as inadmissible (order of 23 May 2008 in Case F-79/07 Braun-Neumann v Par-
liament) the Civil Service Tribunal dismissed the action brought by the other claimant on its merits, 
rejecting both the plea in law seeking to deny the first claimant the status of surviving spouse 
(the Civil Service Tribunal having found in that connection that that person was considered to be 
the surviving spouse by the law and the legal order of a country with very close links both with 
that person and with the dispute as a whole) and the plea that, where there were two surviving 
spouses, each of them was entitled to a full survivor’s pension. Thus, the Civil Service Tribunal held 
that the Parliament, faced with a legislative lacuna, did not err in law by adopting the solution 
described.
Rights and obligations of officials
1.  Obligation to provide assistance
In its judgment in Wenig v Commission, the Tribunal held that the administration could not be 
obliged to provide assistance, in the context of criminal proceedings, to an official suspected, in 
the light of clear and relevant evidence, of having seriously breached his professional obligations 
and subject, on that ground, to disciplinary proceedings, despite the fact that that breach is al-
leged to have arisen as a result of the unlawful conduct of third parties.Annual Report 2010  203
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2.  Access for an official to documents concerning him
In its judgment in A and G v Commission, the Civil Service Tribunal clarified the relationship be-
tween the provisions of Article 26 of the Staff Regulations regarding the right of access of an official 
to his personal file, the provisions concerning access to documents of a medical nature relating to 
him such as those provided for by the common rules on the insurance of officials of the European 
Communities against the risk of accident and of occupational disease, and the provisions of Regu-
lation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).
Careers of officials
1.  Competitions
In its judgment of 15 June 2010 in Case F-35/08* Pachtitis v Commission (under appeal to the Gen-
eral Court), the Civil Service Tribunal annulled the decision of the European Personnel Selection 
Office (EPSO) excluding the applicant from the list of the candidates who had obtained the best 
marks in the admission tests for an open competition, on the ground that EPSO did not have the 
authority to make such a decision. It held that without an amendment to the Staff Regulations 
expressly conferring on EPSO the tasks previously assigned to the selection board, EPSO does not 
have the authority to carry out such tasks, and in particular tasks which, in the case of recruitment 
of officials, affect the determination of the content of the tests and their correction, including tests 
comprising multiple-choice questions to assess verbal and numerical reasoning ability and/or gen-
eral knowledge and knowledge of the European Union, even if those tests are presented as tests 
for ‘admission’ of candidates to the competition’s written and oral tests.
In its judgment in Bartha v Commission, the Civil Service Tribunal clarified certain points relating to 
the provision in the fifth paragraph of Article 3 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, according to 
which if a selection board consists of more than four members, it is to comprise at least two mem-
bers of each gender. It specified inter alia that compliance with that rule had to be verified at the 
time of the constitution of the selection board as recorded in the list published by the institution 
or institutions organising the competition, and that only the full members of the selection board 
should be taken into account.
2.  Promotion procedures
In Bouillez and Others v Council, it was held that it follows from Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations 
that the level of responsibilities exercised by the officials eligible for promotion is one of the three 
relevant elements that the administration must take into account in the analysis of the compara-
tive merits of those officials. The expression ‘where appropriate’ in the fourth subparagraph of Arti-
cle 45(1) of the Staff Regulations simply means that while, in principle, servants in the same grade 
are supposed to hold posts involving equivalent responsibilities, where that is not in fact the case 
that circumstance must be taken into consideration in the promotion procedure.
The Civil Service Tribunal, having held that the plea alleging breach of Article 45(1) of the Staff 
Regulations was well founded, first recalled that the Courts of the European Union have acknowl-
edged that where the act that should be annulled benefits a third party, which is the case of an en-
try on a reserve list, a promotion decision or a decision making an appointment to a vacant post, it 
must first determine whether annulment would constitute an excessive penalty for the irregularity 
committed. The Civil Service Tribunal went on to observe that, where promotion is concerned, the 
Courts of the European Union undertake a case-by-case examination. In the first place, they take 204  Annual Report 2010
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into consideration the nature of the irregularity. In the second place, they balance the interests 
involved. When balancing the interests, they take into consideration, first of all, the interest which 
the officials concerned have in being reinstated in law and in full in their rights, second, the inter-
ests of the illegally promoted officials and, finally, the interests of the service.
In its judgment of 15 December 2010 in Case F-14/09 Almeida Campos and Others v Council, the 
Civil Service Tribunal held that the appointing authority could not lawfully examine the merits 
of officials in the same grade separately according to whether they belonged, under the old Staff 
Regulations, to category A or to the language grades LA, given that the legislature had decided 
that, under the new Staff Regulations, both groups would belong to the single function group of 
administrators.
Working conditions of officials
In the judgment of 30 November 2010 in Case F-97/09 Taillard v Parliament, it was held that, given 
that diseases may evolve, it cannot be maintained that the results of an arbitration which found 
that an official was fit for work remain valid when that official produces a new medical certificate. 
As regards the risk of circumvention of the procedure for medical checks by the production of suc-
cessive medical certificates relating to the same disease, the Civil Service Tribunal held that, where 
it proves necessary, in particular where there is evidence of abuse by the applicant, the institution 
concerned can have recourse to the relevant disciplinary procedures.
Emoluments and social security benefits of officials
1.  Pay
In its judgment of 14 October 2010 in Case F-86/09* W v Commission, the Civil Service Tribunal 
was called upon to rule on a claim for annulment of a Commission decision refusing to pay the 
household allowance to a member of staff on the ground that the couple formed by that member 
of staff and his non-marital same-sex partner did not fulfil the condition laid down by Article 1(2)
(c)(iv) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, since he had access to legal marriage in Belgium. The 
applicant, who has dual Belgian and Moroccan nationality, put the argument to the administration 
that, given his Moroccan nationality, such a marriage was impossible, since, in entering into a mar-
riage with a person of the same sex, he ran the risk of a criminal prosecution in Morocco under 
Article 489 of the Moroccan penal code, which outlaws homosexuality. The Civil Service Tribunal 
held, on the basis of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, that the rules of the 
Staff Regulations extending the right to the household allowance to officials registered as stable 
non-marital partners should be interpreted in such a way as to ensure that that right is not merely 
theoretical but is real and effective. In this case, the Civil Service Tribunal held that a national law 
such as Article 489 of the Moroccan penal code, which criminalises homosexual acts regardless of 
the place where such acts are committed, is likely to make access to marriage and thus to the right 
to a household allowance theoretical. It therefore annulled the decision of the defendant refusing 
to pay the applicant that allowance.
2.  Social security
In its judgment of 1 July 2010 in Case F-97/08 Füller-Tomlinson v Parliament (under appeal to the 
General Court), the Civil Service Tribunal rejected a plea raised by the applicant of the illegality of 
the European physical and mental disability rating scale which is an integral part of the common 
rules on the insurance of officials of the European Communities against the risk of accident and of 
occupational disease, which entered into force on 1 January 2006.Annual Report 2010  205
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In its judgment of 14 September 2010 in Case F-79/09 AE v Commission, the Civil Service Tribunal, 
ruling in an action to establish liability pleading the unreasonable duration of the procedure for 
the recognition of an occupational disease, observed that it is the responsibility of the Commission 
as an institution to remind the members of the medical committees of their duty to act with due 
diligence.
In its judgment of 23 November 2010 in Case F-65/09 Marcuccio v Commission, the Civil Service 
Tribunal rejected a plea of illegality directed against the criteria for the definition of a serious ill-
ness within the meaning of Article 72 of the Staff Regulations, namely, a poor prognosis, chronic 
progression, the need for extreme diagnostic or therapeutic measures and the presence or the risk 
of serious handicap. By that judgment, it was also made clear that the term ‘mental illness’ within 
the meaning of Article 72 of the Staff Regulations can only refer to an illness objectively presenting 
a degree of seriousness and not to any psychological and psychiatric problem whatever its degree 
of seriousness.
In the judgment of 1 December 2010 in Case F-89/09 Gagalis v Council, it was made clear that both 
Article 73(3) of the Staff Regulations and the third subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the common 
rules on the risk of accident must be interpreted as meaning that they only provide for a sup-
plementary reimbursement of the costs of benefits covered by Article 72 of the Staff Regulations 
after reimbursement of the part of the cost falling on the sickness insurance scheme. The accident 
insurance scheme is a supplementary scheme and thus does not provide for any reimbursement 
of the costs of benefits, apart from those provided for by Article 9(2), which are not covered by the 
sickness insurance scheme and which were thus not defrayed by the sickness insurance scheme.
Disciplinary rules
In the judgment in A and G v Commission, the point was made that the fact that the disciplinary 
proceedings have been terminated without a disciplinary measure being taken against the official 
in question cannot prevent the Courts of the European Union from carrying out a review of the 
legality of the decision to bring disciplinary proceedings against the person concerned. In order to 
protect the rights of the official concerned, the appointing authority must be considered to have 
exercised its powers unlawfully not only if a misuse of powers is proven but also in the absence 
of sufficiently precise and relevant evidence suggesting that the person concerned has commit-
ted a disciplinary offence. Moreover, in that judgment, the principle that disciplinary proceedings 
must be held within a reasonable time was upheld. The duty to act with due diligence falling on 
the disciplinary authority concerns both the opening of the disciplinary procedure and its conduct.
Conditions of employment of other servants
1.  Dismissal of a member of staff under a contract of indefinite duration
In its judgments of 9 December 2010 in Case F-87/08 Schuerings v ETF and Case F-88/08 Vandeuren 
v ETF, the Civil Service Tribunal, after pointing out that to allow an employer to end an employ-
ment relationship of indefinite duration without a valid reason would be contrary to the principle 
of stable employment which characterises contracts of indefinite duration and would run counter 
to the very nature of this type of contract, held that the reduction of the scale of the activities of an 
agency may be considered liable to constitute a valid reason for dismissal, provided, however, that 
that agency has no post available to which the member of staff concerned could be transferred. 
When it considers whether a member of staff can be transferred to another post, whether already 
in existence or to be created, the administration must weigh the interest of the service, which de-
mands the recruitment of the most suitable person for the post, against the interest of the member 206  Annual Report 2010
Civil Service Tribunal  Proceedings
of staff whose dismissal is proposed. In doing so, it must take account, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, various criteria, which include the requirements of the post in terms of the qualifications and 
potential of the member of staff, whether or not the employment contract of the member of staff 
concerned specifies that he is engaged to occupy a particular post, his appraisals and his age, his 
seniority and the number of years of pensionable service remaining before he can claim his retire-
ment pension.
2.  Dismissal of a member of staff at the end of his probation period
In its judgment of 24 February 2010 in Case F-2/09 Menghi v ENISA, the Civil Service Tribunal clari-
fied several points regarding dismissals in connection with the dismissal of a member of the tem-
porary staff at the end of his probation period. It stated, first, that the fact it has been established 
that a member of staff has suffered psychological harassment does not make every decision ad-
versely affecting that member of staff arising in the context of that harassment illegal. There still 
has to be a link between the harassment at issue and the grounds of the contested decision. It 
stated, second, that breach of the provisions of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations concerning the 
obligation to provide assistance cannot be relied on against a decision to dismiss. Only adminis-
trative decisions connected with the duty to provide assistance, that is to say, decisions rejecting 
a request for assistance or, in certain exceptional circumstances, failure to provide assistance spon-
taneously to a member of staff, are liable to breach that obligation. The subject of a decision to dis-
miss does not fall within the scope of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations and is, consequently, not 
connected with the obligation to provide assistance laid down by that article. Finally, it held that 
the provisions laid down in Article 22a(3) of the Staff Regulations, according to which an official 
who has provided information concerning facts which give rise to a presumption of the existence 
of possible illegal activity or conduct which may constitute a serious failure to comply with the 
obligations of officials of the Union ‘shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institu-
tion … provided that he acted reasonably and honestly’, do not offer an official who, under Arti-
cle 222a(1) of the Staff Regulations has provided information concerning facts which give rise to 
a presumption of the existence of possible illegal activity protection against any decision liable to 
affect him adversely but only against decisions adopted because of that provision of information.Annual Report 2010  207
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B — Composition of the Civil Service Tribunal
(order of precedence as at 7 October 2009)
From left to right:
S. Van Raepenbusch, Judge; H. Kreppel, Judge; H. Tagaras, President of Chamber; P. Mahoney, Presi-
dent of the Tribunal; S. Gervasoni, President of Chamber; I. Boruta, Judge; M. I. Rofes i Pujol, Judge; 
W. Hakenberg, Registrar.Annual Report 2010  209
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Paul J. Mahoney
Born in 1946; law studies (Master of Arts, Oxford University, 1967; Mas-
ter of Laws, University College London, 1969); Lecturer, University Col-
lege London (1967–73); Barrister (London, 1972–74); Administrator/
Principal Administrator, European Court of Human Rights (1974–90); 
Visiting Professor at the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Can-
ada (1988); Head of Personnel, Council of Europe (1990–93); Head of 
Division (1993–95), Deputy Registrar (1995–2001), Registrar of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (2001 to September 2005); President of 
the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2005.
Horstpeter Kreppel
Born in 1945; university studies in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt-am-Main 
(1966–72);  first  State  examination  in  law  (1972);  court  trainee  in 
Frankfurt-am-Main (1972–73 and 1974–75); College of Europe, Bruges 
(1973–74); second State examination in law (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1976); 
specialist adviser in the Federal Labour Office and lawyer (1976); pre-
siding Judge at the Labour Court (Land Hesse, 1977–93); Lecturer at 
the Technical College for Social Work, Frankfurt-am-Main, and at the 
Technical College for Administration, Wiesbaden (1979–90); national 
expert to the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Com-
munities (1993–96 and 2001–05); Social Affairs Attaché at the Embassy 
of the Federal Republic of Germany in Madrid (1996–2001); presiding 
Judge at the Labour Court of Frankfurt-am-Main (February to Septem-
ber 2005); Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2005.
Irena Boruta
Born in 1950; law graduate of the University of Wrocław (1972), Doc-
torate in Law (Łodz, 1982); lawyer at the Bar of the Republic of Poland 
(since 1977); Visiting Researcher (University of Paris X, 1987–88; Uni-
versity of Nantes, 1993–94); expert of Solidarność (1995–2000); Profes-
sor of Labour Law and European Social Law at the University of Łodz 
(1997–98 and 2001–05), Associate Professor at Warsaw School of Eco-
nomics (2002), Professor of Labour Law and Social Security Law at Car-
dinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw (2000–05); Deputy Minister 
for Labour and Social Affairs (1998–2001); member of the negotiation 
team for the accession of the Republic of Poland to the European Un-
ion (1998–2001); representative of the Polish Government to the In-
ternational Labour Organisation (1998–2001); author of a number of 
works on labour law and European social law; Judge at the Civil Service 
Tribunal since 6 October 2005.
1.  Members of the Civil Service Tribunal
(in order of their entry into office)210  Annual Report 2010
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Haris Tagaras
Born in 1955; law graduate (University of Thessaloniki, 1977); Special 
Diploma in European Law (Institute for European Studies, Free Uni-
versity of Brussels, 1980); Doctorate in Law (University of Thessalo-
niki, 1984); Lawyer-linguist at the Council of the European Communi-
ties (1980–82); Researcher at the Thessaloniki Centre for International 
and European Economic Law (1982–84); Administrator at the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities and at the Commission of 
the European Communities (1986–90); Professor of Community Law, 
International Private Law and Human Rights at Athens Panteion Uni-
versity (since 1990); external consultant for European matters at the 
Ministry of Justice and member of the Permanent Committee of the 
Lugano Convention (1991–2004); member of the national Postal and 
Telecommunications  Commission  (2000–02);  member  of  the Thes-
saloniki Bar, lawyer to the Court of Cassation; founder member of the 
Union of European Lawyers (UAE); associate member of the Interna-
tional Academy of Comparative Law; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal 
since 6 October 2005.
Sean Van Raepenbusch
Born in 1956; law graduate (Free University of Brussels, 1979); Special 
Diploma in International Law (Brussels, 1980); Doctor of Laws (1989); 
Head of the Legal Service of the Société anonyme du canal et des in-
stallations  maritimes  (Canals  and  Maritime  Installations  Company), 
Brussels (1979–84); official of the Commission of the European Com-
munities  (Directorate-General  for  Social  Affairs,  1984–88);  member 
of the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties (1988–94); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Communities (1994–2005); Lecturer at the University of Charleroi 
(international and European social law, 1989–91), at the University of 
Mons Hainault (European law, 1991–97), at the University of Liège (Eu-
ropean civil service law, 1989–91; institutional law of the European Un-
ion, 1995–2005; European social law, 2004–05); numerous publications 
on the subject of European social law and constitutional law of the Eu-
ropean Union; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2005.Annual Report 2010  211
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Stéphane Gervasoni
Born in 1967; graduate of the Institute for Political Studies of Greno-
ble (1988) and the École nationale d’administration (1993); member 
of the Conseil d’État (Rapporteur in the Contentious Proceedings Divi-
sion, 1993–97, and in the Social Affairs Division, 1996–97); Maître des 
requêtes, 1996–98); Councillor of State (since 2008); Maître de con-
férences at the Institut d’études politiques, Paris (1993–95); Commis-
saire du gouvernement attached to the Special Pensions Appeal Com-
mission (1994–96); Legal Adviser to the Ministry of the Civil Service 
and to the City of Paris (1995–97); Secretary-General of the Prefecture 
of the Département of the Yonne, Sub-Prefect of the district of Aux-
erre (1997–99); General Secretary to the Prefecture of the Départe-
ment of Savoie, Sub-Prefect of the district of Chambéry (1999–2001); 
Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(September 2001 to September 2005); titular member of the NATO 
Appeals Commission (2001–05); Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal 
since 6 October 2005.
Maria Isabel Rofes i Pujol
Born in 1956; study of law (law degree, University of Barcelona, 1981); 
specialisation in international trade (Mexico, 1983); study of European 
integration  (Barcelona  Chamber  of  Commerce,  1985)  and  of  Com-
munity law (School of Public Administration, Catalonia, 1986); official 
of the Government of Catalonia (member of the Legal Service of the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy, April 1984 to August 1986); member 
of the Barcelona Bar (1985–87); Administrator, then Principal Admin-
istrator, in the Research and Documentation Division of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (1986–94); Legal Secretary at the 
Court of Justice (Chamber of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 
January 1995 to April 2004; Chamber of Judge Lõhmus, May 2004 to 
August 2009); Lecturer on Community Cases, Faculty of Law, Autono-
mous University of Barcelona (1993–2000); numerous publications and 
courses on European social law; member of the Board of Appeal of the 
Community Plant Variety Office (2006–09); Judge at the Civil Service 
Tribunal since 7 October 2009.
Waltraud Hakenberg
Born in 1955; studied law in Regensburg and Geneva (1974–79); first 
State examination (1979); postgraduate studies in Community law at 
the College of Europe, Bruges (1979–80); trainee lawyer in Regens-
burg  (1980–83);  Doctor  of  Laws  (1982);  second  State  examination 
(1983); lawyer in Munich and Paris (1983–89); official at the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (1990–2005); Legal Secretary at 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (in the Chambers 
of Judge Jann, 1995–2005); teaching for a number of universities in 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Russia; Honorary Professor at Saar-
land  University  (since  1999);  member  of  various  legal  committees, 
associations and boards; numerous publications on Community law 
and Community procedural law; Registrar of the Civil Service Tribunal 
since 30 November 2005.Annual Report 2010  213
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2.  Changes in the composition of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2010
There was no change in the composition of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2010.Annual Report 2010  215
Order of precedence  Civil Service Tribunal
from 1 January to 31 December 2010
P. MAHONEY, President of the Tribunal
H. TAGARAS, President of Chamber
S. GERVASONI, President of Chamber
H. KREPPEL, Judge
I. BORUTA, Judge
S. VAN RAEPENBUSCH, Judge
M. I. ROFES i PUJOL, Judge
W. HAKENBERG, Registrar
3.  Order of precedenceAnnual Report 2010  217
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4.  Former Member of the Civil Service Tribunal
Kanninen Heikki (2005–09)Annual Report 2010  219
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C —   Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Civil Service 
Tribunal
General activity of the Civil Service Tribunal
1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2006–10)
New cases
2.  Percentage of the number of cases per principal defendant institution (2006–10)
3.  Language of the case (2006–10)
Completed cases
4.  Judgments and orders — Bench hearing action (2010)
5.  Outcome (2010)
6.  Applications for interim measures (2006–10)
7.  Duration of proceedings in months (2010)
Cases pending as at 31 December
8.  Bench hearing action (2006–10)
9.  Number of applicants (2010)
Miscellaneous
10.  Appeals against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal to the General Court (2006–10)
11.  Results of appeals before the General Court (2006–10)Annual Report 2010  221
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1.    General activity of the Civil Service Tribunal —
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2006–10)
(1)  Including 14 cases in which proceedings were stayed.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
New cases 148 157 111 113 139
Completed cases 50 150 129 155 129
Cases pending 228 235 217 175 185 (¹)
250
200
150
100
50
0
 New cases    Completed cases   Cases pending
The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken 
of the joinder of cases on the grounds of similarity (one case number = one case).
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010222  Annual Report 2010
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2.    New cases — Percentage of the number of cases per principal 
defendant institution (2006–10)
Percentage of number of new cases  (2010)
European Parliament 
9.35%
Bodies, offices and 
agencies of the  
European Union  
17.27%
European  
Central Bank 
2.88%
Council  
6.47%
European Commission 
58.99%
Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
5.04%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
European Parliament 7.48% 15.29% 14.41% 8.85% 9.35%
Council  5.44% 4.46% 4.50% 11.50% 6.47%
European Commission 72.79% 63.69% 54.95% 47.79% 58.99%
Court of Justice of the European Union 4.08% 3.82% 2.65% 5.04%
European Central Bank 1.27% 2.70% 4.42% 2.88%
Court of Auditors  2.72% 2.55% 5.41% 0.88%
Bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union  7.48% 8.92% 18.02% 23.89% 17.27%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Annual Report 2010  223
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3.  New cases — Language of the case (2006–10)
French  
75.54%
English
6.47%
Italian 
9.35%
Dutch 
1.44%
Spanish 
1.44%
German 
4.32%
Greek 
1.44%
Language of the case 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bulgarian 2
Spanish 1 2 1 1 2
Czech 1
German 2 17 10 9 6
Greek 3 2 3 3 2
English 8 8 5 8 9
French 113 101 73 63 105
Italian 10 17 6 13 13
Lithuanian 2 2
Hungarian 2 1 1
Dutch 7 4 8 15 2
Polish 1
Portuguese 1
Romanian 1
Slovene 1
Finnish 1
Total 148 157 111 113 139
The language of the case corresponds to the language in which the proceedings were brought and 
not to the applicant’s mother tongue or nationality.
Distribution in 2010224  Annual Report 2010
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4.    Completed cases — Judgments and orders — Bench hearing 
action (2010)
Judgments
Orders for removal 
from the register, 
following amicable 
settlement (1)
Other orders 
terminating 
proceedings
Total
Full court 4 1 5
President 3 3
Chambers sitting with three Judges 84 11 25 120
Single Judge 1 1
Total 89 12 28 129
Chambers sitting 
with three Judges 
93.02%
Single Judge
0.78%
President 
2.33%
Full court
3.88%
(1)  In the course of 2010, there were also 12 unsuccessful attempts to bring cases to a close by amicable settlement 
on the initiative of the Civil Service Tribunal.Annual Report 2010  225
Statistics  Civil Service Tribunal
5.  Completed cases — Outcome (2010)
Judgments Orders
Total
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Assignment/Reassignment  1 1 1 3
Competitions 3 2 6 11
Working conditions/Leave 1 1 1 1 4
Appraisal/Promotion 1 3 5 3 8 20
Pensions and invalidity allowances 3 1 4
Disciplinary proceedings 2 2
Recruitment/Appointment/ 
Classification in grade 2 1 16 1 2 5 27
Remuneration and allowances 2 3 2 7
Termination of an agent’s contract 11 4 7 2 1 25
Social security/Occupational  
disease/Accidents 2 4 1 1 1 9
Other  5 2 5 1 2 2 17
Total 20 21 48 10 12 16 2 129226  Annual Report 2010
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6.  Applications for interim measures (2006–10)
Applications for interim 
measures brought  
to a conclusion
Outcome
Granted in full  
or in part Dismissal Removal from  
the register
2006 2 2
2007 4 4
2008 4 4
2009 1 1
2010 6 4 2
Total 17 1 14 2
7.  Completed cases — Duration of proceedings in months (2010)
Duration of full 
procedure
Duration of 
procedure, not 
including duration 
of any stay of 
proceedings
Judgments Average duration Average duration
New cases before the Civil Service Tribunal 81 21.4 19.7
Cases initially brought before the General 
Court (1) 8 62.4 34.9
Total 89 25.1 21
Duration of full 
procedure
Duration of 
procedure, not 
including duration 
of any stay of 
proceedings
Orders Average duration Average duration
New cases before the Civil Service Tribunal 37 17.1 10.1
Cases initially brought before the General 
Court (1) 3 66.5 28.9
Total 40 20.8 11.5
OVERALL TOTAL 129 23.8 18.1
(1)  When the Civil Service Tribunal commenced work, the Court of First Instance (now the General Court) transferred 
118 cases to it.
The durations are expressed in months and tenths of months.Annual Report 2010  227
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8.    Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2006–10)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Full court 2 3 5 6 1
President 4 3 2 1 1
Chambers sitting with three Judges 212 206 199 160 179
Single Judge
Cases not yet assigned 10 23 11 8 4
Total 228 235 217 175 185
Chambers sitting  
with three Judges
96.76%
Cases not yet  
assigned 
2.16%
President 
0.54%
Full court 
0.54%
Distribution in 2010228  Annual Report 2010
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9.    Cases pending as at 31 December — Number of applicants (2010)
The pending cases with the greatest number of applicants 
Number of applicants Fields
327 (15 cases)
Staff  Regulations  —  Remuneration  —  Annual  adjustment  of  the 
remuneration and pensions of officials and other servants — Article 65 of 
and Annex XI to the Staff Regulations — Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 
No 1296/2009 of 23 December 2009 Staff Regulations — Promotion — 
Promotion year 2005 — Additional grades provided for by the new Staff 
Regulations 
169 Staff Regulations — ECB staff — Reform of the pension scheme
35 Staff Regulations — EIB — Pensions — Reform of 2008
26 (3 cases)
Staff Regulations — Reclassification — Candidates placed on the reserve list 
in an internal competition before the new Staff Regulations — Classification 
in grade under less favourable provisions — Transitional provisions in Annex 
XIII to the Staff Regulations — Loss of promotion points
18
Staff Regulations — Remuneration — Member of the contract staff employed 
either  in  a  safety  and  security  department  or  in  emergency  and  crisis 
coordination  —  Allowance  for  workers  regularly  required  to  remain  on 
standby duty — Article 56b of the Staff Regulations
16 (2 cases)
Staff Regulations — Members of the contract staff — Clause terminating 
a contract where the member of staff is not included on a reserve list of 
a competition — Termination of the contract of a member of staff
14 Staff Regulations — Appointment — Security firm employees — Claim for 
recognition as a member of staff
13 Staff Regulations – Member of the auxiliary staff – Member of the temporary 
staff  – Conditions of engagement – Duration of contract
The term ‘Staff Regulations’ means the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the 
Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union.
Total number of applicants for all pending cases 
Total applicants Total pending cases
2006 1 652 228
2007 1 267 235
2008 1 161 217
2009 461 175
2010 812 185Annual Report 2010  229
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10.    Miscellaneous — Appeals against decisions of the Civil Service 
Tribunal to the General Court (2006–10)
Appeals (1) Decisions subject  
to appeal (2)
Percentage  
of appeals (3)
Percentage of appeals 
including amicable 
settlements (4)
2006 10 39 25.64% 22.22%
2007 25 107 23.36% 21.93%
2008 37 99 37.37% 34.91%
2009 30 95 31.58% 30.93%
2010 24 99 24.24% 21.62%
(1)  Decisions appealed against by several parties are taken into account only once. In 2007, two decisions were 
each the subject of two appeals.
(2)  Judgments, orders — declaring the action inadmissible, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, or-
ders for interim measures, orders that there is no need to adjudicate and orders refusing leave to intervene — 
made or adopted during the reference year.
(3)  For a given year this percentage may not correspond to the decisions subject to appeal given in the reference 
year, since the period allowed for appeal may span two years.
(4)  The Civil Service Tribunal endeavours to answer the legislature’s appeal for the facilitation of the amicable set-
tlement of disputes. A certain number of cases are closed in this way each year. Those cases do not give rise to 
‘decisions subject to appeal’ on the basis of which the ‘percentage of appeals’ is traditionally calculated in the 
Annual Report, including for the Court of Justice and the General Court. In so far as the ‘percentage of appeals’ 
may be considered to represent the ‘rate of challenge’ of the decisions of a court, that percentage would reflect 
the position better if it were calculated so as to take account not only of decisions subject to appeal but also 
those which are not precisely because they have brought the dispute to a close by amicable settlement. The re-
sult of that calculation appears in this column.
   Appeals (1)  Decisions subject to appeal (2)
120
100
80
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11.    Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the General Court 
(2006–10)
   Appeal 
dismissed
   Decision totally or partially 
set aside and no referral back
   Decision totally or partially
set aside and referral back
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Appeal dismissed 6 14 21 27
Decision totally or partially set aside  
and no referral back 1 4 9 4
Decision totally or partially set aside  
and referral back 3 1 6
Total 7 21 31 37
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Chapter IV
Meetings and visitsAnnual Report 2010  233
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A —   Official visits and events at the Court of Justice, the General 
Court and the Civil Service Tribunal
Court of Justice
25 and 26 January  Delegation from the judiciary of England and Wales, Scotland and North-
ern Ireland
29 January  Delegation from the Spanish Presidency of the ‘Court of Justice’ Group of 
the Council
7 to 9 February  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the United States of America and 
professors of the SMU Dedman School of Law
23 February  Delegation  from  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  of  the  European 
Parliament
2 March  Mr M. Šefčovič, Vice-President of the European Commission
9 March  Ms A. Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
22 and 23 March  Seminar for judges of the Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Cyprus,  Ireland,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom)
19 April  Mr C. Kart, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg
19 to 21 April  Delegation from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia
26 April  Meeting of Agents of the Member States and the institutions of the Eu-
ropean Union
26 to 28 April  Delegations from the Court of Justice of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), from the Court of Justice of the Central Afri-
can Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) and from the Court 
of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)
4 May  Delegation from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Af-
fairs of the European Parliament
17 and 18 May  Delegation from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey
31 May  Mr P. Étienne, Permanent Representative of the French Republic to the 
European Union
3 June  Mr J.-M. Bockel, Secretary of State for Justice of the French Republic
7 and 8 June  Colloquium and General Assembly of the Association of the Councils of 
State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union
9 June  Ms H. Trüpel, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgets of the European 
Parliament
14 June  Mr A. Ronchi, Minister for European Affairs of the Italian Republic
20 to 22 June  Delegation from the Hoge Raad of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
28 and 29 June  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
1 and 2 July  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia
6 and 7 September  ‘4. Luxemburger Expertenforum zur Entwicklung des Unionsrechts’, with 
the participation of Ms Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Minister 
for Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany234  Annual Report 2010
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20 to 22 September  Delegation from the Superior Council of the Magistracy and the National 
Institute for Magistrates of Romania
7 October  Mr T. de Maizière, Minister for the Interior of the Federal Republic of 
Germany
7 October  Mr L. Barfoed, Minister for Justice of the Kingdom of Denmark
7 October  Mr K. Jäger, Ambassador of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the King-
dom of Belgium and to the European Union
12 October  Permanent Delegation of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Eu-
rope (CCBE)
25 October  Mr M. Radović, Minister for Justice of Montenegro, and Mr A. A. Pejović, 
Ambassador of Montenegro to the European Union
8 November  Mr L. Mosar, President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg, and members of the Legal Committee of the Chamber 
of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
8 and 9 November  Delegation from the EU Select Committee of the House of Lords
10 November  Ms A. Pipan, Ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to the Kingdom of 
Belgium and to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
15 November  Seminar for judges of the Member States (Czech Republic, Spain, France, 
Italy, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and 
Sweden)
18 November  Delegation of judges of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by Prince 
Dr Bandar bin Salman bin Mohammed Al Saud, Councillor to the King, 
President of the Saudi Arbitration Team
23 November  Mr M. Manevski, Minister for Justice of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and HE Ambassador Nikola Poposki, Head of Mission of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union
24 and 25 November  Ms K. Prost, Ombudsperson of the 1267 Committee of the United Na-
tions Security Council
2 December  Mr J.-U. Hahn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Justice, Integration 
and European Affairs of Hesse (Germany)
General Court
29 January  Delegation from the Spanish Presidency of the ‘Court of Justice’ Group of 
the Council
7 to 9 February  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the United States of America and 
of university professors
23 February  Delegation  from  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  of  the  European 
Parliament
16 March  Delegation from the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (Spain)
26 April  Meeting of Agents of the Member States and the institutions of the Eu-
ropean Union
12 October  Delegation from the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)
27 October  Mr N. Diamandouros, European Ombudsman
28 October  Visit of members of the three Courts to the Villa VaubanAnnual Report 2010  235
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8 November  President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg and members of the Legal Committee of the Chamber of Depu-
ties of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
8 to 9 November  Delegation from the EU Select Committee of the House of Lords
24 and 25 November  Ms K. Prost, Ombudsperson of the 1267 Committee of the United Na-
tions Security Council
2 December  Mr J.-U. Hahn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Justice, Integration 
and European Affairs of Hesse (Germany)
Civil Service Tribunal
25 March  Ms M. de Sola Domingo, Mediator of the European Commission
20 April  Mr A. Schneebalg, lawyer and mediator
30 September  Mr A. Zack, President of the Administrative Tribunal of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank
1 October  Colloquium on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Civil Service 
Tribunal
26 October  Mr N. Diamandouros, European OmbudsmanAnnual Report 2010  237
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B — Study visits (2010)
1.  Distribution by type of group
Number of groups
National civil servants 
8.44%
Others 
10.76%
Law lecturers, 
teachers   
4.14%
National judiciary 
20.86%
Lawyers/ 
Legal advisers 
12.75%
Diplomats/ 
Parliamentarians 
2.32%
Students/
Trainees 
40.73%
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3.  Study visits — National judiciary (2010)
4.  Trend in number and type of visitors (2007–10)
2007 2008 2009 2010
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2007 1 719 2 025 157 213 7 178 1 111 1 206 13 609
2008  2 463 1 219 156 262 7 053 1 016 1 854 14 023
2009 2 037 1 586 84 193 6 867 870 2 078 13 715
2010 2 087 1 288 47 146 6 607 830 1 507 12 512
 National judiciary
 Diplomats/Parliamentarians
 Others
 Lawyers/Legal advisers
 Students/Trainees
 Law lecturers, teachers
 National civil servants
BE 8
BG 3
CZ 8
DK 4
DE 17
EE 2
IE 4
EL 7
ES 12
FR 16
IT 19
CY 2
LV 2
LT 4
LU 2
HU 8
MT 1
NL 7
AT 6
PL 16
PT 8
RO 8
SI 2
SK 4
FI 4
SE 5
UK 11
Total 190
SeminarAnnual Report 2010  241
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C — Formal sittings
1 February  Formal  sitting  in  remembrance  of  Advocate  General  D.  Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer
8 March  Formal  sitting  in  remembrance  of  Lord  Slynn  of  Hadley,  of 
Mr K. Bahlmann and of Mr M. Diez de Velasco, former members of the 
Court of Justice
15 March  Formal sitting in remembrance of Mr H. Jung, former Registrar of the 
Court of First Instance
3 May  Formal sitting for the giving of solemn undertakings by the President 
and the Members of the European Commission, in the presence of HRH 
the Grand Duke, HRH the Grand Duchess and Mr J. Buzek, President of 
the European Parliament
10 June  Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Judge 
C. W. A. Timmermans and the entry into office of Ms S. Prechal as a Judge 
at the Court of Justice
28 June  Formal sitting for the giving of solemn undertakings by the new mem-
bers of the European Court of Auditors
13 September  Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Judge 
A. W. H. Meij and the entry into office of Mr M. van der Woude as a Judge 
at the General Court
6 October  Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Judge 
P. Kūris and the entry into office of Mr E. Jarašiūnas as a Judge at the 
Court of Justice, and of the departure from office of Mr R. Grass, Registrar 
of the Court of Justice, and the entry into office of Mr A. Calot Escobar as 
Registrar of the Court of Justice
25 October  Formal  sitting  for  the  giving  of  solemn  undertakings  by  Baroness 
Ashton,  Vice-President  of  the  European  Commission,  High  Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and by 
Mr N. Diamandouros, European Ombudsman, and on the occasion of 
the departure from office of Judge M. Vilaras and the entry into office of 
Mr D. Gratsias as a Judge at the General Court
26 November  Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Judge 
V.M. Ciucă and the entry into office of Mr A. Popescu as a Judge at the 
General CourtAnnual Report 2010  243
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D — Visits and participation in official functions
Court of Justice
4 January  Representation of the Court at the New Year reception organised by the 
Court of Cassation, in Brussels
11 January  Representation of the Court at the New Year reception organised by the 
Council of State, in Brussels
14 January  Representation  of  the  Court  at  the  ceremonies  organised  to  mark 
the 90th anniversary of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia, in 
Tartu
18 January  Representation of the Court at the formal sitting for the start of the legal 
term of the Court of Appeal of Paris
29 January  Participation of a delegation from the Court at the seminar entitled ‘The 
Convention is yours’ and at the formal sitting of the European Court of 
Human Rights, in Strasbourg
29 January  Representation of the Court at the ceremony inaugurating the judicial 
year of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione, in Rome
4 to 6 February  Delegation from the Court to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, 
in Lausanne
8 February  Representation of the Court at the official celebration organised to mark 
the 15th anniversary of the accession of the Republic of Finland to the 
European Union, at the invitation of Mr Eikka Kosonen, Head of the Eu-
ropean Commission Representation in Finland, in Helsinki
9 February  Representation  of  the  Court  at  the ‘Rechtspolitischer  Neujahrsemp-
fang 2010’, at the invitation of Ms Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, 
Minister for Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin
12 February  Reception at the Grand Ducal Court of a delegation from the Court of 
Justice on the occasion of the New Year
7 to 11 March  Representation of the Court at the 10th Congress of the International 
Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions, in Sydney
15 March  Participation of the President of the Court at the hearing of Mr Jean-Paul 
Costa, President of the European Court of Human Rights, organised by 
the European Committee of Social Rights, in Strasbourg
18 March  Representation of the Court at a hearing organised by the Committee 
on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament on ‘Institutional 
aspects of accession by the European Union to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, in 
Brussels
19 March  Participation of the President of the Court at the colloquium of the Net-
work of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European 
Union on the topic ‘Practical aspects of the independence of justice’, in 
Dublin
14 April  Representation of the Court at the General Assembly of the Constitu-
tional Court, in Warsaw
17 and 18 April  Representation of the Court at the ceremonies organised on the occa-
sion of the funeral of Lech Kaczyński, President of the Republic of Po-
land, in Warsaw244  Annual Report 2010
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23 April  Representation of the Court at the Annual Conference of the European 
Employment Lawyers Association (EELA), in Luxembourg
8 to 10 May  Participation of the President of the Court, and representation of the 
Court, in the visit made at the invitation of Ms Iva Brožová, President of 
the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, in Prague and Brno
9 May  Representation of the Court at the celebration of the 60th anniversary 
of the Declaration of Robert Schuman at the seat of the European Parlia-
ment, in Strasbourg
19 to 22 May  Representation of the Court at the international conference on the topic 
‘Global environmental governance’, organised by the International Court 
of the Environmental Foundation (ICEF), in Rome
3 and 4 June  Representation of the Court at the meeting of the General Assembly 
of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary on the topic ‘To-
wards a European judicial culture’, in London
6 to 8 June  Representation of the Court at the colloquium on the topic ‘Preventing 
backlog in administrative justice’ and at the Board Meeting and General 
Assembly of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Ad-
ministrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, in Luxembourg
10 June  Representation  of  the  Court  at  the  ceremonies  organised  to  mark 
the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Poland, in Warsaw
23 June  Luxembourg National Day, celebration of the solemn Te Deum followed 
by a reception at the Grand Ducal Court
1 July  Representation of the Court at the funeral of A. Brazauskas, former Presi-
dent of the Republic of Lithuania, in Vilnius
24 July  Reception of the President of the Hellenic Republic organised to mark 
the 36th anniversary of the restoration of the Republic, in Athens
16 August  Representation of the Court at the funeral of G. de Marco, former Presi-
dent of the Republic of Malta, in Valletta
17 September  Representation of the Court at the Regleg conference (‘Access of regions 
with legislative powers to the European Court of Justice’), in Zaragoza
26 and 27 September  Official visit of a delegation from the Court to the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, in Karlsruhe
1 October  Representation of the Court at the Opening of the Legal Year, at the invi-
tation of the Lord Chancellor, in London
1 October  Representation of the Court at the ‘Jubiläum — 90-jähriges Bestehen der 
Bundesverfassung Österreichs’, in Vienna
3 October  Representation of the Court at the ceremonies organised for the ‘Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit’, in Bremen
21 to 23 October  Official visit to the higher courts of Slovakia at the invitation of Mr Štefan 
Harabin, President of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, and 
meeting with representatives of the Parliament and the Government, in 
Bratislava
22 and 23 October  Representation of the Court at the conference ‘Criminal justice in Europe: 
Challenges, principles and perspectives’, organised by the Institut uni-
versitaire international Luxembourg, in Luxembourg
3 to 6 November  Participation at the 24th FIDE Congress, in MadridAnnual Report 2010  245
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18 November  Representation of the Court at the formal sitting organised to mark 
the 130th anniversary of the Supreme Court of Cassation of the Republic 
of Bulgaria, in Sofia
18 November  Representation of the Court at the ‘Conference for the 25th anniversary 
of the EIA directive’, organised by the European Commission (Environ-
ment DG), in Leuven
18 November  Representation of the Court at the formal sitting for the installation of 
Mr Robert Biever as Procureur général d’État (Principal State Counsel) at 
the High Court of Justice of Luxembourg
22 November  Representation of the Court at the Board Meeting of the Association of 
the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union, in Brussels
25 November  Representation of the Court at the special academic session to mark 
the 40th anniversary of the creation of the Fondation du Mérite Eu-
ropéen, in Luxembourg
General Court
1 January  Representation of the Court at the reception of the President of the Re-
public of Malta, on the occasion of the traditional ceremony for the ex-
change of New Year greetings, in Valletta
14 January  Representation of the Court on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Estonia, in Tartu
9 February  Representation of the Court at the reception ‘Rechtspolitischer Neu-
jahrsempfang 2010’ organised by the Minister for Justice of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in Berlin
12 February  Representation of the Court at the reception at the Grand Ducal Court of 
a delegation from the Court of Justice on the occasion of the New Year
9 April  Representation of the Court at the formal Judges’ Congress, organised 
by the President of the Council of Judges of the Republic of Lithuania, 
to mark the 20th anniversary of the restoration of the Lithuanian State 
and the 15th anniversary of the restoration of the Court of Appeal of the 
Republic of Lithuania and the regional courts, in Vilnius
16 to 18 April  Representation of the Court at the national ceremony in remembrance 
of Lech Kaczyński, President of the Republic of Poland, and of his wife
12 May  Participation in the ‘Día Europeo de la Competencia’ organised by the 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, in Madrid
1 June  Representation of the Court at the reception of the President of the Ital-
ian Republic, on the occasion of the National Day, in Rome
23 June  Representation of the Court at the Luxembourg National Day events, 
celebration of the solemn Te Deum followed by a reception at the Grand 
Ducal Court
24 July  Representation of the Court at the reception of the President of the Hel-
lenic Republic to mark the 36th anniversary of the restoration of the Re-
public, in Athens
16 to 19 September  Participation in the ‘Seminar for the EU and US judiciary’ under the pa-
tronage of Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United 246  Annual Report 2010
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States of America and of Judge A. Borg Barthet, organised by the Bos-
ton-based research institute ‘Mentor Group’, in Berlin
1 October  Representation of the Court at the formal celebration of the 90th anni-
versary of the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Austria
1 October  Representation of the Court at the Opening of the Legal Year, at West-
minster Abbey, in London
3 October  Representation of the Court at the reception of the President of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, on the occasion of the National Day
22 and 23 October  Representation of the Court at the conference ‘Criminal justice in Europe: 
Challenges, principles and perspectives’, organised by the Institut uni-
versitaire international Luxembourg, in Luxembourg
28 to 29 October  Representation of the Court at the formal sitting for the installation of 
Mr R. Grass as a judge at the Court of Cassation in the presence of the 
First President of the Court of Cassation, in Paris
3 to 6 November  Representation of the Court at the 24th FIDE Congress, in Madrid
25 November  Representation of the Court at the special academic session to mark 
the 40th anniversary of the creation of the Fondation du Mérite Eu-
ropéen, in Luxembourg
6 December  Representation of the Court at the official reception of the President of 
the Republic of Finland and of her husband on the occasion of the Inde-
pendence Day of the Republic of Finland
Civil Service Tribunal
23 March  Participation of Registrar W. Hakenberg in the symposium organised to 
mark the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the World Bank Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, in Washington
15 December  Meeting of Judges H. Tagaras and H. Kreppel with the judges of the Unit-
ed Nations Dispute Tribunal, in Geneva
16 December  Visit of Judge H. Kreppel to the Administrative Tribunal of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, in GenevaAbridged organisational 
chart248  Annual Report 2010
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